Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
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Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS

In the first week of September 2025, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah concluded it had no option but to release Israeli-Russian researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov even if it meant surrendering a valuable bargaining chip without reward, multiple officials and faction insiders told Asharq Al-Awsat.

According to sources, the decision marked the end of the group’s fraught relationship with what is known as the “Iraqi resistance coordination,” and followed weeks of increasingly complex arrangements for her handover. These included security contacts, factional negotiations and discreet transfers between sites.

On Sept. 9, Tsurkov was left alone for four hours in one Baghdad property before a government-designated force arrived to collect her.

Asharq al-Awsat spoke with a US State Department official, Iraqi government advisers, security personnel and members of two armed factions to piece together what was described as a “liberation operation.”

Those interviews suggested Iraq’s government opened a security track against the abductors in parallel with “tough” American warnings over the consequences of prolonged detention. Kataib Hezbollah, sensing it had exhausted potential gains from holding her longer, delivered her under pressure.

Advisers and militia elements told Asharq Al-Awsat that Kataib Hezbollah was effectively forced into releasing Tsurkov “after a political siege and negotiations that escalated since August, under pressure from the Iraqi government and the United States.”

“The release of Princeton University student Elizabeth Tsurkov came after a decisive partnership with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani,” a US State Department spokesperson told the newspaper.

On Sept. 11, as photographs circulated showing Tsurkov en route to an Israeli hospital, a Kataib Hezbollah official said the faction had made “a concession for the sake of public security, to avoid embarrassing the government and to support it.”

Tsurkov, a Princeton doctoral student, had vanished in Baghdad in March 2023. Israel later accused Kataib Hezbollah of abducting her. In May 2025, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that negotiations for her release were in their final stage.

After she was handed to the US embassy in Baghdad, supporters of Kataib Hezbollah spread word that the release was part of a wider bargain: a US troop withdrawal pledge and an Israeli prisoner swap. Iranian outlet Tasnim cited Iraqi sources to claim Israel would release Lebanese and Iraqi detainees, including naval officer Imad Amhaz, captured in Lebanon in late 2024.

But political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanon had received no notice of any such return. Hezbollah officials did not mention Amhaz in a speech on Sept. 10.

A commander of another Iraqi faction allied with Kataib Hezbollah confirmed to the newspaper that Tsurkov was freed “without any deal.”

A politician within the Coordination Framework – the coalition of Shiite parties that dominates government and is aligned with the “resistance axis” – told Asharq al-Awsat the handover to Israel heralded “an unprecedented split” inside the camp.

“For years, these factions operated together under Revolutionary Guard direction,” he said. “Now some are siding with the government, while Tehran has shown no reaction. Kataib Hezbollah feels bitter, even toward pro-Iran Shiite factions.”

Accounts gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that multiple actors became involved in the handover, and their competing agendas produced conflicting narratives. Still, most agreed on one key detail: Tsurkov spent her last hours in Baghdad alone in a rented house in Jadriya, an affluent district by the Tigris River favored by Shiite leaders and militia commanders.

Sources said she was moved there on the final day, near the new Iraqi central bank headquarters. The property was owned by a retired politician and leased by a senior militia figure for sensitive meetings, according to the paper.

Armed men in military garb brought her in, one helping her down from a tinted car due to severe back pain. She had undergone spinal surgery a week before her abduction, and months of shifting between safehouses worsened her condition, Iraqi officials told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The armed men left, later alerting a security body to the location. Initially hesitant, a government unit eventually entered the house and “found Tsurkov alone.”

During her captivity she had been moved between buildings, sometimes disguised by decoy façades. US forces twice located her, but failed to reach her, officials said.

Israeli channel i24 aired footage on Sept. 11 of Tsurkov struggling to walk in a Tel Aviv hospital, leaning on a companion.

Negotiations intensified in recent months, according to a political adviser and a security official who spoke to the paper. Kataib Hezbollah’s leverage had ebbed after a July clash with the Iraqi army in southern Baghdad, in which Sudani accused the militia of “breaking the law.”

Two sources from armed factions said Quds Force advisers urged Kataib Hezbollah not to escalate against the government. Political intermediaries floated swap proposals, but the group concluded Tsurkov had become a burden.

By Sept. 9, both sides “reluctantly reached the end,” an Iraqi mediator said. The government pressed its advantage with US backing.

On Sept. 6, President Donald Trump signed an executive order sanctioning hostage-takers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned of “severe” penalties for state or non-state actors. The same day, new US Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris met Sudani, raising expectations of a breakthrough.

“The message to Kataib Hezbollah was clear: the government was ready to confront them, backed by Washington,” a government adviser told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Inside Baghdad’s ruling coalition, fears spread of looming US sanctions targeting the Shiite-led political system. While no major measures materialized, some parties began quietly signaling pragmatic readiness to adjust their stance, a Shiite politician told the newspaper.

A US State Department spokesman said the release was “a practical embodiment of peace through strength.” A senior militia commander stressed: “Not a single shot was fired in this liberation.”

