El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Viewed Carlos as a Poisonous Present from Jordan

Carlos' wanted photos as released by Interpol. (AFP)
Carlos' wanted photos as released by Interpol. (AFP)
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El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Viewed Carlos as a Poisonous Present from Jordan

Carlos' wanted photos as released by Interpol. (AFP)
Carlos' wanted photos as released by Interpol. (AFP)

An attractive foreigner once entered a store in Khartoum. The owner never once imagined who it could possibly be. The foreigner noticed the portrait of a senior military figure hanging on the wall. The lady explained that she was his widow and had he been alive, he would have been the president of Sudan.

Zeinab Mustafa was talking about her late husband El-Hadi al-Mamoun al-Mardi who established the Islamic movement in the army and served as a minister after the coup on June 30, 1989. He later died of an illness.

Zeinab did not realize the danger of the visitor and that international intelligence agencies were searching for him. France was seeking his arrest because back in 1975 he killed two members of its security force there and fled. The owner and the foreigner became more acquainted. He explained that he was in Sudan on an important political visit and wanted to meet President Omar al-Bashir or Dr. Hassan al-Turabi. He gave her a book by David Yallop called “Until The Ends of the Earth.” He requested that it be sent to al-Turabi's office.

Zeinab took the book and met with Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam, head of al-Turabi's office. He sent the book to al-Turabi, who asked if Yallop was in Sudan. He replied, “No, it was Carlos.” He was shocked. It was none other than the Venezuelan Ilich Ramírez Sanchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal, who was guided by Palestinian plane hijacker mastermind Dr. Wadie Haddad to carry out the kidnapping of the OPEC ministers in Vienna in 1975.

Abdul Salam knows Carlos’ story in Sudan from start to finish. He was tasked with interpreting the discussions that took place between French and Sudanese intelligence that culminated in Carlos being turned over to France on August 15, 1994, where he now lies in prison.

A photo of Carlos seen in Sudan in 1994 and released by France during his trial. (AFP)

Throughout the 1980s, Carlos roamed all over eastern Europe to evade capture. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, eastern Europe was no longer an option. Baghdad was out of the question, so he landed in Syria, where Hafez al-Assad's regime used him for operations in France and Lebanon. He was later asked to leave the country as Assad sought to polish his image before the West.

Carlos then turned to Moammar al-Gaddafi in Libya. The leader eventually prioritized his relationship with Sabri al-Banna, also known as Abu Nidal, over the burdensome Carlos. Carlos turned to Jordan, which after a while turned him away, so he found himself seeking refuge in Sudan.

Following up on Carlos’ case is an exercise in patience. For two decades, French intelligence agent Philippe Rondot sought his arrest before he eventually succeeded. My profession has allowed me to interview al-Turabi and Carlos. The former told me that Carlos arrived in Sudan “from a country somewhere close to your part of the world” - meaning Jordan. Carlos told me that al-Turabi and Bashir had struck a deal with France for his arrest. Today, I am interviewing Abdul Salam to ask him about Carlos.

“I know all about Carlos’ story in Sudan because I was the interpreter for the Sudanese and French security agencies,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. He had arrived in Sudan from Jordan in 1993. He entered through the airport using a southern Yemen passport and spent a year in Sudan.

“I had informed Rondot that the passport was fake, but he didn’t believe me, saying it was indeed issued by the Yemeni foreign ministry. Meanwhile, I insisted that Abdullah Barakat – the name on the passport – was not his real name. Sudan discovered that Carlos was on its soil. He indeed was a ‘poisonous gift’ from Jordan as al-Turabi once said. We spent nearly a year persuading him to leave Sudan,” recalled Abdul Salam.

Asked if he had ever met Carlos, he confirmed that he did twice in the final moments before he was flown out of the country.

Asked how come it had taken Sudanese agencies so long to realize that the infamous Carlos was in the country, Abdul Salam explained that his operations were connected to the Palestinians, so he was on the radar of countries that were involved with them, such as Jordan, Syria and Libya. Sudan was not, so he arrived in the country undetected.

Al-Turabi probably found out early on that Carlos was in Sudan, perhaps after his arrival, said Abdul Salam. “He visited our office and requested to meet al-Turabi. The guards at the door were not aware who he was,” he said. Ultimately, he never met with al-Turabi even after he realized that Carlos was in Sudan.

Abdul Salam could not confirm or deny whether Carlos met with Osama bin Laden while they were in Sudan, saying he did not have any information about the issue.

