President Donald Trump’s 43-hour visit to Beijing was very different from his first visit in 2017. Then, some described the trip as an attempt to break the ice, a natural step at that stage that sought to improve their “personal acquaintance” and reinforce dialogue between the two superpowers.
The second visit consolidates the course of “normal” relations between Washington and Beijing. Needless to say, normal relations between major international powers entail areas of both cooperation and disagreement, especially in the “post-post–Cold War” world. This trajectory is not predetermined by conflicts or open disputes rooted in the past and entrenched ideological differences that prevent rapprochement or place obstacles before understanding on certain issues. At the same time, this does not mean the two countries will enjoy fully harmonious relations and seamless joint cooperation on the international stage. It is a system that has yet to fully stabilize in terms of its framework and principles. Chinese President Xi Jinping does not see his country in this frame. The People’s Republic of China, rather, is one of the principal powers in a new world divided into a “new bipolar world” of North and the South. That does not mean that this will permanently remain a confrontational binary, nor that there are no disagreements and differences between the two sides.
This new binary is the contemporary version of the Cold War’s “East–West” divide.
The timing of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing, just after Trump’s trip, sent a message about the special nature of relations between Moscow and Beijing, and each side’s affirmation of that special relationship. Accordingly, the normalization of relations and the degree of “warmth” resulting from the broad understandings reached between the United States and the People’s Republic of China does not, from the Chinese perspective, come at the expense of relations with Moscow.
In the same context, the American president warned Taiwan against contemplating a declaration of independence, which would inevitably lead to a Chinese war on Taiwan. In such a scenario, Washington would not stand with or support the latter, as its existing support is intended to preserve the status quo, not to provoke Beijing on an issue of absolute importance for its standpoint.
The shift away from the framework of permanent confrontation that once prevailed in the past is also evident in the Middle East. Beyond the “traditional” rhetoric of solidarity on certain regional issues, the People’s Republic of China maintains good relations with rival or competing powers of the Middle East. This is far removed from the image of the old Maoist Communist China that some still try to preserve and upon which they attempt to build their political discourse, narratives, or wishful thinking.
Stability in the Middle East is a strategic political and economic interest for China, as well as the relationships Beijing has forged with all parties in the region, all reflect this balanced and pragmatic Chinese approach. It is an approach that speaks to Beijing’s strategic vision of international relations and on the basis of interests, rather than the “discourse of yesterday” on which some still wish to wager.
Strengthening China’s role internationally passes, above all, through the gateway of economics. This naturally reinforces China’s economic position in different regions of the world while also enhancing its political role and strategic standing within the new global order, which the People’s Republic of China will undoubtedly play a fundamental role in shaping.