One member of Sudani’s team said the government applied “political and security pressure” to block ransom or prisoner-exchange demands. An Iraqi politician called it “a battle in which no trigger was pulled.”

On Sept. 9, government forces and senior officials arrived to take custody of Tsurkov. Exhausted, she listened warily as one officer explained: “You are free now... you can trust everyone in this room.”

Only when reassured in English did she comply. Iraqi authorities checked her documents, ran medical tests, and asked the US embassy to conduct further examinations.

Armored vehicles escorted her to the embassy, and later to the airport. Before departure, she retrieved books and belongings she had bought in Baghdad markets, Asharq Al-Awsat said.

While she rested in a Baghdad hotel under government protection, US diplomats hesitated to receive her without Washington’s green light. Trump abruptly announced her release, catching officials by surprise.

A source close to Sudani said he “resented the US rush” but chose to let Trump “reap the benefits” rather than risk derailing the outcome.

Analysts told the paper that Sudani aims to secure a second term and saw the case as strengthening his credentials with Washington. “The governing coalition is now laying mines for him after the Tsurkov bomb was defused,” one said.

For Kataib Hezbollah, the ordeal ended with humiliation. “They lost their bargaining chip and got nothing,” a Baghdad security official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The episode, Iraqi politicians say, may mark a realignment. Some factions are tilting toward cooperation with the government, while others cling to Iran’s “resistance” camp.

“This was a battle without gunfire,” a senior official said. “But it may ignite a deeper political war inside the Shiite camp – over Iraq’s future direction.”

Tsurkov, reunited with her family in Israel, thanked those who helped secure her release, Israeli media reported. For Iraq, the affair has underscored Sudani’s precarious balancing act: keeping US ties alive while managing fractious allies who once marched in lockstep under Tehran.



Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
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Can Iran Legally Impose Tolls on the Strait of Hormuz?

FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: Cargo ships in the Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz, as seen from northern Ras al-Khaimah, near the border with Oman’s Musandam governance, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in United Arab Emirates, March 11, 2026. REUTERS/Stringer/File Photo

Tehran has sought to tighten its grip over the Strait of Hormuz by charging tolls on vessels to ensure safe passage, in conjunction with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The following explains law governing toll collections and actions that countries opposed to tolls might take, according to Reuters.

WHAT IS THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ?

The Strait of Hormuz is ‌a waterway connecting the Gulf with the Gulf of Oman, and located within Iran's and Oman's territorial waters. It is perhaps the world's most important energy shipping lane. About 20% of the world's oil passes through it.

The waterway is about 104 miles (167 km) long. Its width varies, and at its narrowest point provides 2-mile channels for inbound and outbound shipping, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.

Iran effectively closed the strait following US-Israeli strikes on the country, and has demanded a right ⁠to collect tolls as a precondition to ending the war. The status of any toll collections so far could not immediately be confirmed.

WHAT LAW GOVERNS PASSAGE ON THE STRAIT?

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, opens new tab, sometimes known as UNCLOS, was adopted in 1982 and has been in force since 1994.

Article 38 provides vessels a right of unimpeded "transit passage" through more than 100 straits worldwide, including the Strait of Hormuz.

The treaty allows a country bordering a strait to regulate passage within its "territorial sea," up to 12 nautical miles from its border, but shall permit "innocent passage."

Passage is innocent if it is not prejudicial to a country's peace, good order and security. Military action, serious pollution, spying and fishing are not permitted. The concept of innocent passage was key to a 1949 International Court ‌of ⁠Justice case concerning the Corfu Channel, along the coasts of Albania and Greece.

Approximately 170 countries and the European Union have ratified UNCLOS. Iran and the United States have not. This raises the question of whether the treaty's rules affording freedom of maritime navigation have become part of customary international law, or bind only ratifying countries.

Experts say UNCLOS has become or is generally viewed as customary international law. Some non-ratifying countries may ⁠argue that they need not follow the treaty because they persistently and consistently object. Iran has argued that it has made such objections. The United States disputes Iran's authority to charge tolls.

HOW CAN TOLLS BE CHALLENGED?

There is no formal mechanism to enforce UNCLOS. The International Tribunal for the Law ⁠of the Sea in Hamburg, Germany, which the treaty established, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands could issue rulings but cannot enforce them.

Countries and businesses have other potential means to counteract tolls.

A willing state or coalition of states could ⁠try to enforce the treaty. The UN Security Council could pass a resolution opposing tolls.

Companies could redirect shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz, and have begun doing so. Countries could expand sanctions targeting financial transactions believed to benefit Iran's government, by sanctioning companies willing to pay tolls.


How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
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How China’s Weapons Transfers to Iran Have Evolved Over Decades

FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: A member of the People's Liberation Army stands as the strategic strike group displays DF-5C nuclear missiles during a military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War Two, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. REUTERS/Tingshu Wang/File Photo

Washington: David Pierson

For much of the last two decades, China has maintained a delicate balance in its military relationship with Iran, offering often indirect assistance instead of arms sales.