When I interviewed Carlos, he informed me that al-Turabi and Bashir “sold me out.” Abdul Salam said: “He believed that the Islamic regime in Sudan was the same as the one in Iran in that it was hostile to the West and that its leaders would be eager to meet with him and learn from his experience. The regime in Sudan was not like that.”

Carlos presented himself as a Muslim and he tried to offer his services to the regime, revealed Abdul Salam.

Turning to Rondot, Abdul Salam described him as an “extraordinary” man. “It is said that he was born in Tunisia. He was of the ‘black feet’ (pieds-noirs) French colonizers in north Africa. He would occasionally visit during Ramadan and fast the entire month even though he was not Muslim. He once told me that he had spent 30 years on missions. He held a doctorate in sociology and his father was a major sociologist. He had close ties to the Muslim and Arab worlds. He had ties with all Arab intelligence.”

Rondot described Iraqi intelligence as being derived from ideas, while Algerian intelligence only saw what it wanted to see, meaning it was subjective, said Abdul Salam.

Rondot spent some 20 years pursuing Carlos. Abdul Salam told Asharq Al-Awsat that the process to turn over Carlos to France started around four months after he arrived in Sudan, which was in August 1993. “In October, Rondot came to Khartoum following a visit by Sudan’s chief of intelligence to France. Negotiations over Carlos took a long time.”

On how come he was chosen to act as interpreter, Abdul Salam said Sudanese intelligence does boast French speakers, but they wanted to keep the number of people involved in the case limited. Al-Turabi was aware of it and made sure that Sudan respected its agreements with Interpol regarding the arrest of wanted people.

At one point, recalled Abdul Salam, discussions were made over the possibility of returning Carlos to Jordan. Sudan was under international sanctions, and it was best that Carlos be returned to the country he came from. France contacted Jordanian authorities to that end, but they turned down its request.

Asked if Sudanese intelligence had questioned Carlos, Abdul Salam responded: “He was fully aware that the operations that he carried out in the 1970s and 80s were no longer possible. All efforts were focused on how to get him out of Sudan.”

“He was a burdensome guest. Some guests are difficult, but none more so than Carlos who captured the world’s attention and was wanted by a major power like France,” said Abdul Salam. “Several offers were made to him to leave for Uganda, Kenya or eastern Europe. He would say that it was dangerous for him to flee by ship or plane because it was impossible for him to reach Iran, Russia or eastern Europe without passing through regions that were dangerous to him. These discussions were held between him and Sudanese security agencies. It wasn’t that he was maneuvering, but that he was afraid.”

Eventually, Sudan decided that it was time to turn him over to France in line with agreements with Interpol and “preparations for his arrest began immediately,” added Abdul Salam. French intelligence agents soon arrived in Khartoum and French and Sudanese Interpol agencies agreed that the announcement of his arrest would be made six hours after his arrest.

“What ensued is an odd story. Carlos needed to have minor surgery that required follow-up and that’s what happened. The hospital director was unaware of who the patient was. The hospital was informed that the patient needed to be taken out of the facility. The staff were told that he was an Israeli and that he had AIDS. It is said that he was drugged so that he could be handed over to French agents without incident.”

“Throughout that day I was with the chief of intelligence. The tension was in the air until we learned that the handover was a success. I was there to act as interpreter between the Sudanese and French Interpol and saw Carlos as he was being boarded on the plane and that was the end of it.”

French intelligence agent Philippe Rondot. (AFP)

Asked whether Sudan received anything in return for aiding in the arrest, Abdul Salam said Paris provided modern training to its security agencies and also provided them with modern cameras and recording equipment.

Rondot later recalled in his memoir that Carlos awoke on the plane when he heard people speaking French around him.

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Abdul Salam about another “burdensome” guest called Osama bin Laden. He acknowledged that he first appeared in Sudan as an “investor”. Later, following his implication in the failed attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s life in 1995, Sudan decided that it was time to “get rid of this guest.”

Upon his departure from Sudan, he warned: “My exit will not protect you from the West and imperialism. You will continue to be targeted,” recalled Abdul Salam. Bin Laden had set up training camps for al-Qaeda members in Sudan, but their activities were “very limited.”

Abdul Salam said that Sudan “is now definitely paying the price” of harboring figures like Carlos and bin Laden. The militias that are now active in the country are definitely products of that point in time.

Carlos’ recollection of the ‘trap’ set up by al-Turabi and Bashir

Years ago, Asharq Al-Awsat asked Carlos at his French prison whether he had made a mistake in heading to Sudan. “Given that I was arrested there, the answer would be yes. I could have headed to various places on condition that I behave.”

