Those taking part in war bear the pain during military operations, as their full attention is devoted to winning it. Once it winds down- whether due to exhaustion and fatigue, the despair of one side fully crushing the other, or a compromise settlement over demands and objectives - do combatants find themselves dealing with the aftermath. That is when it becomes clear that the pain, and the effort required to address that pain, are far greater. As with people, the pain of states intensifies once the wound cools.
The war raging in the Middle East differs from all previous wars in terms of its duration. We could date it back to the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which followed by Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza and the ignition of multiple fronts as its extension; then came the direct involvement of the United States and Iran, turning this regional war into a global crisis whose turbulence has spared no society on the planet.
If we add the threats now being made to the damage that has already been done, none of those involved, nor those engaged in mediation efforts to stop it, can tell how far this goes. We cannot overlook what has been said about the possibility of using a tactical nuclear weapon or something close to it either, nor mutual threats to destroy everything reachable by conventional weapons.
Wars born of miscalculation and mutual intransigeance create the possibility of those in charge becoming irrational amid ferocious action and reaction. That is precisely what happened in the Gaza war, where even the most unrestrained imagination could not have anticipated the events that had begun with the earthquake of Al-Aqsa Flood and evolved into the unprecedented genocide in Gaza.
However far this war expands or devolves, it must eventually end - either after one side decisively prevailing over the other or once a cessation of hostilities is imposed by exhaustion or a compromise shaped by a third party achieving the near-miracle of mutual concessions once deemed impossible in the literature of war.
When that happens and the war stops, all will return to what was forgotten - or deliberately ignored - during its blaze: what is commonly called “the day after.”
On that day, narratives of victory will flourish. Language and imagination will readily fabricate them, given the urgent need to justify what had happened and grant those in power the legitimacy to manage its consequences. Who can forget the phrase that prevailed after the June 1967 defeat: “What was taken by force can only be recovered by force, and the priority is removing the effects of aggression”?
Israel, victorious in that war, failed in its management of the day after. The ease of victory turned the heads of its leaders, who had seen its outcome as a final resolution of the conflict with the Arabs. Instead, the day after produced fierce Palestinian resistance and a series of wars, small and large, all lacking the one decisive condition: a political solution.
The parties to this war will inevitably have to confront the day after with all its dilemmas, which cannot be resolved as easily as pulling a hair out of dough or simply pretending that yesterday has no bearing on today or tomorrow.
The United States, the war’s chief and most powerful sponsor, along with its strong Israeli arm, may find compensation for the money they had spent. However, they will not find a remedy for the political losses they had incurred, especially after entering a perpetual conflict without achieving decisive results to justify the sacrifices made.
As for Iran, where poems of victory - celebrating the regime’s survival and its ability to exhaust the “Great Satan” and its lesser ally - began to be written early on.
Before this war, Iran had been under a suffocating international blockade that had left one of the richest in the world and a deeply rooted civilization in poverty. On the day after, it will struggle to return to what it had been before the war. And if the blockade and sanctions persist, one can only imagine the scale of the difficulty it will face in addressing them.
Israel and Hezbollah, regardless of their relative strength or weakness, will share the bill of the major powers.
The day after, despite its gravity and the magnitude of its dilemmas, they will be branches of a larger root. This is most evident for Israel, which boasts and claims that things will not be the same after this conflict. This will not be limited to fixing the destruction inflicted on cities and villages. They will be confronting a different regional and international reality that is far less favorable to its former dominance and influence.
Before this chapter of war, Israel had been isolated and nothing has happened to change that.