That approach is now drawing renewed attention after US officials said intelligence agencies were assessing whether China may have shipped shoulder-fired missiles to Iran in recent weeks. President Trump has said he would impose an additional 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods if the assessment proves accurate. China has denied the claim, calling it “pure fabrication” and has vowed to “resolutely retaliate” if the Trump administration goes through with tariffs.

The American officials said the information obtained by US intelligence agencies was not definitive. But if proven true, it would be a significant tactical change in the way Beijing supports its closest strategic partner in the Middle East.

Chinese arms sales to Iran exploded in the 1980s and have all but vanished in the last decade to comply with a United Nations embargo and US sanctions. Chinese support for Iran in recent years has instead come in the form of components that could be used in both civilian technologies as well as missiles and drones.

China has a major stake in the crisis in Iran. About a third of its total crude oil imports come from the Arabian Gulf.

Here is how China’s military support for Iran has evolved over the years:

The 1980s: The Boom Years

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 coincided with major market reforms in China when the leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping, ordered state-owned companies to wean themselves off government support and instead seek commercial profit.

Chinese state-run defense companies were suddenly empowered to export their wares. That resulted in a deluge of Chinese missiles, fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles and assault rifles being sold to Iran starting in 1982 and peaking in 1987, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

At the same time, China sold even more arms to Iraq, resulting in a situation in which the two warring sides clashed with each other using the same Chinese weapons.

The Reagan administration opposed China’s arms sales to Iran, particularly Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles. Tehran used the missiles in attacks in Kuwaiti waters in 1987 that struck an American-owned tanker and an American-registered tanker.

The United States responded by curbing exports of some high-technology products to China. China denied selling arms directly to Iran, but said it would do more to prevent its military exports from reaching Iran through intermediaries.

The 1990s: Technology Transfers

Following the war, Iran set out to develop its own military-industrial base with the help of China. One of its key products was the Noor anti-ship cruise missile, which had been reverse-engineered through purchases of Chinese C-802 cruise missiles.

“China played a major role in supporting Iran’s military modernization for decades, especially in developing Iran’s missile capabilities,” said Brian Hart, a fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Iran also received help from China in building missile-production facilities and even in constructing a missile test range east of Tehran, wrote Bates Gill, a longtime China expert, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Under US pressure to curtail its sale of finished weapons, particularly missiles, to Iran, China began increasing exports of machine tools and components that could be used for both military and civilian purposes.

The 2000s to the Present: Dual-Use Technologies

In 2006, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. China voted in favor of the resolution and largely pivoted away from new, formal arms contracts with Tehran.

The shift was as much about regional strategy as it was about international law. Starting in the mid-2010s, China began deepening its strategic relationships with Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar.

China continued to supply Iran with dual-use technologies and materials that have helped it amass an arsenal of missiles and drones.

That included chemicals used to produce fuel for ballistic missiles and components for drones, such as radio frequency connectors and turbine blades.

But Mr. Hart said China was still “a critical form of support, given Iran’s reliance on ballistic missiles and drones to attack US and Israeli forces and other countries in the region.”

The US Treasury Department has sanctioned Chinese and Hong Kong front companies it says were set up to source parts and ingredients for ballistic missiles and drones for Iran.

Suspicions are also growing that Iran is using its access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, an alternative to the US-owned Global Positioning System, for military purposes. Last month, a US congressional agency said BeiDou may have been used to direct Iran’s drone and missile strikes across the Middle East.

The New York Times


A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
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A Look at Sudan’s War by the Numbers

Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)
Sudanese refugees, who have fled the violence in their country, line up to receive food rations from World Food Program (WFP), in Adre Chad July 20, 2023. (Reuters)

Sudan is entering a fourth year of war between the military and paramilitary forces.

The fighting has pushed many people into famine, caused a huge displacement crisis and left over 30 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. Parties have been accused of committing atrocities like ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings and sexual violence against civilians.

Here's a look at the war by the numbers:

59,000 At least this many people have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, or ACLED. Aid groups say the true toll could be much higher as access to areas of fighting across the vast country remains limited.

4.5 million About this many people have fled the country to places like Egypt, South Sudan, Libya and Chad.

9 million About this many people remain displaced in Sudan.

19 million More than this many people face acute hunger, according to the World Food Program.

24% This is the amount that fuel prices have shot up in Sudan since conflict in the Middle East escalated.

354 This is the number of community kitchens that have closed over the last six months after providing a lifeline for millions of people, according to Islamic Relief.

Over 4,300 About this many children have been killed or maimed in the war, according to UNICEF.

8 million At least this many children are still out of school, according to UNICEF.

11% About this many schools are being used by warring sides or are shelters for displaced people, according to UNICEF.

63% This many of Sudan's health facilities are fully or partially functioning, according to World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

217 This is the number of verified attacks on health facilities since the war began, according to the WHO.

1,032 This was the number of civilians killed by air and drone strikes in 2025, according to ACLED, as a surge in drone strikes took a growing toll.