Wars do not begin suddenly. There are gradual preludes to escalation: the massing of forces, the raising of combat readiness, and the widening of limited operations until the decisive moment arrives and a wider confrontation begins. Military movements and limited operations should not be read separately, but as parts of a cumulative military process that is ultimately hard to contain.
This is what the region is witnessing today. Escalating attacks on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz coincide with continuing American military reinforcements, while mediation tries to prevent the confrontation from moving into a new phase.
Since the start of the American-Israeli military operations against Iran on February 28, known as Operation Epic Fury, the Strait of Hormuz has become a principal arena of confrontation and attrition. Although American operations succeeded in restoring part of the traffic, securing the southern channel, and announcing the clearance of naval mines from the strait, continued attacks reveal Iran's capacity to threaten ships and raise the cost of protecting them. According to reports, at least 25 ships came under attack over the past month, and the United States has announced that it secured the passage of more than 3,000 ships over six months at high operational cost.
In this context, five main indicators of escalation in the region stand out.
The first is the American naval buildup, with the aircraft carriers George H.W. Bush and George Washington in the Arabian Sea and the announced dispatch of a third. The naval force deployed in US Central Command's area of responsibility includes destroyers, amphibious ships, air and missile defense capabilities, and cruise missile launch capabilities. The possible deployment of additional naval assets would give Washington greater capacity to distribute defensive and offensive missions.
The second is air reinforcement. A number of American fighter squadrons, flying F-16s, F-15s, F-35s, and A-10s, are present in the region, along with support and early-warning aircraft, in addition to air and missile defense systems, the latest being the transfer of a set of such systems from the central United States to bases in the region. It should also be noted that the strategic bombers left RAF Fairford in Britain for the US after the discovery of a sabotage cell seeking to target the bombers' positions.
The third is personnel and amphibious reinforcement. Reports speak of between 9,000 and 10,000 additional personnel being sent, including sailors and Marines within the carrier groups and the amphibious ships of the Marine expeditionary units. These forces provide additional flexibility.
The fourth indicator of escalation is the changing nature of the Iranian maritime threat. The dangers are not confined to drones and missiles; they include naval mines, small boats, and varied methods of attack. That means raising the military capabilities for protecting ships transiting the strait: reconnaissance and surveillance systems, early-warning systems, air defense, and naval protection.
The fifth is operational readiness. More telling than the number of forces is that the arrival of reinforcements coincides with an increase in aerial refueling and military transport sorties, the movement of additional offensive capabilities, and raised levels of readiness. These indicators should be read together, because they may reflect the scale of preparation for widening operations, though they do not prove that a decision to use them has been taken.
When these indicators are linked to developments on the ground, four military scenarios for the coming phase emerge.
The first scenario is continued slow escalation, through intermittent attacks, further American reinforcements, and a continued naval blockade, while channels of negotiation are kept open. This scenario is an extension of the present state of "no war, no peace," but it carries the risk that incidents and losses accumulate until the status quo becomes costlier and more draining than changing it.
The second scenario is limited American military operations against Iranian capabilities linked to the threat to navigation, similar to last July's operations, aimed at reducing attacks and restoring deterrence. This option may become a priority in American calculations if a ship or naval vessel suffers heavy losses, or if there are signs that the means of protection are no longer adequate.
The third scenario is the most dangerous in its consequences. The confrontation could move to simultaneous horizontal and vertical escalation, with the geographic scope of operations widening in parallel with an increase in strikes and in the quality of targets, especially if sensitive sites in Iran are targeted, such as Pickaxe Mountain or energy infrastructure. The targets might then extend to economic facilities and vital infrastructure, with possible spillover into other regional arenas.
Reaching this dangerous level does not require a prior decision for all-out war. It could begin with a limited strike followed by a larger-than-expected response, and then a chain of exchanged operations that is hard to stop without bearing a high political and military cost.
The fourth scenario is the success of Qatari mediation in achieving an interim calm, allowing measures to ease economic pressure and restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, which could reduce the likelihood of a military clash. That would not mean the end of the dispute between the two sides, but it would help manage the crisis rather than let it widen.
These four scenarios cannot be treated as separate tracks. Slow escalation could continue alongside negotiations; a limited strike could return the two sides to the negotiating table; or stalled negotiations and failed mediation could lead to sudden escalation and a widening of military operations. Judging the direction of the crisis therefore requires close monitoring of actual military conduct, not just political statements.
The indicators of escalation and the military movements point toward one of the scenarios of limited or comprehensive escalation. In my estimation, however, the American buildup provides broad military options but is not enough on its own to conclude that an order for a new strike has been issued.
The decisive signal will be the convergence of three indicators: a qualitative escalation in Iranian attacks, a strengthening of offensive capabilities, and a stalling of the diplomatic track. Wars do not begin when one party decides to fight them, but when everyone loses the ability to stop the escalation.
