Our region is strewn with long-buried landmines, any one of which could spark unintended consequences. This is not meant to refer to the Saudi-Emirati dispute in southern Yemen, despite it being one of today’s heated issues that could still be resolved through direct talks.
Beyond these landmines, however, the more dangerous issue is the rising likelihood of a US-Iran war and its repercussions on our surroundings, foremost among them the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which sit in the front row of the theater of war.
It is worth recalling that the GCC was established more than four decades ago to confront this very danger. Yet its member states chose to expand its objectives from defense cooperation to almost everything, down to minor details such as laundry labels and electrical sockets. It remains the only largely successful regional bloc, a fact that does not negate the existence of political disagreements.
One researcher once argued to me that the GCC was built on “hatred of Iran’s regime.” That is, of course, inaccurate. It was indeed founded against the backdrop of confronting Khomeini’s threats to Gulf states and the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq. However, the region overlooking the western Gulf needed a framework to organize relations among its six states even if no external threat had existed. Major undertakings can be born out of unintended circumstances.
The European Union, for example, was built on an agreement over coal between Germany and France. The Coal Union became a gateway for developing relations after World War II and later led to the establishment of the broader European Union. The Gulf states will not agree on everything, but their shared interest lies in preserving collective security. The Iranian threat has continued to play a role in strengthening inter-GCC relations.
Not all of our history with Iran has been turbulent; this condition has been limited to the current regime. Under Iran’s monarchy, Tehran maintained generally positive relations with its neighbors for centuries, marked by occasional disputes typical of relations between neighboring states. Matters deteriorated immediately after the rise of the clerical regime.
From the very first week, Saudi Arabia expressed its desire for good relations, sending official and unofficial delegations to Khomeini and dispatching a shipment of petroleum products to alleviate a severe shortage in Tehran at the time, as a gesture of friendship toward the new regime. Yet Khomeini formally declared his intention to work toward overthrowing neighboring systems.
It took more than 40 years for the republic to correct its course and seek reconciliation with Riyadh. Today, Tehran faces an existential threat that forces it to choose between abandoning the 1979 project it proclaimed – exporting revolutions and confronting the world – or risking a devastating confrontation.
The six Gulf capitals recognize that they are not in a position to support or change the regime; the event is larger than them. Yet its repercussions are dangerous for them. The possibilities if war erupts are many, ranging from collapse, to a coup, to the regime holding firm and emerging stronger. The risks are immense and cannot even be compared to the invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam’s regime, which occurred quickly and easily. If the pillars of Tehran’s system collapse, a vacuum will emerge that threatens everyone; if it endures, it will return with force.
All Gulf governments have chosen not to become involved in the operation. This does not represent a disappointment for the US ally, which maintains military assets and agreements with GCC states and likewise prefers not to expand the front, which would require greater defensive efforts. Despite Iran’s hints at striking facilities in Gulf states, such a scenario remains unlikely, though not impossible.