“Sudanese authorities were aware that I was there. One of its ministers was on the flight that flew me from Amman to Sudan. He knew who I was,” he added.

He confirmed that Sudan had asked him to leave the country for “security reasons. I did not refuse to leave Sudan, but I refused to cooperate with a trap that was set up by al-Turabi and Bashir. I was alerted to their plan by some sympathizers within the regime in Khartoum.”

Moreover, he revealed that the “United States was the mastermind behind the trap that was overseen by some Gulf figures. The French only took part in the final stage of the operation.”



Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.


Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
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Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)

Tehran stands to gain billions of dollars from a 60-day reprieve from US sanctions announced on Monday, but unwinding more than four decades of restrictions poses legal, political and commercial challenges that could take years.

At issue is whether an interim US deal with Iran can translate into lasting economic relief, given the complexity of dismantling a sanctions regime that spans US law, international measures and private-sector risk concerns.

The United Nations, the US and the European Union have imposed sanctions and trade embargoes and have frozen assets since the late 1970s over Iran's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for armed groups around the region.

Under a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran last week, Washington is to start abolishing all types of sanctions using a schedule to be forged in a final deal within 60 days, a period that can be extended.

On Monday, the US Treasury issued a temporary general license allowing the production, delivery and sale of crude oil and petrochemical and petroleum products of Iranian origin through August 21.

Removing the remaining sanctions - if it happens - would represent a stark change in US policy toward the Middle East, which has long focused on curbing ‌Iran's influence and ‌using financial pressure to weaken its theocratic government.

It would also be difficult, requiring executive action for some measures, approval ‌by ⁠Congress for others ⁠and close coordination with the UN and other countries that have imposed their own sanctions. Companies, wary after decades of restrictions, could also blunt the impact.

"You have this tangled nest of sanctions, and it's not just executive orders, it's congressional sanctions," said Juan Zarate, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under former President George W. Bush.

CONGRESS IS SKEPTICAL

Washington first sanctioned Iran in 1979, after revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage.

Since then, Congress has passed half a dozen sanctions laws and presidents have issued executive orders over Iran's nuclear program and its support for groups the US deems terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Since early 2025, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft, according to Treasury data.

Delisting thousands of entities designated for ⁠sanctions would take OFAC at least a year, said Jeremy Paner, a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed ‌and a former US sanctions official.

President Donald Trump can rescind executive orders issued on Iran, but some ‌measures - including sanctions on Hamas and Hezbollah - are mandated by law and will have to be removed or amended by Congress, where the interim deal has already sparked sharp ‌public criticism from his fellow Republican lawmakers.

Undoing 40 years of sanctions would be difficult, added Matt Zweig, managing director of policy at FDD ‌Action, the lobbying arm of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"Any attempt to comprehensively remove layer upon layer of sanctions will be like peeling back an onion - exposing the administration - not just to legal complexities but political risks," said Zweig, a former aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The license issued on Monday could be worth up to $3 billion for Iran over two months, by some estimates.

That could swell to "at least tens of billions of dollars" if made permanent, erasing a discount on Iranian oil, allowing Tehran to ‌sell to additional buyers beyond China, and increasing exports, said Edward Fishman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. China now buys about 90% of Iranian oil, despite the sanctions.

The new license is broader than ⁠the one issued in March, calling for ⁠inclusion of not just oil and petroleum products, but also banking, insurance and transportation related to the oil trade, giving Tehran quicker access to its revenues.

"There are a number of thorny issues involved," said Stephanie Connor, a former OFAC official now a partner with law firm Holland & Knight, adding that lifting sanctions could mean funds flowing to groups the US considers a threat.

"Are we really going to let money start flowing to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps?" she asked, referring to the powerful paramilitary force that the US has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

WARY COMPANIES

Banks, oil firms and insurers will face evolving regulations, tougher due diligence and exposure to sanctions-evasion risks tied to Iran links with countries such as China, North Korea and Russia. They also remain subject to separate sanctions from Britain, the UN, the EU and others.

"We've kind of beaten the markets up with the risk of doing business with or through Iran, so you can't just flip a switch and say, 'Oh, now it's okay to do business with Iran,'" Zarate said.

Companies that deal with Iran would still face lawsuits from victims of attacks, who can sue investors and companies for aiding designated groups under the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aides say is unlikely to be repealed.

Given such risks, companies may steer clear of working with Iran to escape legal and reputational risk as long as the Iranian government remains in power, said Brett Erickson, principal with Obsidian Risk Advisors.

"We're not going to see massive multi-billion-dollar commitments until things are far more cemented and politically stable," he said. "There's just a long way to go."