The stance of the four deputy Lebanese Central Bank governors has become shrouded in ambiguity and confusion after their latest meeting with caretaker Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati. They did not announce a clear decision regarding their future, and it remains uncertain whether all four or only two of them will resign if the appointment of a new Central Bank Governor is delayed.
Since the sitting Governor Riad Salameh, whose term has ended, announced that his time in public office was over, the position will probably remain vacant. The deputies are expected to become caretakers, and as First Deputy, Waseem Mansouri (who was the first one among them to suggest he would be resigning) would bear the brunt of the responsibility that comes with this role.
According to several credible Lebanese media outlets, Mansouri does not have a strong background in finance or banking, neither academically nor professionally. He is a lawyer who has held several prominent positions in his field. His appointment as deputy governor is the result of the sectarian-quota-based spoils-sharing regime that distributes public sector appointments, from entry-level to ministerial positions, among the political parties representing the sects of the country.
These parties choose their representatives in the public sector according to sectarian considerations rather than professional merit. Loyalty, not the skills required to do the job, is key. This is crucial for understanding why competence levels have dropped in government and state institutions.
Regardless of Mansouri’s professional and academic background, his early hints at resignation are an attempt to avoid being held responsible for the monetary policy of the country as it undergoes an economic crisis, nothing more. Indeed, the national currency has taken the biggest hit, with the lira likely to be devalued even further. Additionally, those who nominated him, the duo that governs and controls the Shiites (Hezbollah and the Amal Movement), do not want him to oversee the state’s potential “bankruptcy.”
In fact, the duo trying to evade accountability has not succeeded yet. If the cabinet fails to appoint a new Central Bank governor, which is likely, the “Shiite duo” would find themselves responsible for monetary policy in a country whose Central Bank is in danger of becoming bankrupt. This outcome would increase their share of the blame for the economic crisis.
It would also place greater responsibility on them to fix it. Indeed, the duo has always been a supporter and partner of Salameh, defending his monetary policies since he took office, leaving most of the Lebanese people furious after losing deposits in Lebanese banks.
This scenario would aggravate the public’s anxiety about future Central Bank policies, as Mansouri and the duo lack the experience needed to oversee monetary policy. The duo’s oversight of the finance ministry, where they also put a lawyer in charge, gives us an idea of what we should expect. His statement on the eve of the economic collapse remains fresh in the memory: “The lira is doing great.”
With regard to their particular sectarian modus operandi, the duo’s push to evade responsibility for monetary policy opens the door to questions about how it sees the public sector and its criteria for making appointments. From appointing a lawyer to serve as deputy Central Bank governor to naming a party cadre as finance minister, the duo has a policy of disregarding merit, excluding even competent loyalists from their own circles and sect.
They make appointments based on political and partisan considerations, not to serve the public interest. As seen with the dismissal of General Abbas Ibrahim, any appointee that manages to carve out a degree of independence is pushed out. This is not to imply that those employed to represent other sectarian parties are independents, but they appoint competent loyalists at times.
The duo’s approach demands a reassessment of Shiite representation in the state and how it was approached over two phases. The first phase is that of Shiite political feudalism, which the left and Shiite Islamists accuse of making poor appointments and monopolizing representation in the state. They also spread rumors about the feudal elite - “Kamel is receiving an education” (so you don’t have to), though made up, became a notorious statement in the South.
This era coincided with “political Maronitism” (the era when Maronites held most of the power in the country) and its relatively merit-based appointments during the terms of Presidents Camille Chamoun and Fouad Chehab. This phase also demands objective and studious critique and revaluation. As for the second phase, it is the post-civil war period, in which the duo holds power.
