China is pursuing parallel diplomatic efforts to prevent the Middle East from sliding into another confrontation, one whose repercussions could extend from the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. For Beijing, containing tensions is no longer a matter removed from its immediate interests. The oil that fuels its industries, the ships that carry its goods and the investments it has built up over the years all become vulnerable whenever war escalates and fighting threatens vital shipping routes.
Against this backdrop, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, in Beijing. The meeting conveyed a clear message: continued fighting offers no way out, and the solution lies in dialogue and negotiations. For his part, the Iranian official reaffirmed his country's commitment to protecting its sovereignty, security and territorial integrity while keeping the door open to negotiations. This leaves room for diplomacy, although it does not yet indicate agreement on the terms of a settlement.
The meeting coincided with an announcement that China would dispatch three envoys to Iran, Oman and Saudi Arabia, followed by Egypt, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This diplomatic itinerary reveals how Beijing views the region's crises as interconnected. Escalation involving Iran affects Gulf security, Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia threaten stability and maritime navigation, and disruptions in the Red Sea have repercussions for the Suez Canal and ports in the Horn of Africa. Calming one flashpoint while leaving the others unresolved would not provide sufficient protection for trade and energy supplies.
The same reasoning was evident during Chinese President Xi Jinping's meeting with Oman's Sultan Haitham bin Tarik in Beijing. Xi's warning against turning the Middle East into an arena for competition among major powers reflects a desire to prevent regional conflict from escalating into a broader confrontation. Oman's relationships and diplomatic channels give it an opportunity to convey messages and explore possible settlements. Closer Chinese-Omani cooperation could combine Beijing's economic weight with Muscat's experience in quiet diplomacy.
China has a diplomatic track record on which to build. In March 2023, it hosted the Saudi-Iranian agreement to restore diplomatic relations, following earlier rounds of talks in Iraq and Oman. That achievement demonstrated Beijing's ability to provide political backing for an agreement when both parties possess the will to reach one. Restoring relations between two countries, however, is easier than containing a confrontation involving the United States, Iran, the Houthis and the security of maritime routes. Yesterday's success gives China an opportunity, but it does not guarantee a similar outcome today.
China's relations with Iran rest on economic and political interests that allow Beijing to engage the Iranian leadership as a partner. It can explain to Tehran the costs of escalation and emphasize the opportunities for cooperation and trade that stability would bring. Yet its ability to influence decisions is not the same as its ability to dictate them. If Iran's leadership believes that backing down would threaten its survival or weaken its deterrence, it may place its security calculations above the advice of its Chinese partner, however important that partnership may be.
At the same time, China maintains extensive energy, trade and investment partnerships with Gulf countries. It therefore cannot pursue a successful diplomatic initiative while overlooking Saudi Arabia's security or downplaying the seriousness of attacks on its cities and facilities. Any initiative must directly address Gulf concerns, foremost among them missiles, drones and maritime security. The more Beijing can do to help stop the attacks, the greater the confidence in its role. General appeals for restraint alone would leave the most pressing questions without convincing answers.
Djibouti illustrates why China's diplomatic efforts extend beyond the Gulf. Its presence there encompasses commercial interests, infrastructure and maritime facilities, alongside a military base opened in 2017 near the Doraleh Multipurpose Port. It is important to distinguish Chinese investment in ports from sovereignty over them. The ports remain on Djiboutian territory. This presence gives Beijing a strategically important position near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, supporting its naval operations and helping protect its interests and supply routes.
Disruptions to this passage could force China to bear higher shipping and insurance costs, while its goods could face delays or be diverted along longer routes. Its regional investments and its partners' ability to trade would also suffer, particularly in Ethiopia, which depends on access through Djibouti. China's diplomatic visits, therefore, are not simply about exchanging political messages. They are an attempt to protect a network of interests linking ports, markets and energy sources. In this sense, Red Sea security is part of China's economic security.
The prospects for success will depend on the limits Beijing sets for its mission. Achieving a temporary de-escalation, opening a negotiating channel or securing commitments to protect navigation appear more attainable than a comprehensive settlement. Such steps require coordination with Washington, since the American decision to launch or suspend military strikes remains a decisive factor. They also require verifiable commitments from Iran and the Houthis. China's relationship with Tehran may help it apply pressure, but that relationship alone cannot guarantee compliance by all parties.
Another obstacle is the absence of publicly announced details about the initiative. What is being asked of each party? What guarantees would be provided? And how would violations be addressed? Without answers, China's efforts remain closer to a diplomatic push for de-escalation than a fully developed peace plan.
The more realistic assessment is that China has an opportunity to reduce tensions and buy time for negotiations, while the prospects of resolving all the region's crises at once remain limited. The measure of its success will be whether it can halt the deterioration and translate its diplomatic contacts into concrete steps that protect civilians, infrastructure and maritime navigation, giving the region some breathing room before another confrontation whose consequences could prove difficult to contain.
