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Maurer to Asharq Al-Awsat: Switzerland Ready to Strengthen Relations With Saudi Arabia

Maurer to Asharq Al-Awsat: Switzerland Ready to Strengthen Relations With Saudi Arabia
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Maurer to Asharq Al-Awsat: Switzerland Ready to Strengthen Relations With Saudi Arabia

Maurer to Asharq Al-Awsat: Switzerland Ready to Strengthen Relations With Saudi Arabia

In the next two days, Swiss President Ueli Maurer will tour the Gulf region, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Talks are expected to focus on the prevailing atmosphere in the region after the recent attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities and Iranian violations of international maritime rules in and around the Strait of Hormuz, as well as exploring opportunities to expand trade and investment opportunities.

Maurer, who also heads of the Swiss Federal Department of Finance, is accompanied by a high-level delegation from major financial institutions.

His visit to Saudi Arabia comes on the eve of the Future Investment Initiative conference, which has become a regional and international attraction and is expected to witness the participation of the world's leading financial institutions.

Asharq Al-Awsat interviewed the Swiss leader ahead of his anticipated visit:

1. You are visiting the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia soon, what are your expectations from this visit?

I will be spending a number of days in the Gulf Region together with a delegation from the Swiss financial sector. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are our biggest economic partners in the Middle East and Africa region. My visit to Saudi Arabia is a follow-up to my visit in February 2018, during which Switzerland and Saudi Arabia agreed to hold regular discussions on financial matters to engage in a financial dialogue.

There are further areas in which we see potential for closer cooperation between our countries. We seek not only to strengthen our economic relations; we also want to work more closely together in the fields of science, research and development cooperation. During my visit I will be sounding out my Saudi colleagues on the possibilities. Finally, I would also like to offer our good offices in an attempt to deescalate the current tensions in the Gulf Region.

2. How do you describe your relationship with Saudi Arabia?

Our countries enjoy strong ties. For many years, we have been welcoming guests from Saudi Arabia to Switzerland, especially to the Lake Geneva region. Since bilateral relations were established in 1956, cooperation has intensified and diversified considerably. Besides the growing level of trade, we pursue many other common interests. Let me give a few examples; at the multilateral level, we are both committed to efforts to reform the UN Security Council. And Switzerland has joined Saudi Arabia in the conservation of natural resources by supporting an innovative project for the protection of Red Sea corals.

Switzerland also welcomes the current reform process in Saudi Arabia and is ready to explore opportunities for new areas of cooperation. One example could be the eco-friendly tourism project on the Red Sea coast, where we could bring in the expertise of Swiss tourism organizations or hotel management schools. Moreover, thanks to the recently launched tourist visa, more Swiss visitors might soon travel to Saudi Arabia.

3. How do you evaluate the level of trade exchanges and political deliberations with Saudi Arabia?

Switzerland and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia look back on a long history of strong bilateral relations and trading relations. Swiss exports to Saudi Arabia remained relatively stable in 2018 and amounted to 1.9 billion Swiss francs. Our imports from Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, increased substantially to 833.5 million Swiss francs. Saudi Arabia is an important market, not only for goods, but also for services. Swiss financial institutions, for example, are well represented on the Saudi markets. At the political level, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia hold regular exchanges at all levels, which offer the opportunity to discuss issues in-depth and, at the same time, explore further areas of cooperation.

4. The Kingdom is witnessing a great transformation under Vision 2030. Are you interested in the investment opportunities resulting from such change?

I welcome the reform plans under Vision 2030, which should diversify the economy and reduce its dependence on oil. The Kingdom’s aim of fostering SME entrepreneurship and strengthening the development of the private sector are very important steps towards more sustainable economic growth. Let me emphasize the importance of integrating the female workforce into the labor market. This is key to inclusive social and economic development in the Kingdom.

Swiss companies already have a substantial presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Almost every month at least one more Swiss company establishes some form of business links with the country. Switzerland has a very liberal economic system and the role of the State is limited to creating favorable framework conditions. Private investors decide on new investment opportunities based on their own calculations and interests.

5. Switzerland is a very dynamic economy. What are the secrets behind this success?

You cannot put it down to any single factor. Instead you have to see it like a puzzle. Each improvement in framework conditions adds one more piece to complete the big picture. Having said that, some pieces are rather more important than others! In my view, the dual-track system of vocational and professional education is one of the key elements. The dual-track of practice and theory does not only prepare young people for work, but also provides top-level education at higher education institutions. Other important aspects are reliable governance, high-quality infrastructure and the stable legal and political system. Our tax environment is conducive to growth, resulting in a high level of employment. However, there are still many challenges ahead. Switzerland is facing major demographic changes in the coming years, which will be a challenge for the sustainability of our state pension system.

As for the potential for cooperation, cooperation already exists in many sectors. We have active dialogues at the political and economic level, and the many Swiss companies operating in the Kingdom are shaping the areas in which we cooperate. The recent developments and openings in Saudi Arabia are quickly creating new opportunities. Arrangements are already in place for instance among Swiss hospitality training institutions and their Saudi counterparts. This is a very promising sector and Swiss expertise can bring considerable added value.

6. Alongside your role as President of the Swiss Confederation, you are also Switzerland’s finance minister. Where do you see opportunities for cooperation between Switzerland and Saudi Arabia in this field?

