The new chapter in Syria, which began after it turned the page on 54 years of Assadist rule, could be undermined by the painful developments earlier this month.
The new leadership in Damascus, as far as I can tell, was aware that former regime remnants had been present in the region, and of the communities had profited from its transgressions without having necessarily played any part in them.
On the other hand, I also believe that certain Syrian factions are skeptical that coexistence with the new leadership’s ideology (with its interpretation of political Islam "in power") is possible. Indeed, Syria has witnessed many episodes of religious and sectarian violence from various directions over the past 14 years - kidnappings, forced disappearances, and even massacres. Moreover, despite the broad popular support it enjoys, the current interim authorities came to power under exceptional circumstances and due to a military balance that could change at any moment.
Moreover, while this leadership currently enjoys some regional and international support, every reasonable observer understands that it does not have a mandate to do what it likes. On the contrary, it is being closely scrutinized by international actors, and the immense confidence exhibited by key figures in the top brass despite the tabs the world is keeping - perhaps even more confidence than a great many Syrian citizens - is striking.
On the other hand, the speed at which the "understanding" between the new Damascus authority and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) was announced, despite indications that a clash had been all but inevitable, strongly signals that Washington is comfortable with the new leadership in Damascus.
Since the SDF is an integral part of Washington’s strategy in Syria, the underlying message is that Syria’s territorial unity will not be threatened, as had previously been assumed, by a separatist Kurdish insurgency. Thus, it seems that all the gains made by the SDF in recent years merely "improved the terms" in accord with the authorities in Damascus, encouraging the Druze in southern Syria to follow a similar path.
The Druze, particularly in southern Syria, remain a force to be reckoned with. However, it may take longer for a decisive outcome to emerge. Keen observers have gotten the sense that the unprecedented Israeli "offensive" to "protect" and "support" the Druze has complicated things in the Druze-majority province of Sweida. Israel has taken these steps despite not having been publicly asked to by the Druze, and many doubt that any major Druze political leader would openly endorse such an initiative.
The Druze understood the "impetus" behind Israel’s pressure campaign when Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister, Israel Katz, mentioned the one billion dollars that Israel had allocated for this campaign. This development certainly did not come out of nowhere. Rather, the seeds of this plan were probably planted some time ago - in Syria itself, as well as Lebanon and the diaspora, particularly in the United States, where the Israeli lobby has plenty of room for maneuver, as well as a lot of sway, including through intelligence infiltration.
Indeed, while Sweida activists from various factions have sought arrangements with Damascus to preserve national unity and reinforce the fraternity of Syria’s communities, Israel’s "veto" has upped the ante and shed doubt on these settlements. In my view, even in the southern region (Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra), Washington’s priorities do not significantly diverge from Netanyahu’s.
This brings us to the wounded coastline. Alawites make up a majority of the population in rural Latakia and Tartus, as well as the suburbs of Syria’s four coastal cities: Latakia, Tartus, Jableh, and Baniyas.
The operations of paramilitaries affiliated with the former regime, or some of its factions, could not have happened without Iran’s support. Indeed, the statements that Iranian officials had made before the militias launched their attacks, which had horrific consequences, make Iran’s stance crystal clear: the new authorities in Damascus are not acceptable and that they will not last long.
However, one might wonder whether the leadership in Tehran had misread the situation and misunderstood the dynamics of the relationship between the new Damascus authorities and the international community, especially Washington.
It is reasonable to assume that the US-Israeli strategy is hostile to a resurgence of Iranian influence. That might explain the restraint of the US-Russian initiative at the UN Security Council and relatively mild rhetoric about the massacres on the coast last week, which led to the death of approximately 1,225 people.
The Security Council condemned the "massacres" against civilians, called on the Damascus authorities "to protect all Syrians, regardless of ethnicity or religion" and condemned the violence, particularly against Alawite civilians. It then urged the authorities to prosecute those who were implicated in violence and called for "further measures to prevent its recurrence."
Finally, the "draft constitutional declaration" was recently announced in Damascus. Several of its provisions sparked controversy, particularly the way in which it concentrated power in the hands of the president, its five-year timeline for the transition, the dissolution of Syria’s constitutional court, and the president’s authority (albeit temporarily) to appoint the members of the new constitutional court.
Critics argue that it would have been better to avoid stipulations that bring the recent past to mind. Instead, they recommend a stronger focus on broadening political representation and reassuring Syria’s communities, as well as avoiding "past experiments" and not rekindling old concerns.
Diversity enriches and protects Syria. Fostering unity and communal harmony is particularly crucial at this stage; the country needs all its qualified and dedicated citizens to contribute. No community should be excluded or marginalized.
