Hassan Al Mustafa
Hassan Al Mustafa is a Saudi researcher and journalist
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Saudi Arabia and the US: Restoring Balance in the Middle East

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the United States and the meetings he held with President Donald Trump are a crucial moment for their bilateral relations. It is the first toward broader cooperation that is expected to reinforce the Kingdom’s political safety net and restore regional balance.

Indeed, the Middle East’s balance has been upended by Israel’s insistence on using excessive force to impose realities on the ground and consolidate a role for itself as a regional enforcer that shapes politics through coercion. These hostile actions are not acceptable to the Kingdom, which sees them as a threat to regional peace.

The Middle East has undergone structural shifts since October 7, 2023. Israel has expanded its influence; Iran has lost much of its ability to use its proxies; Syria has pushed out the so-called “Axis of Resistance”; and Gaza is continuing to suffer displacement as the extremist government in Tel Aviv continues its effort to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. These major changes, among others, make political, security, and defense cooperation between Riyadh and Washington crucial for preventing protracted chaos that would allow terrorist groups to prosper.

From this perspective, the reasons behind the announcement of the strategic defense agreement and the US president’s approval of a deal to sell Saudi Arabia F-35 fighter jets can be understood as steps toward redefining Riyadh’s role, its standing, and its alliance with Washington.

During the state dinner, Trump’s announcement that the United States would designate Saudi Arabia a “Major Non-NATO Ally” grants their military relationship an advanced legal and political status, especially if the defense agreement is elevated to a “treaty” and Congress does not object to finalizing the fighter-jet deal. This designation does not constitute an open-ended explicit commitment to mutual defense, but it brings privileges granted to only a limited number of countries: advanced weapons systems, priority in training and readiness programs, the expansion of pre-positioned equipment, and enhanced interoperability between the Saudi and US armed forces.

With regard to the strategic defense agreement, it is part of this broader trajectory of the relationship between Riyadh and Washington. It also reflects the two countries’ significance as major security allies working together to confront shared threats by establishing a framework for a genuine and durable partnership that will strengthen political alignment and integrate economic interests. This agreement is not a threat to any state in particular; the Kingdom views diplomacy and dialogue, alongside the deterrence of aggression, as the optimal path for resolving conflicts. It prefers the negotiating table over war, and this is precisely what it did with Iran through the “Beijing Agreement.”

Through this strategy, the Kingdom is preempting any sudden shifts in this highly volatile region. Thus, building an advanced defensive system does not signal a pursuit of confrontation, but rather the development of tools for preventing escalation and hindering militias or states with expansionist ambitions from exploiting any incident to ignite new fronts, attack Saudi territory, or threaten its economic interests.

The F-35 fighter jet deal rises to the forefront of every discussion of Saudi-US military cooperation. Trump has announced his intention to proceed, while the logistical and procedural details remain pending. If concluded, this deal would reshape Saudi Arabia’s defensive doctrine.

This multi-functional stealth aircraft would grant Riyadh advanced capabilities that allow for operations in highly complex defensive systems, and it would transform the Royal Saudi Air Force into an integrated operational network of collecting, integrating, and converting data into precise field decisions. Introducing this system requires parallel upgrades to the command-and-control network and training, as well as the integration of air, land, and naval forces into a more unified strategy that facilitates rapid response. In pursuing this strategy, the Kingdom will secure capabilities possessed only by a limited number of states.

As it is strengthens deterrence through the steps laid out above, Riyadh has maintained a rational and active diplomatic approach, whether through its ongoing de-escalation efforts with Iran and their dialogue aimed at resolving outstanding issues, or through communication channels with the Houthis as part of the Kingdom’s push to restore all components’ inclusion in the legitimate government in Yemen. Moreover, it is also reinforcing stability through coordination with international powers and cooperation with France on the “Two-State Solution Conference” initiative, as well as Saudi support for Trump’s initiative to end the war in the Gaza Strip.

This combination of dialogue and deterrence reflects an approach grounded in realism, which understands that regional security is not attainable through military force alone, nor through diplomacy alone. Politics, even when rooted in a viable, principled, and persuasive strategy, becomes ineffective if it is not backed and safeguarded by power that underpins the achievement of its goals.

After the Saudi-US meeting at the White House, the ability of both countries to turn agreements and statements into clear, actionable programs will be tested. At the same time, the evolving regional landscape since Al-Aqsa Flood Operation will test the resilience and cohesion of this trajectory.

Nevertheless, the general course of events is apparent: enhancing Saudi military power, institutionalizing the defense partnership, and consolidating the Kingdom as a significant political and security actor that seeks to reduce the cost of conflicts as keenly as it seeks to prevent them. Riyadh sees regional instability as the greatest obstacle to its development and to its large and ambitious economic and investment programs.