As part of the reports published by Asharq Al-Awsat on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, Hani Al-Hassan, a member of the Central Committee of the Fatah movement, narrates that the Palestinians had gathered information a year before about Israel’s preparation for a wide-scale aggression against the country, with the aim of eliminating the military resistance.
Al-Hassan said that the PLO leadership contacted Saudi Arabia, which responded quickly, by launching an initiative sponsored by then Saudi Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz.
“The goal of the initiative was to contain a potential war in Lebanon and prevent it from occurring,” he remarked. But the Saudi endeavor collided with the Soviet Union’s rejection.
In the first months of 1982, information began to reach the office of the Director of Intelligence in the Lebanese Army, Colonel Johnny Abdo, about Israeli preparations to carry out a large-scale invasion that might reach Beirut.
Abdo recounted: “We obtained this information from Lebanese sources. I believe that the Western countries themselves were getting their information from Lebanon... It was about a large-scale invasion with an Israeli desire to avoid a clash with the Syrian forces deployed in Lebanon. We did not see how such a broad aggression could be launched without clashing with the Syrian forces. We had questions about the importance of an adventure of this kind, especially in light of Syrian-Soviet relations and the treaty signed between the two countries.”
At that time, statements were issued by pro-Syria Lebanese figures. They put this information within the framework of intimidation attempts that aim to exert pressure on the resistance to push it to facilitate the deployment of the Lebanese army in the South, Abdo said.
He added that the solution to avoid the invasion lied in the withdrawal of the Palestinians from the South and the redeployment of the army there.
“We tried this several times, but Abu Ammar was not willing to abandon South Lebanon. The PLO refused to discuss the issue in detail,” he underlined.
“The Israeli ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, was shot, and the Israeli raids on Lebanon began, followed by the invasion on June 6. Many thought that the process was limited, but the information available to us indicated otherwise,” the Lebanese official recounted.
Abdo expressed his regret that the Lebanese authority was unable to persuade the PLO to agree on what could have helped to avoid the invasion. He also noted that the Syrian side did not take seriously the information conveyed by Lebanon.
“Yasser Arafat’s state”... and the long journey of torment
Another man was disappointed with the fact that Lebanon had not succeeded in avoiding the catastrophe of the invasion, despite the efforts that had been made. His name is Fouad Boutros, the Foreign Minister of that era.
After turning off the tape recorder, he said: “I want you, as a journalist, to know the story briefly. [Yasser Arafat’s state] was stronger on Lebanese soil than the Lebanese state. It was stronger in the Arab and Islamic worlds. This is in addition to the Soviet Union and the countries within its orbit. We saw some foreign ministers and ambassadors expressing an understanding of Lebanon’s right to deploy its army in the South to avoid Israeli attacks, but this perception was neither declared publicly, nor translated into the policies of these countries. The Palestinian issue enjoyed sanctity that prevented even raising the transgressions of the Palestinian organization that exposed Lebanon to dangers.”
He added: “The PLO considered its military presence in southern Lebanon as its last card to remind of its existence, its demands, and its cause. Arafat was not ready to give up this card. The Arab countries, for their part, were not willing to put pressure on the organization. The media in the region was insensitive to any Lebanese call to impose the sovereignty of the Lebanese state alone on its lands. In addition to all of this, the Lebanese division over the Palestinian military presence was deep and violent, and the mere attempt to control it was labeled as treason.”
Another man was alarmed by Abdo’s information and tried to convince himself not to believe it. He is then-Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Wazzan. Never before in the history of the conflict has Israel occupied an Arab capital.
He recounted: “After the invasion, we summoned the ambassadors of the major powers... It ultimately became clear that we had no choice but to bet on the United States to curb the aggression, or to push Israel to withdraw, even if it was supportive of the invasion or its goals... We wished there was an Arab force capable of intervening and turning the course of events, but the reality was otherwise. Thus, we came under the fire of Israeli aggression... and the long journey of torment began.”
Al-Wazzan added: “I called King Fahd bin Abdulaziz and informed him that Beirut was living without water, bread, or medicine. He was very saddened and told me that he would call me back. Five hours later, King Fahd informed me that he had spoken to President Ronald Reagan asking for his intervention, and that the American president had called Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who promised him the return of the water. In those harsh conditions, we considered the restoration of water an achievement. I would like to stress here that Saudi Arabia has not spared Lebanon any possible assistance.”
The Silent Action Party
I was unable to obtain President Élias Sarkis's testimony about those days. The reasons are many. He was from the party of silent action, not from the party of speech. He was confident, based on his integrity and responsible behavior, that history would do him justice if it was written fairly.
Sarkis saw Beirut burning, besieged, and invaded. He saw the occupation soldiers even approaching the presidential palace. He was the voice of the state and the state was weak. He was the voice of the nation, and the nation was divided. His friends say that he was counting the days waiting for his departure, refusing any proposal to extend his term.
Did the Palestinian side try to avoid the Israeli invasion, and who bears responsibility for thwarting that attempt? I found the answer with Hani Al-Hassan. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Fatah movement and in charge of its political security. He was also in the narrow circle of decision-makers around President Yasser Arafat.
Al-Hassan said that information was gathered in 1981 indicating that Israel was preparing a large-scale aggression against Lebanon with the aim of striking the military presence of the resistance.
He added that the Reagan’s administration facilitated an operation of this kind. The Arab situation was very difficult. Egypt was in semi-Arab isolation, and Iraq was immersed in its war with Iran. The organization’s leadership went to Saudi Arabia and informed its officials, who took a quick action.
Al-Hassan asserted that the goal of the Saudi initiative was to contain the next war in Lebanon and prevent it from occurring.” But the initiative faltered because the Soviet Union issued orders to block it.
He stressed that anyone who wanted to narrate the Palestinian revolution between 1972 and 1982 must always keep the Soviet position in mind, because the Palestinian revolution lived during that period a stage of indecision, where in the end, despite all the differences and the multiplicity of viewpoints, only the Soviet decision prevailed.
Al-Hassan recounted: “The siege took place and Abu Ammar told me that we had to fight for six months... The important thing is that we made a secret decision to fight for six months, and Abu Ammar asked me to assume the political work. That is, he asked me to move forward with political action, but without returning with an agreement. This means that we negotiate for the mere purpose of negotiation, then we see the balance of fighting, the international situation, and the weight of Syrian intervention.”
