The American-Israeli war against Iran has erupted. The scenes are reminiscent of the 12-day war, but we are also seeing new developments, as well as a chasm between rhetoric and practice. It is worth recalling that the American president had prevented Israel from eliminating the Iranian Supreme Leader last year; this time, on the other hand, Washington contributed to Tel Aviv’s operation to assassinate him.
The US objective in this war is to change the nature and orientation of the regime, showing an openness to the old regime’s survival. Israel’s objective is different; it has made the overthrow of the regime its goal, even if the price is chaos, violence, and terrorism. The United States would not mourn the regime if it fell. As Donald Trump himself has said, however, it prefers alternatives from within: factions and wings that it could engage with and can maintain existing institutions while changing their nature, policies, and relations with the region and the world. Such actors would also take the difficult decisions the late Supreme Leader never took: ending the nuclear program and freezing the missile program.
America’s insistence on removing the “old Iran” that the world has known for nearly half a century is not merely a nominal objective. The means it has chosen to achieve this objective is overwhelming American-Israeli military force. Unprecedented firepower has been deployed, and influential military and civilian facilities have been used to kill the leader and top-ranking military and civilian officials.
The Americans’ goal is clear, and there are no restrictions to military tools it is willing to use. They will keep going until the objective is achieved: either changing the nature and orientation of the regime or bringing it down.
Changing the nature of the Iranian regime could follow a different model from that seen in Iraq after the American invasion of 2003. The US has not seen ground forces that could unite broad segments of the Iranian population against it. State institutions continue to function in Iran, and no “Bremer” has dissolved Iran’s armed forces as happened with the Iraqi army. Moreover, there is a degree of diversity and factionalism within the Iranian regime, as well as space to protest against the political system that Iranians have fought for themselves. We saw manifestations of this in the massive demonstrations that swept the country last year and in the early months of this year.
Despite the painful scenes of war and destruction, this moment could be an opportunity for change in Iran that preserves its unity and national cohesion, preventing its institutions from turning into militias or the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from devolving into fragmented local groups, which aggravate the threat.
Of course, Iran should seize the moment. After the Supreme Leader’s elimination, it should accept the terms of the US, however harsh. Doing so would save the country, the region, and the world from the perils of a total collapse in a massive country. Unfortunately, however, Tehran has done the opposite so far. It has targeted Gulf states that had not been parties to the war; some of them, such as Oman, had even proactively facilitated pre-war negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
Iran’s missile strikes against Gulf states are a miscalculation. Tehran seeks to raise the cost of the war and believes that Gulf countries will pressure the United States to end the conflict out of fear. This is a flawed assumption. In fact, these missiles have had far less of an impact than Iran imagines. More importantly, Gulf states, and indeed all Arab countries, have been seeking to end the war; however, they condition this demand on fundamental changes in Iran’s behavior toward the region and the world.
Launching arbitrary attacks on both “enemies and friends” serve only to deepen the wounds that had been left by Iran’s interventions in other countries’ affairs. Syria is a clear example: Tehran was a partner of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in vast crimes, leaving behind wounds that have not yet healed.
Communication with neighboring countries, neighbors that will remain by virtue of history and geography, is the alternative. The absence of the Supreme Leader could be approached as an opportunity for change, reform, and compliance with the conditions of the international community, including Iran’s total abandonment of its nuclear program.
The countries of the region, and even the United States, do not want the Middle East to descend into chaos, violence, and state collapse. Some have even argued that a single “sub-state” actor, the IRGC, is better than ten scattered actors that would revive the concepts of “unconstructive chaos” that wreaked havoc across the region after the occupation of Iraq in 2003.
Iran’s actions remain counterproductive. The path forward would begin by reassuring its neighbors, respecting their choices and their political experience, noninterference in other countries’ affairs, and seeing proxies and armed affiliates as elements of a hateful past that must be left behind.
The steps required entail neither miracle nor fantasy. Iran could simply become a normal state with its particular political model and experience. Others would accept it so long as it does not interfere in their affairs, impose its “revolution” upon them, or threaten them with words or missiles.
