Former Iraqi FM Comments on Amr Moussa’s Memoirs

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
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Former Iraqi FM Comments on Amr Moussa’s Memoirs

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi commented on the memoirs of former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Mouss that were published by Asharq Al-Awsat. Al-Hadithi clarifies in the below text a number of issues:

In the memoirs of the former Secretary-General of the Arab League Mr. Amr Moussa, published in your newspaper on Dec. 7, 2020, there were a number of misleading points regarding his visit to Iraq on January 18, 2002, and other matters related to the crisis in the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations at the time.

As I followed his visit from its beginning in New York and accompanied him until after his arrival in Baghdad, I would like to discuss the following points to clarify the truth:

First: In the memoirs, Mr. Moussa said that on his visit to New York to attend the General Assembly meetings, he met with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and stressed the need to make “a clear effort to prevent an imminent war on Iraq.”

“I will visit the Iraqi president in January, he told him. I want a message that I can convey to him on your behalf to resolve the position over the resumption of the work of international inspectors.” Moussa said that secretary-general approved the request.

After that, the memoirs quoted Mr. Moussa as saying: “I arranged with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi, my visit to Iraq.” This means that he decided on the visit, set its subject and date, and then met with me to arrange it...

In fact, I met Mr. Amr Moussa on the sidelines of the General Assembly, and talked with him about the crisis of the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations, and about the urgent need to seek a peaceful political solution that guarantees the sovereignty of Iraq, the security of its people and its national interests. I explained to him our keenness to build a positive relationship with the United Nations Secretariat and its agencies operating in Iraq, and our efforts to resume dialogue, negotiation and interaction with them, as the first essential step on the road to resolving the crisis.

I felt that he understood and supported our direction. So I suggested that the Arab League have a role in this endeavor. He showed willingness to do so. Here, I proposed that he visits Iraq to confirm this willingness. I told him it would provide a symbolic and effective evidence of the Arab League’s solidarity with the Iraqi people in the face of the siege and the continuous aggression against the country. He agreed, and an official invitation was sent to him at once. He contacted me after his return to Cairo to schedule the date of the visit. We set the visit on Jan. 18, 2002.

Therefore, Mr. Moussa’s visit to Iraq was my idea. He had no idea about it before our meeting. Moreover, it’s the first time that I hear that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has sent a message to the President of the Republic of Iraq through Mr. Amr Moussa. I don’t know how the person who wrote the memoirs (and I am not pointing to Mr. Moussa) has missed that the head of any international organization does not send messages to countries through people from outside his organization, let alone the head of the largest international organization in the world.

Second: The memoirs recount how Mr. Moussa went the next day to meet President Saddam Hussein, saying that he moved from his residence to a “military headquarters” and then to “a military unit headquarters”, providing a dramatic description of the president’s secretary...

In fact, Mr. Moussa, his assistants and I met at the National Council building in Karada Mariam before going to the place of the meeting with the president. Then the president’s secretary, Lieutenant General Abdel Hammoud, came and escorted us in his car to one of the presidential palaces in the Radwaniyah area. The National Council building is not a military barracks, as mentioned in the memoirs, but rather a large building with a beautiful classic urban style located on the Tigris River, less than 200 meters from the Republican Palace. It includes civilian offices of the Presidency of the Republic. It is usual for the building to be protected by an external fence, and for its external entrance gate to be guarded by a few security guards, like any building belonging to the Presidency of the State in any country in the world.

Third: The memoirs give a different version of the meeting with President Saddam Hussein. It claimed that Mr. Moussa was furious and talked to President Saddam in a tone as if he were shouting at him, and that the President addressed him with the title of Doctor… etc.! Everything that was mentioned about the meeting is absolutely untrue. The meeting began with Mr. Moussa’s talk about the Arab League’s position on the issue of Iraq and its keenness on the country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as its support in the face of violations and threats, and against the continued siege on its people.

Within the framework of the visit, which we have agreed upon in New York, Moussa touched on the importance of working for a peaceful political solution to the crisis with the United Nations by communicating and negotiating with its secretary-general on all pending issues between the two sides. He expressed the readiness of the Arab League General Secretariat to contribute to this endeavor.

President Saddam Hussein responded by explaining Iraq’s stance on the relationship with the United Nations, and reviewing the arbitrary decisions imposed by the United States and Britain on the Security Council, their violations of Iraq’s sovereignty, their attacks on its citizens and locations, as well as their insistence on maintaining the siege on its people.

