Iran made a mistake when it decided to expand the scope of the war. Instead of confining its response to a direct confrontation with those who had initiated the attack, it chose to expand the flames, targeting neighboring Gulf states and Jordan. With this decision, it shifted from a party with diplomatic leverage and legal claims in the face of the attack it had suffered, becoming a party that has assaulted its neighbors and fueled chaos.
Tehran could have built its narrative around legitimate self-defense as laid out in the United Nations Charter, presenting itself as a state subjected to aggression by the United States and Israel. It could have limited its response to direct military action against those who had attacked it, keeping the conflict bound between two sides. But when missiles and drones extended into the territory of neighboring Gulf and Arab states, and when the repercussions spread to Lebanon and Iraq, the picture changed.
It is true that Iran is angry. It believes that it had been targeted during negotiations and sees itself as the victim of the assassinations, foremost among them its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. They have motives for revenge, but they do not justify this miscalculation.
Politics is not the management of anger but the management of outcomes. Expanding the confrontation transforms Iran from a state that claims to be defending itself into a party threatening the stability of the entire region. It also gives its adversaries an opportunity to redefine and frame their operations under the banner of regional and international security, as well as the security of navigation and energy.
Strategically, a response should serve clear objectives and produce gains. With its retaliation against its neighbors, Tehran has lost on several levels. First, does bombing its Gulf neighbors achieve? It does not undermine Israel’s military capacity, nor does it force Washington to alter its calculations in Tehran’s favor. Instead, it invites countermeasures, tightens economic pressure, and solidifies a coalition against it that would have otherwise sought de-escalation.
Second, there are the calculations and considerations arising from damage to the international economy. The Gulf’s energy supplies and the Strait of Hormuz cannot be separated from the nervous system of the global economy. Disruption of these energy flows triggers jumps in energy prices, insurance costs, and shipping rerouting. Everyone will be hit, including Iran itself and its already burdened economy, which cannot withstand additional shocks. The world will not stand watch; pressure on Iran will intensify, even from allies like China.
There is also a domestic dimension within Iran. Prolonged confrontation drains budgets and magnifies the economic crisis. A national security doctrine cannot indefinitely be separated from the welfare of society. States endure by aligning power and achievable political objectives; without this alignment, they erode from within.
Third, there is the cost of the diplomatic opportunity it missed. Had Iran not initiated strikes against its neighbors, Gulf states could have positioned themselves to mediate a ceasefire. These states have strong relations with Washington and have maintained open lines with Tehran, which would have enabled them to play an intermediary role. But Tehran’s decision to target neighboring states reduced any potential regional sympathy.
Fourth, the logic of escalation is unforgiving. Deterrence theory teaches that retaliation must be proportionate; otherwise it slides into violence that undermines international sympathy. Whatever grievances Tehran may have regarding American and Israeli operations, expanding the target list to include neighboring states weakens the force of its argument and reframes the conflict under the headings of chaos, destabilization of regional security, and threats to the global economy.
Israel is the ultimate beneficiary. Turmoil in the region is conducive to the idea of Greater Israel- a project it is explicitly pursuing and openly discusses. While Netanyahu’s government moves to strengthen its global relationships, normalize security cooperation, and expand its geopolitical margins, the region is breaking apart. Talk of “Greater Israel” has unsettled the Arab public since Netanyahu raised his presumed maps before the world. More recently, US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee stated that there was nothing wrong with the establishment of Greater Israel stretching “from the Nile to the Euphrates.” Regardless of whether such maximal maps are feasible, the image calls for caution and action. If the region’s states are preoccupied with their own security and economies and with preventing a fire in the region, they will not be able to focus or coordinate in confronting Israel’s strategic challenges.
Within this complex picture, Tehran miscalculated. It erred in the manner of its response and lost an opportunity to reinforce the narrative of a “victimized state under attack.” The retaliation against its neighbors has rendered it a regional power willing to expand the war beyond the original battlefield and spread chaos.
At watershed moments, success is not measured by the number of missiles fired but by a state’s ability to win the political, legal, and moral battle before regional and international public opinion. And precisely there, Tehran has lost an important part of that battle.
