Former Iraqi FM Comments on Amr Moussa’s Memoirs

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
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Former Iraqi FM Comments on Amr Moussa’s Memoirs

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa and former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi in Baghdad, 2002 - Getty Images

Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri al-Hadithi commented on the memoirs of former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Mouss that were published by Asharq Al-Awsat. Al-Hadithi clarifies in the below text a number of issues:

In the memoirs of the former Secretary-General of the Arab League Mr. Amr Moussa, published in your newspaper on Dec. 7, 2020, there were a number of misleading points regarding his visit to Iraq on January 18, 2002, and other matters related to the crisis in the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations at the time.

As I followed his visit from its beginning in New York and accompanied him until after his arrival in Baghdad, I would like to discuss the following points to clarify the truth:

First: In the memoirs, Mr. Moussa said that on his visit to New York to attend the General Assembly meetings, he met with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, and stressed the need to make “a clear effort to prevent an imminent war on Iraq.”

“I will visit the Iraqi president in January, he told him. I want a message that I can convey to him on your behalf to resolve the position over the resumption of the work of international inspectors.” Moussa said that secretary-general approved the request.

After that, the memoirs quoted Mr. Moussa as saying: “I arranged with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri Al-Hadithi, my visit to Iraq.” This means that he decided on the visit, set its subject and date, and then met with me to arrange it...

In fact, I met Mr. Amr Moussa on the sidelines of the General Assembly, and talked with him about the crisis of the relationship between Iraq and the United Nations, and about the urgent need to seek a peaceful political solution that guarantees the sovereignty of Iraq, the security of its people and its national interests. I explained to him our keenness to build a positive relationship with the United Nations Secretariat and its agencies operating in Iraq, and our efforts to resume dialogue, negotiation and interaction with them, as the first essential step on the road to resolving the crisis.

I felt that he understood and supported our direction. So I suggested that the Arab League have a role in this endeavor. He showed willingness to do so. Here, I proposed that he visits Iraq to confirm this willingness. I told him it would provide a symbolic and effective evidence of the Arab League’s solidarity with the Iraqi people in the face of the siege and the continuous aggression against the country. He agreed, and an official invitation was sent to him at once. He contacted me after his return to Cairo to schedule the date of the visit. We set the visit on Jan. 18, 2002.

Therefore, Mr. Moussa’s visit to Iraq was my idea. He had no idea about it before our meeting. Moreover, it’s the first time that I hear that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has sent a message to the President of the Republic of Iraq through Mr. Amr Moussa. I don’t know how the person who wrote the memoirs (and I am not pointing to Mr. Moussa) has missed that the head of any international organization does not send messages to countries through people from outside his organization, let alone the head of the largest international organization in the world.

Second: The memoirs recount how Mr. Moussa went the next day to meet President Saddam Hussein, saying that he moved from his residence to a “military headquarters” and then to “a military unit headquarters”, providing a dramatic description of the president’s secretary...

In fact, Mr. Moussa, his assistants and I met at the National Council building in Karada Mariam before going to the place of the meeting with the president. Then the president’s secretary, Lieutenant General Abdel Hammoud, came and escorted us in his car to one of the presidential palaces in the Radwaniyah area. The National Council building is not a military barracks, as mentioned in the memoirs, but rather a large building with a beautiful classic urban style located on the Tigris River, less than 200 meters from the Republican Palace. It includes civilian offices of the Presidency of the Republic. It is usual for the building to be protected by an external fence, and for its external entrance gate to be guarded by a few security guards, like any building belonging to the Presidency of the State in any country in the world.

Third: The memoirs give a different version of the meeting with President Saddam Hussein. It claimed that Mr. Moussa was furious and talked to President Saddam in a tone as if he were shouting at him, and that the President addressed him with the title of Doctor… etc.! Everything that was mentioned about the meeting is absolutely untrue. The meeting began with Mr. Moussa’s talk about the Arab League’s position on the issue of Iraq and its keenness on the country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as its support in the face of violations and threats, and against the continued siege on its people.

Within the framework of the visit, which we have agreed upon in New York, Moussa touched on the importance of working for a peaceful political solution to the crisis with the United Nations by communicating and negotiating with its secretary-general on all pending issues between the two sides. He expressed the readiness of the Arab League General Secretariat to contribute to this endeavor.

President Saddam Hussein responded by explaining Iraq’s stance on the relationship with the United Nations, and reviewing the arbitrary decisions imposed by the United States and Britain on the Security Council, their violations of Iraq’s sovereignty, their attacks on its citizens and locations, as well as their insistence on maintaining the siege on its people.

