After President Donald Trump rejected Iran’s response to his proposals for peace talks to end the war, with Tehran calling the American demands as “unreasonable” nearly two months after the outbreak of the conflict, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that Iran is defying the Americans and behaving like the victor. It insists on setting the terms; meanwhile, Washington seems hesitant, oscillating between short-lived proposals and measures that constantly shift.
The first question that comes to mind is this: how can a country like Iran - even under normal circumstances - remain capable of dictating terms to America and Israel after enduring a war like the two rounds of conflict, in June 2025 and this year? The latest example, according to media reports, is its demand for Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon as a condition for ending the war.
It is no longer useful to keep telling Americans and Westerners in general that the rulers of Tehran and their allies/proxies spread throughout the region have a different conception of victory and defeat. In the logic of ideological regimes, victory is not measured solely by the balance of losses; they also see steadfastness and the regime’s ability to remain intact - even if only outwardly - as part of the equation, as well as the regime’s maintain control domestically, even amid security instability and miserable economic and living conditions. Iran’s pride has overwhelmed any inclination toward surrender or even serious concessions. Moreover, the top brass of the regime appears prepared for another military confrontation aimed at exerting further pressure.
Iran is perhaps convinced that time is on its side, unlike the American administration. The latter faces multiple crises and obligations: the economy and oil prices, then the midterm elections in November, and then divisions over the war itself within both the Democratic and Republican parties. Finally, and most importantly, the war has a fundamental flaw: the absence of a strategic vision regarding its objectives and what comes next.
Does Washington want to overthrow the regime? All indications suggest otherwise. Does it seek to change its behavior? That would prove difficult, as the behavior of the Iranian regime is not merely linked to temporary political decisions that can easily be adjusted. Iran’s approach is shaped by a deeply intertwined ideological, security, and economic structure that makes any shift costly for the regime. Does it want to halt uranium enrichment? That task is also complicated, because for Iran, enrichment is a matter of sovereignty, security, and regional balance, not simply a technological program. Abandoning it is therefore viewed as surrendering a crucial strategic asset.
As for imposing restrictions on the ballistic missile program, that may be the most difficult objective of all. The program is the backbone of Iran’s deterrence doctrine given that it has no air force comparable to those of its adversaries. Iran built its power around missiles, drones, and allied networks.
Abandoning its regional proxies is no less complicated; these networks are not merely instruments of foreign influence that can easily be discarded. They are an essential part of Iran’s security and strategic doctrine and one of the pillars of the regime’s survival. This explains why Tehran links any settlement to Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. As for the Strait of Hormuz, it has become a source of power equivalent to a nuclear bomb, according to Mohammad Mokhber, adviser to the supreme leader.
The United States is unlikely to accept Iran’s conditions, and even if Washington compromises on some issues, Israel, whether under its current government or any leadership that replaces it in the future, would not.
Washington only has difficult options: end the war through an agreement that respects some of Iran’s red lines, avoid military escalation while tightening sanctions and economic isolation - as a slow path with uncertain outcomes; or proceed toward what it considers a “strategic victory” by finishing the confrontation that effectively began with the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation and was consolidated by the 2025 war.
Given this state of affairs, there is a growing sense of anxiety across the region, because it is likely to pay the price of any of these courses of action. Continuing the war means a direct threat to energy supplies, ports, and navigation routes. Returning to the pre-2023 status quo would mean a return to Iran’s policy of attrition and destabilization. The issue is no longer simply what Washington wants from Iran, but rather what kind of Iran will remain? A state capable of deterrence and compromise, or a regime wielding nuclear ambitions, missiles, proxies, and weaponizing the Strait of Hormuz?
The United States has often stumbled in the region, but this moment offers opportunities that Trump could exploit to achieve several breakthroughs that pave the way for containing and besieging Iran, compelling Tehran to adopt different policies: returning to the New York meeting and the resolutions of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, completing what was begun in Gaza and ending the war in a way that restores the path toward a two-state solution; supporting Syria and providing economic and security assistance to fortify the new regime so it can engage in peace and regional security; and offering serious support to Lebanon that would encourage Arab states to re-engage and help the country free itself from the hegemony of Iran and Hezbollah, facilitating progress in negotiations with Israel.
These rare opportunities come on top of Iran’s enormous losses over the past two years: the collapse to of its “forward defense” doctrine after the war reached its territory, the economic crisis, the loss of Syria, the setbacks of its proxies, the shrinking room for maneuver available to Russia and China, and the rise of projects focused on regional economic and strategic interconnective. If Trump succeeds in investing in these shifts wisely, he could achieve through soft containment what wars failed to accomplish through military force: encircling Iran without overthrowing it.
