Talk of potential negotiations between Lebanon and Israel continues to fluctuate, appearing plausible at times and nearly nonexistent at others. This comes amid a renewed Israeli war that is open-ended in both time and geography, nearly two decades after the July 2006 war and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.
That resolution, which has yet to be fully implemented, calls in its third clause for “the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,” and stipulates that no weapons should exist without the consent of the Lebanese government and that no authority should exist other than that of the state.
For Lebanon to initiate negotiations, there must first be genuine consensus within its leadership on the reference framework for the talks, as well as a clear roadmap for implementing the resolution. In this context, several key points should be highlighted:
First, negotiations should take place within an international and UN-backed framework, comprising countries friendly to both parties, similar to the ceasefire “mechanism” committee, even if the level and nature of representation differ. The role of this framework would be to supervise, facilitate, accompany the negotiations, and ensure respect for agreed reference points.
Second, in light of developments in Syria, Lebanese-Syrian negotiations should be launched to demarcate the border between the two countries, particularly in the south with regard to the Shebaa Farms area. This would remove a key pretext previously used to block negotiations or to link the Lebanese track to the Syrian one under the banner of the “unity of tracks,” as occurred following the launch of peace talks at the Madrid Conference in 1991. At the time, the aim was for the former Syrian regime to retain control of the “Lebanese card.”
Third, a prerequisite for launching negotiations - or at least an absolute priority to ensure their credibility - must be Israel’s implementation of its obligations under the ceasefire agreement of November 26, 2024, which entered into force the following day. In practice, the agreement has been implemented unilaterally by Lebanon, while Israel has failed to comply with it from the outset.
Fourth, it must be clear that the reference framework for negotiations lies in the effective revival of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. Israel has consistently rejected or ignored this agreement, which was later undermined by the 1969 Cairo Agreement between Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization, an accord that effectively turned Lebanon into what was described as the “Hanoi of the Palestinian revolution.”
The seriousness of any negotiations, if launched, would depend on Israel’s commitment to that agreement as a negotiating reference. This would affirm recognition of Lebanon’s internationally established borders, as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council - an issue that must be emphasized in light of Israeli expansionist policies, sometimes justified in the name of religion and at other times in the name of “national security.”
The latest Israeli doctrine, termed “security sovereignty,” seeks to redefine conflict management while disregarding the principle of national sovereignty and the rights and rules that stem from it.
Fifth, if there is discussion of “strengthening” the armistice agreement due to developments that have overtaken it, as suggested by some Israeli theories, then any such effort must be balanced and reciprocal in terms of the measures and commitments required from both parties, not solely from Lebanon.
Sixth, in parallel, a firm and practical approach is required to implement decisions taken by Lebanon’s executive authority regarding the state’s monopoly on arms, even if this is done gradually due to acknowledged challenges. This begins with a clear affirmation that decisions of war and peace - as well as deterrence and coercion in military and security terms - must rest entirely with the Lebanese state.
There can be no sharing of such a fundamental sovereign responsibility between the national authority and any other actors, regardless of who they are. Unity of decision-making is a cornerstone of effective state sovereignty and of safeguarding national unity, which ultimately serves everyone.
Seventh, the reference framework for any peace negotiations, after reaffirming the necessity of reviving the armistice agreement, lies in Lebanon’s commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, adopted at the Beirut Arab Summit. This initiative is based on international resolutions and relevant legal norms and customs, and thus provides a comprehensive and realistic foundation for the required settlement.
Eighth, many obstacles and challenges remain. This necessitates proactive Lebanese engagement at both the official and public diplomacy levels targeting opinion-makers and influential actors in decision-making, to build support for Lebanon’s position and help drive the necessary change in this direction. This is not an easy task, but it remains essential to secure the support Lebanon needs. Failure to act would leave the Lebanese once again on the sidelines, waiting for solutions from others, after decades of enduring “others’ wars,” conflicts in which they have participated and for which they have paid a heavy price at the expense of their nation and state.