He also talked about their threats to wage war against Iraq, and the practices of the United Nations inspection teams, which violated the country’s sovereignty and security. He expressed no objection to the resumption of negotiations with the UN General Secretariat.

The meeting ended with Mr. Moussa’s pledge to contact the UN Secretary-General to agree on arrangements for the resumption of comprehensive negotiations between Iraq and the United Nations at the earliest possible. Consequently, we agreed with Mr. Annan to start the negotiations on March 7, 2002 at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

However, what’s strange is the memoirs mentioning Mr. Moussa’s anger, his shouting at President Saddam Hussein, and other allegations. How did Brother Amr accept that the person, who wrote his memoirs, attributes this blatant lie to him and to the Egyptian diplomacy? This contradicts the simplest characteristics of a successful diplomat, which are graciousness, politeness and good speech.

Fourth: The memoirs quoted Mr. Amr Moussa as saying that his visit to Iraq was to persuade President Saddam Hussein to bring back the inspectors, and that the President had agreed and authorized Moussa to speak on behalf of Iraq.

The truth is that the return of the inspectors was not raised during the meeting. It was also not mentioned in the first round of negotiations with the United Nations, which was held at the headquarters of the international organization in New York on March 7, 2002.

Moreover, the issue was neither raised in the second round of talks, which took place on May 2, 2002, nor in the third meeting, which was held at the UN headquarters in Vienna on May 7, 2002, based on my request to avoid the US intelligence’s harassment of the members of the Iraqi delegation.

Before the end of the third round, Mr. Kofi Annan met with me privately, and told me that he needed a promise from us that the Iraqi government would consider the return of the inspectors, so that he could continue negotiations and agree with us on a fourth round. But I apologized as I did not have my government’s permission to do so. Therefore, how do the memoirs say that Mr. President has approved the return of the inspectors and authorized Mr. Amr Moussa to speak on behalf of Iraq?

On Sept. 9, 2002, I met President Saddam Hussein before I went to New York to attend the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly. I asked him about any new position regarding the return of the inspectors, and he told me to wait, meaning that the refusal was still valid.

Upon my arrival at the United Nations, the Arab League General Secretariat called for a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in a hall in the building of the international organization on Sept. 15, 2002. Before entering the meeting room, I learned that US Secretary of State Colin Powell had begun consultations with his legal advisers to draft a Security Council resolution authorizing any country to launch war on Iraq under the pretext of its refusal to allow the return of the international inspectors. The draft-resolution imposes exorbitant demands on Iraq within short deadlines, which are impossible to meet even if the country desired to comply.

Thus, I was convinced that the inspectors should be returned. The focus of the Arab ministers meeting was the crisis between Iraq and the United Nations. The secretary-general and ministers called on Iraq to work on resolving the crisis and to deal flexibly with Security Council resolutions. One of my best memories is the moving appeal of His Highness the late Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

After we left the meeting, Mr. Amr asked me what I would do. “We will allow the return of the inspectors,” I replied, and he welcomed that. I asked him to join me in arranging the matter with the Secretary-General so that the decision would guarantee the United Nations’ respect for Iraq’s inalienable rights to protect its sovereignty, the sanctity of its territories and the right of its people to lift the inhuman blockade in accordance with the UN Charter, the relevant Security Council resolutions and international law. He expressed his readiness for that.

I immediately sent an encrypted message to President Saddam Hussein, requesting his consent for the return of the inspectors unconditionally. Three hours later, I received the approval. This happened nine months after Mr. Amr Moussa’s visit to Baghdad, during which the memoirs claim that the President had informed him of his consent over the return of the inspectors!

I called Mr. Amr and we went together to Mr. Annan to inform him of the decision. Then, he joined me in all the necessary contacts until we put the final wording of the Iraqi decision, in coordination with Mr. Annan, and presented it to him in the evening of Sept. 16, 2002.

The good and friendly working relationship that brought me together with Brother Amr Moussa continued until the last Arab ministerial meeting I attended on March 25, 2003 at the Arab League’s headquarters after the start of the US invasion of Iraq. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Amr escorted me to the outside gate of the building on the main street to bid me farewell.

Naji Sabri al-Hadithi – Foreign Minister of Iraq (2001-2003)



Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.


