The culture of pragmatism has long been associated with the United States of America. With the current president, Donald Trump, we almost forgot this association, given the prevalence of international dominance rhetoric. This has made the White House's "interactions" with world events and Washington's "role" in creating and "directing" events in recent years a distinct and unique chapter in the book of American foreign policy.
However, what is typically connected to a nation's culture remains deeply rooted, even if it disappears from view and becomes imperceptible. It appears to us that Trump's recent state visit to China is an example of the deep-seated culture of pragmatism, which the President himself invoked to manage what has come to be called the "Iranian crisis."
Just a few months ago, the White House was at the peak of tension in its relationship with China, and a trade war was waged, employing the deadly weapon that disrupted China's trade balance: tariffs.
The visit generated considerable discussion, with the US President adopting a remarkably different and striking diplomatic demeanor. He was uncharacteristically diplomatically disciplined and respectful of strict Chinese protocol. We did not see the US president improvising, heedless of potential gaffes. He delivered a speech that fostered friendship, closeness, and de-escalation, abandoning the tone of challenge and confrontation that had characterized the relationship with China over the past period. It was here, specifically, that the world saw the pragmatic Trump, eager to de-escalate the situation in the Middle East and overcome the Iranian crisis by allying with a rising and powerful nation, with all that this implies in terms of trade concessions in the "tariff war."
Thus, we observe a qualitative shift in the White House's rhetoric towards China, which was previously considered a threat to US national security. Moreover, the harsh increase in tariffs was framed as protecting American products. The specific choice of the trade issue in confronting China stems from the fact that trade is the backbone of the Chinese economy.
In contrast to this trade war, which has been evident since 2018 - that is, since Trump's first term - anyone who believes it is based on a rupture between the two countries misunderstands the balance of relations. There is what is called "economic interdependence" and "stability of global supply chains," both of which strongly characterize their exchanges: the United States relies on China for electronic components, manufacturing, and rare earths, while China, for its part, is the largest consumer of US agricultural products, such as grains and others. Furthermore, the trade war did not negate mediation efforts between them during crises.
We believe that a deeper understanding of this point, often obscured by the trade war with China, is crucial to break free from ready-made templates for interpreting political relations, and also to avoid exaggerating the relationship between China and Iran. Among powerful nations, or those of comparable strength, even if they contend and each power creates a camp of nations in its interest, in serious international moments, the rapprochement that was brewed in the secret kitchen of the club of powers will have its effect, however slight.
The question is: In whose fundamental interest is Washington's pursuit of rapprochement and de-escalation of tensions with Beijing; and how will China play its winning cards without letting a losing card slip?
There is no doubt that China is currently perplexed about how to manage this opportunity without any loss. The United States' recourse to China will not be without a price, and China is well aware of this. Indeed, it understands China's preferred compensation: a reduction in tariffs and a complete, even if subtly unstated, disengagement from the Taiwan issue.
The second question: Supposing the United States offers the necessary concessions to resolve the Strait of Hormuz crisis and weaken Iran, would this compensation be enough for China to completely turn its back on Iran, given that it is the primary buyer of Iranian oil, purchasing it in Chinese currency? And can the "Iran card" truly be dropped, with all that implies for abandoning the Middle East, a vital region in the world?
So far, China appears to be winning, and it is certainly concerned with its own interests, but in the Chinese way and its understanding of long-term interests. China is a future power, and every step it takes calculates both the present and the future, in addition to its approach to international relations differing from that of the White House.
The ball is in Beijing's court, and the task is to pass it, adopting a tactic of "maximum profit" without loss or uncalculated risk.