He also talked about their threats to wage war against Iraq, and the practices of the United Nations inspection teams, which violated the country’s sovereignty and security. He expressed no objection to the resumption of negotiations with the UN General Secretariat.

The meeting ended with Mr. Moussa’s pledge to contact the UN Secretary-General to agree on arrangements for the resumption of comprehensive negotiations between Iraq and the United Nations at the earliest possible. Consequently, we agreed with Mr. Annan to start the negotiations on March 7, 2002 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

However, what’s strange is the memoirs mentioning Mr. Moussa’s anger, his shouting at President Saddam Hussein, and other allegations. How did Brother Amr accept that the person, who wrote his memoirs, attributes this blatant lie to him and to the Egyptian diplomacy? This contradicts the simplest characteristics of a successful diplomat, which are graciousness, politeness and good speech.

Fourth: The memoirs quoted Mr. Amr Moussa as saying that his visit to Iraq was to persuade President Saddam Hussein to bring back the inspectors, and that the President had agreed and authorized Moussa to speak on behalf of Iraq.

The truth is that the return of the inspectors was not raised during the meeting. It was also not mentioned in the first round of negotiations with the United Nations, which was held at the headquarters of the international organization in New York on March 7, 2002.

Moreover, the issue was neither raised in the second round of talks, which took place on May 2, 2002, nor in the third meeting, which was held at the UN headquarters in Vienna on May 7, 2002, based on my request to avoid the US intelligence’s harassment of the members of the Iraqi delegation.

Before the end of the third round, Mr. Kofi Annan met with me privately, and told me that he needed a promise from us that the Iraqi government would consider the return of the inspectors, so that he could continue negotiations and agree with us on a fourth round. But I apologized as I did not have my government’s permission to do so. Therefore, how do the memoirs say that Mr. President has approved the return of the inspectors and authorized Mr. Amr Moussa to speak on behalf of Iraq?

On Sept. 9, 2002, I met President Saddam Hussein before I went to New York to attend the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly. I asked him about any new position regarding the return of the inspectors, and he told me to wait, meaning that the refusal was still valid.

Upon my arrival at the United Nations, the Arab League General Secretariat called for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in a hall in the building of the international organization on Sept. 15, 2002. Before entering the meeting room, I learned that US Secretary of State Colin Powell had begun consultations with his legal advisers to draft a Security Council resolution authorizing any country to launch war on Iraq under the pretext of its refusal to allow the return of the international inspectors. The draft-resolution imposes exorbitant demands on Iraq within short deadlines, which are impossible to meet even if the country desired to comply.

Thus, I was convinced that the inspectors should be returned. The focus of the Arab ministers meeting was the crisis between Iraq and the United Nations. The secretary-general and ministers called on Iraq to work on resolving the crisis and to deal flexibly with Security Council resolutions. One of my best memories is the moving appeal of His Highness the late Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

After we left the meeting, Mr. Amr asked me what I would do. “We will allow the return of the inspectors,” I replied, and he welcomed that. I asked him to join me in arranging the matter with the Secretary-General so that the decision would guarantee the United Nations’ respect for Iraq’s inalienable rights to protect its sovereignty, the sanctity of its territories and the right of its people to lift the inhuman blockade in accordance with the UN Charter, the relevant Security Council resolutions and international law. He expressed his readiness for that.

I immediately sent an encrypted message to President Saddam Hussein, requesting his consent for the return of the inspectors unconditionally. Three hours later, I received the approval. This happened nine months after Mr. Amr Moussa’s visit to Baghdad, during which the memoirs claim that the President had informed him of his consent over the return of the inspectors!

I called Mr. Amr and we went together to Mr. Annan to inform him of the decision. Then, he joined me in all the necessary contacts until we put the final wording of the Iraqi decision, in coordination with Mr. Annan, and presented it to him in the evening of Sept. 16, 2002.

The good and friendly working relationship that brought me together with Brother Amr Moussa continued until the last Arab ministerial meeting I attended on March 25, 2003 at the Arab League’s headquarters after the start of the US invasion of Iraq. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Amr escorted me to the outside gate of the building on the main street to bid me farewell.

Naji Sabri al-Hadithi – Foreign Minister of Iraq (2001-2003)



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.