The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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The Gaza Ceasefire Began Months Ago. Here’s Why the Fighting Persists

Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers and tanks stand in Gaza, as seen from the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border, in Israel, February 4, 2026. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

As the bodies of two dozen Palestinians killed in Israeli strikes arrived at hospitals in Gaza on Wednesday, the director of one asked a question that has echoed across the war-ravaged territory for months.

“Where is the ceasefire? Where are the mediators?” Shifa Hospital's Mohamed Abu Selmiya wrote on Facebook.

At least 556 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli strikes since a US-brokered truce came into effect in October, including 24 on Wednesday and 30 on Saturday, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. Four Israeli soldiers have been killed in Gaza in the same period, with more injured, including a soldier whom the military said was severely wounded when militants opened fire near the ceasefire line in northern Gaza overnight.

Other aspects of the agreement have stalled, including the deployment of an international security force, Hamas' disarmament and the start of Gaza's reconstruction. The opening of the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt raised hope of further progress, but fewer than 50 people were allowed to cross on Monday, The Associated Press said.

Hostages freed as other issues languish In October, after months of stalled negotiations, Israel and Hamas accepted a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump aimed at ending the war unleashed by Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.

At the time, Trump said it would lead to a “Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace."

Hamas freed all the living hostages it still held at the outset of the deal in exchange for thousands of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and the remains of others.

But the larger issues the agreement sought to address, including the future governance of the strip, were met with reservations, and the US offered no firm timeline.

The return of the remains of hostages meanwhile stretched far beyond the 72-hour timeline outlined in the agreement. Israel recovered the body of the last hostage only last week, after accusing Hamas and other militant groups of violating the ceasefire by failing to return all of the bodies. The militants said they were unable to immediately locate all the remains because of the massive destruction caused by the war — a claim Israel rejected.

The ceasefire also called for an immediate influx of humanitarian aid, including equipment to clear rubble and rehabilitate infrastructure. The United Nations and humanitarian groups say aid deliveries to Gaza's 2 million Palestinians have fallen short due to customs clearance problems and other delays. COGAT, the Israeli military body overseeing aid to Gaza, has called the UN's claims “simply a lie.”

Ceasefire holds despite accusations

Violence has sharply declined since the ceasefire paused a war in which more than 71,800 Palestinians have been killed, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. The ministry is part of the Hamas-led government and maintains detailed records seen as generally reliable by UN agencies and independent experts.

Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people in the initial October 2023 attack and took around 250 hostage.

Both sides say the agreement is still in effect and use the word “ceasefire” in their communications. But Israel accuses Hamas fighters of operating beyond the truce line splitting Gaza in half, threatening its troops and occasionally opening fire, while Hamas accuses Israeli forces of gunfire and strikes on residential areas far from the line.

Palestinians have called on US and Arab mediators to get Israel to stop carrying out deadly strikes, which often kill civilians. Among those killed on Wednesday were five children, including two babies. Hamas, which accuses Israel of hundreds of violations, called it a “grave circumvention of the ceasefire agreement.”

In a joint statement on Sunday, eight Arab and Muslim countries condemned Israel’s actions since the agreement took effect and urged restraint from all sides “to preserve and sustain the ceasefire.”

Israel says it is responding to daily violations committed by Hamas and acting to protect its troops. “While Hamas’ actions undermine the ceasefire, Israel remains fully committed to upholding it,” the military said in a statement on Wednesday.

“One of the scenarios the (military) has to be ready for is Hamas is using a deception tactic like they did before October 7 and rearming and preparing for an attack when it’s comfortable for them,” said Lt. Col. Nadav Shoshani, a military spokesperson.

Some signs of progress

The return of the remains of the last hostage, the limited opening of the Rafah crossing, and the naming of a Palestinian committee to govern Gaza and oversee its reconstruction showed a willingness to advance the agreement despite the violence.

Last month, US envoy Steve Witkoff, who played a key role in brokering the truce, said it was time for “transitioning from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

That will require Israel and Hamas to grapple with major issues on which they have been sharply divided, including whether Israel will fully withdraw from Gaza and Hamas will lay down its arms.

Though political leaders are holding onto the term “ceasefire” and have yet to withdraw from the process, there is growing despair in Gaza.

On Saturday, Atallah Abu Hadaiyed heard explosions in Gaza City during his morning prayers and ran outside to find his cousins lying on the ground as flames curled around them.

“We don’t know if we’re at war or at peace,” he said from a displacement camp, as tarpaulin strips blew off the tent behind him.


