The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, along with the attempted assassination of President Donald Trump at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner, has brought renewed focus on the role of intelligence in shaping the future of states, presidents, leaders, and scientists. Many argue that strategic intelligence, which is supposed to help shape grand policy, has never been the decisive factor in national security decisions. Leaders, particularly in democratic states, tend to hold their own views and ideas about the world and how to deal with it, and do not rely entirely on intelligence reports to understand the strategic environment. Nonetheless, demand for this type of intelligence in both the United States and Israel appears to be declining.
In recent years, both countries have increasingly adopted preventive strategies based on initiative and preemptive action, using direct force to compel adversaries to change their behavior rather than merely deterring them. This approach is not new. Israel, for example, has long sought to prevent its adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons, but the pace of implementation has clearly accelerated. According to a security expert I spoke with, this trend was evident in the Israeli campaign against Iran in June 2025, which aimed to prevent it from developing nuclear and missile capabilities, alongside American strikes pursuing the same objective. In this case, deterrence was no longer sufficient to change Tehran’s behavior, and a policy of coercion was adopted. The same logic was applied in the US operation in early 2026 to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro; here too, direct force was used after deterrence failed.
Today, the expert says, US and Israeli operations against Iran represent the clearest example of this preventive approach: both countries seek to block Tehran from developing nuclear weapons, reduce its regional influence, and, in the Israeli case, even push toward regime change. Here again, deterrence is no longer seen as an effective tool.
This shift toward preventive strategies may reflect a decline in the importance of strategic intelligence. First, these strategies focus on degrading the adversary’s capabilities rather than attempting to understand and influence its intentions. As a result, operational and technical intelligence, along with targeting intelligence, become more important than strategic analysis aimed at interpreting intent. In Iran’s case, the decision appears to have been made on the assumption that its nuclear program constitutes a threat that must be stopped, regardless of its actual future intentions.
Second, the security expert explains: “Leaders increasingly rely on their political and ideological perspectives to assess the severity of threats, not only on intelligence assessments.” In the United States, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard indicated that the president alone determines whether a threat is imminent, referring to Iran. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stressed that his country acted because Iran had begun moving its facilities underground, which could make them harder to target later.
Once again, it is operational information about capabilities, rather than strategic analysis of intentions, that appears to drive decision-making.
Third, there has been a decline in leaders’ confidence in the quality of the strategic assessments provided by their intelligence agencies. In the United States, President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed distrust of intelligence assessments and at one point told intelligence personnel to “go back to school.” Some administrations also view these agencies as politicized, which may in turn contribute to further politicization. In Israel, following the major intelligence failure of October 2023, which involved a misreading of Hamas’s strategy and intentions, the government likely lost part of its confidence in strategic assessments.
The expert adds that in this context, leaders may believe their personal assessments of an adversary’s intentions are more accurate than those of specialists, even though they cannot carry out operations without precise operational intelligence.
This decline is not only the result of political choices; it also reflects the nature of the international environment, which has become more volatile and less predictable. In a rapidly changing world, where traditional threats intersect with cyberattacks and asymmetric warfare, it is increasingly difficult to produce long-term strategic assessments that decision-makers trust. This, he argues, pushes leaders to favor immediate, precise data that can be acted upon quickly, rather than waiting for analyses that may not hold up amid fast-moving developments.
Technology has also played a dual role in this shift. Advances in surveillance, satellites, and artificial intelligence have made vast amounts of real-time data available, increasing the value of operational intelligence at the expense of strategic analysis, which requires time, patience, and complex synthesis. As reliance on these tools grows, decisions are increasingly based on what can be observed and measured immediately, rather than on what can be inferred and analyzed over the long term.
The influence of public opinion and domestic political pressure, especially in democratic countries, cannot be overlooked. The public demands swift and decisive results in confronting threats, pushing leaders toward more direct and visible policies, even at the expense of analytical depth. By nature, strategic intelligence does not provide definitive answers but rather scenarios and probabilities, which may not align with the pace of day-to-day politics.
Still, the question remains, as the expert notes, about the long-term cost of this shift. Weakening the role of strategic intelligence may lead to decisions that lack a deep understanding of adversaries’ behavior, increasing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. In moments of major crises, the need for this type of analysis may return strongly after its role has diminished or its capabilities have eroded. The paradox is that when strategic thinking is marginalized, its absence becomes most apparent precisely when it is needed most.
This trajectory may also open a broader debate within security institutions about how to restore balance among the different levels of intelligence, ensuring that the operational dimension does not overshadow the broader strategic perspective. History shows that decisions based solely on immediate information may achieve quick success but do not guarantee long-term stability. The conclusion is clear: the value of strategic analysis must be reconsidered, not as a substitute for field operations, but as a complementary element that reduces risks and provides decision-makers with a broader perspective in moments of uncertainty.