We see various possibilities for closer cooperation in the financial sector that would be in both countries’ interests. Partnership between Swiss and Saudi firms could be envisaged, especially in areas where Switzerland and its financial center may be able to provide specific expertise. This could be the case, for instance, in the area of asset management or in sustainable investments. The increasing demand for sustainable assets and infrastructure, particularly also from countries in the Middle East, could provide the opportunity for deeper cooperation. Financing quality infrastructure investments for sustainable development, by leveraging technological innovations, is in the interests of both our countries. Moreover, within the context of Vision 2030 Switzerland would like to explore other areas, such as sharing best practices in the field of SME-lending and financing activities through banks.

7. Your visit to Saudi Arabia comes after the attack on Aramco, one that Iran is suspected of being behind. What is your stance on this?

Switzerland is very concerned about increasing tensions in the Gulf region. We believe any further escalation must be avoided, because another violent conflict would have devastating consequences for all peoples in the region and beyond. We immediately condemned the recent attacks on Aramco and welcome the thorough investigation that is currently underway into the matter.

8. Iran’s recent activities have raised the issue of maritime safety in the Strait of Hormuz, which, in turn, led the United States of America to react. What is your view on this?

Switzerland calls upon all parties to respect international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which sets out clear rules for the passage of commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz.

9. Does Switzerland plan to play a role in lowering tensions in the Gulf region?

Switzerland has long been committed to promoting security and peaceful co-existence in the Middle East and the Gulf region. We repeatedly offer our good offices to all parties concerned and are always ready to facilitate communication. This is nothing new and we will continue to do this under the current circumstances. Moreover, in addition to our longstanding protecting power mandate for the US in Iran, we have recently assumed reciprocal protecting power mandates for Saudi Arabia in Iran and vice versa.

10. Switzerland has previously played a role in attempts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. How do you perceive the peace process today?

It is now over 25 years since the Oslo Accords were signed, and key issues, including borders, Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and settlements, remain unresolved. The situation on the ground, in particular, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, the continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip and recurring violence threaten the prospects of a two-state solution. The economic and humanitarian problems caused by the Israeli occupation, the division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and high levels of youth unemployment are further challenges undermining prospects for a viable Palestinian State. According to Switzerland, a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians can only be achieved through negotiations based on the Two-State solution, as well as on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Switzerland is engaged in the Middle East in cooperation and peace promotion and humanitarian aid programs. Switzerland encourages innovative approaches to addressing core issues of the conflict, in particular by supporting efforts to deal with the past and by promoting mutual understanding between Israelis and Palestinians. Switzerland also works hard to ensure that all parties respect international law. Moreover, Switzerland has been active in intra-Palestinian reconciliation. Through diplomatic channels, it assists Egyptian-led efforts to re-establish the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip. Finally, UNRWA is an important multilateral partner to Switzerland whose role is essential for the security and stability in the region. Switzerland will continue working with UNRWA and other donors on reform efforts to ensure that UNRWA can provide its services more effectively and efficiently.

11. Switzerland is the depositary state of the Geneva Conventions, which are this year celebrating their 70th anniversary. What is Switzerland’s role in this regard?

I firmly believe that values serve us as a compass. They help us to find our way in a complex world and preserve what is worth protecting. One such compass is the Geneva Conventions, adopted 70 years ago. The purpose of international humanitarian law is to preserve the dignity of people in countries beset by war. It should be possible to treat the wounded and sick, for children to go to school and for civilians to be spared from the fighting. Yet we still encounter violations of international humanitarian law on a regular basis.

Switzerland is the depositary state of the Conventions, and humanitarian engagement is a key element of our foreign policy. Switzerland is firmly committed to strengthening and encouraging respect for humanitarian international law. In this anniversary year, we are calling on all states to take measures to improve respect for humanitarian international law. This is why the situation in Yemen is one of the issues that will be on the agenda for my meetings with high-ranking officials in the United Arab Emirates and in Saudi Arabia.

12. You have a special relationship with President Trump. How do you perceive Washington’s role internationally?

Solid bilateral relations with the USA are vital for our country. Our relations have strong historical roots. Switzerland and the USA have long shared common values such as democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law. This, together with our own interests and priorities, provides the basis on which we work with the US government. At a meeting in May, President Trump and I discussed a number of issues, including the way in which Switzerland’s good offices can open up diplomatic channels in conflict areas.

13. There is controversy about immigration to Europe, and as a result, we are witnessing the rise of rightist, anti-refugee movements. Are there concerns about the notion of coexistence in Switzerland, specifically, and in Europe generally?

When it becomes hard to control streams of refugees, as was the case in 2015, it is understandable that concerns should arise. When we are able to control migration, it becomes less of an issue. Switzerland is pursuing a clear objective: people who need protection should receive protection; people who do not need protection must leave Switzerland at the earliest opportunity. We expect all prosperous regions of the world to show solidarity and to contribute towards solving the global refugee problem.

Around a quarter of the population of Switzerland are foreign nationals. In the vast majority of cases, we live our daily lives together without any difficulty. Integration is the key to maintaining the peaceful co-existence of Swiss people with our foreign residents. This works when every person living in Switzerland accepts the values set out in the Federal Constitution and shows respect for their fellow residents. Integration can be regarded as a success when all the residents of a country, irrespective of their origins, have the same opportunities.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.