What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
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What to Know as Iran and US Set for Nuclear Talks in Oman

The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER
The flags of USA and Iran are displayed in Muscat, Oman, 25 April 2025. EPA/ALI HAIDER

Iran and the United States will hold talks Friday in Oman, their latest over Tehran's nuclear program after Israel launched a 12-day war on the country in June and Iran launched a bloody crackdown on nationwide protests.

US President Donald Trump has kept up pressure on Iran, suggesting America could attack Iran over the killing of peaceful demonstrators or if Tehran launches mass executions over the protests. Meanwhile, Trump has pushed Iran's nuclear program back into the frame as well after the June war disrupted five rounds of talks held in Rome and Muscat, Oman, last year.

Trump began the diplomacy initially by writing a letter last year to Iran’s 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to jump start these talks. Khamenei has warned Iran would respond to any attack with an attack of its own, particularly as the theocracy he commands reels following the protests.

Here’s what to know about Iran’s nuclear program and the tensions that have stalked relations between Tehran and Washington since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Trump writes letter to Khamenei Trump dispatched the letter to Khamenei on March 5, 2025, then gave a television interview the next day in which he acknowledged sending it. He said: “I’ve written them a letter saying, ‘I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it’s going to be a terrible thing.’”

Since returning to the White House, the president has been pushing for talks while ratcheting up sanctions and suggesting a military strike by Israel or the US could target Iranian nuclear sites.

A previous letter from Trump during his first term drew an angry retort from the supreme leader.

But Trump’s letters to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in his first term led to face-to-face meetings, though no deals to limit Pyongyang’s atomic bombs and a missile program capable of reaching the continental US.

Oman mediated previous talks

Oman, a sultanate on the eastern edge of the Arabian Peninsula, has mediated talks between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US Mideast envoy Steve Witkoff. The two men have met face to face after indirect talks, a rare occurrence due to the decades of tensions between the countries.

It hasn't been all smooth, however. Witkoff at one point made a television appearance in which he suggested 3.67% enrichment for Iran could be something the countries could agree on. But that’s exactly the terms set by the 2015 nuclear deal struck under former President Barack Obama, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew America. Witkoff, Trump and other American officials in the time since have maintained Iran can have no enrichment under any deal, something to which Tehran insists it won't agree.

Those negotiations ended, however, with Israel launching the war in June on Iran.

The 12-day war and nationwide protests Israel launched what became a 12-day war on Iran in June that included the US bombing Iranian nuclear sites. Iran later acknowledged in November that the attacks saw it halt all uranium enrichment in the country, though inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been unable to visit the bombed sites.

Iran soon experienced protests that began in late December over the collapse of the country's rial currency. Those demonstrations soon became nationwide, sparking Tehran to launch a bloody crackdown that killed thousands and saw tens of thousands detained by authorities.

Iran’s nuclear program worries the West Iran has insisted for decades that its nuclear program is peaceful. However, its officials increasingly threaten to pursue a nuclear weapon. Iran now enriches uranium to near weapons-grade levels of 60%, the only country in the world without a nuclear weapons program to do so.

Under the original 2015 nuclear deal, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67% purity and to maintain a uranium stockpile of 300 kilograms (661 pounds). The last report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s program put its stockpile at some 9,870 kilograms (21,760 pounds), with a fraction of it enriched to 60%.

US intelligence agencies assess that Iran has yet to begin a weapons program, but has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Iranian officials have threatened to pursue the bomb.

Decades of tense relations between Iran and the US Iran was once one of the US’s top allies in the Mideast under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who purchased American military weapons and allowed CIA technicians to run secret listening posts monitoring the neighboring Soviet Union. The CIA had fomented a 1953 coup that cemented the shah’s rule.

But in January 1979, the shah, fatally ill with cancer, fled Iran as mass demonstrations swelled against his rule. The Iranian Revolution followed, led by Grand Khomeini, and created Iran’s theocratic government.

Later that year, university students overran the US Embassy in Tehran, seeking the shah’s extradition and sparking the 444-day hostage crisis that saw diplomatic relations between Iran and the US severed.

The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s saw the US back Saddam Hussein. The “Tanker War” during that conflict saw the US launch a one-day assault that crippled Iran at sea, while the US later shot down an Iranian commercial airliner that the US military said it mistook for a warplane.

Iran and the US have seesawed between enmity and grudging diplomacy in the years since, with relations peaking when Tehran made the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers. But Trump unilaterally withdrew America from the accord in 2018, sparking tensions in the Mideast that persist today.