Turkey Speaks of ‘Additional Steps’ to Improve Ties with Egypt

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaks during a trilateral foreign ministers press conference with his Romanian and Polish counterparts in Istanbul, Turkey, 27 May 2022. (EPA)
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaks during a trilateral foreign ministers press conference with his Romanian and Polish counterparts in Istanbul, Turkey, 27 May 2022. (EPA)
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Turkey Speaks of ‘Additional Steps’ to Improve Ties with Egypt

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaks during a trilateral foreign ministers press conference with his Romanian and Polish counterparts in Istanbul, Turkey, 27 May 2022. (EPA)
Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu speaks during a trilateral foreign ministers press conference with his Romanian and Polish counterparts in Istanbul, Turkey, 27 May 2022. (EPA)

Turkey said it will take “additional steps” to bolster relations with Egypt, in light of efforts to normalize bilateral ties at various levels.

“Differences might exist, but severing relations is not good,” Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said during a meeting with with UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan on Friday.

“We will work to take additional steps in collaboration with Egypt in this regard,” he added, noting that Ankara wants to improve ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

He made his remarks days after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said it was possible to develop the dialogue and normalize relations with Cairo.

Dialogue may develop to reach higher levels, he said in April.

Egypt and Turkey had held "exploratory" talks in recent months in order to improve their relations.

Cairo hosted the second round of talks, which officials described as "frank and deep".

They tackled bilateral ties and regional issues. The officials agreed to continue consultations.

Erdogan said in December that his country would take steps to improve ties with Egypt and Israel similar to efforts it made with the United Arab Emirates, which led to investments.

Egypt’s FM Sameh Shoukry had previously said that Turkey was keen on changing course with Egypt, especially on the security level.

He noted Turkish statements that reflect a change in behavior and that it was steering clear of meddling in Egypt's internal affairs or harboring extremists figures that are hostile to Cairo.

An informed Egyptian source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Cairo "appreciates Ankara's efforts, but tangible steps are needed to reach a greater understanding to resolve differences."



Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
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Iran’s Allies Constrained in Confronting Israel

Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)
Armed Houthi supporters carry images of deceased military and political figures from Iran-aligned groups during a protest in Sanaa against Israeli airstrikes on Iran (EPA)

As war rages between Tehran and Tel Aviv, Iran may soon need to call upon its network of regional allies - groups it has armed and funded for years. But now, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” looks strained, fragmented, and far from ready.

On June 19, 2025, General Mohammad Reza Naqdi of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard urged Iran’s regional allies to take action to relieve mounting pressure on Tehran. At that point, Iran was entering its second week of heavy Israeli bombardment. Strategically, an Israeli strike on the Iranian capital once seemed unthinkable, but the regional terrain has since shifted. Iran’s supply routes are now disrupted, and its key proxy groups have either been neutralized or weakened.

According to The Times of Israel, Israel launched this war after nearly two years of systematically targeting Iran’s allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen. The 2023 Hamas attack on Israel had triggered a chain of retaliation that left many of Iran’s partners damaged or demoralized. With the Assad regime collapsed in Syria, Hezbollah weakened in Lebanon, and Hamas reduced to guerrilla tactics in Gaza, few proxies appear ready for a new confrontation.

In Gaza, Hamas has been forced into small ambushes and urban warfare, its rocket arsenal depleted and many senior leaders killed. Iranian communication channels with the group have also eroded. Israel’s targeted assassination of Mohammad Saeed Izadi, a key Quds Force commander linked to Palestinian factions, further strained coordination. For now, Hamas can offer little more than rhetorical support.

In Iraq, US forces have fortified their embassy in Baghdad, while withdrawing from bases such as Ain al-Asad. Iraqi factions loyal to Iran are posturing, threatening US interests should America enter the war. But most Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to drag the country into open conflict, knowing the consequences could be disastrous. Iran, too, is cautious about sacrificing Iraq’s political and economic value.

Hezbollah, reeling from the death of its longtime leader Hassan Nasrallah in a 2024 Israeli strike, is in disarray. Its military capacity and leadership have been significantly degraded. Though the party retains some strategic capabilities, domestic and regional pressures have so far restrained it from opening a major front.

In Yemen, the Houthis have emerged as Iran’s last viable card. They now play a key role in smuggling weapons and expanding Iranian influence into Africa. Should the US directly join Israel’s war, Tehran may finally authorize the Houthis to use their stockpile of ballistic missiles, signaling a decisive and potentially catastrophic new phase of the conflict.