Between France’s warning that Lebanon is approaching the brink of collapse, the domestic and foreign wars being waged against it, and its ongoing economic and political crisis, the Lebanese debate has become confined to how to avoid collapse or manage accumulated crises. Yet the more important question may not concern only Lebanon’s ability to survive, but its place in a region whose balances and priorities are being reshaped with unprecedented speed.
In a previous article, we addressed what the country needs internally to restore the state, sovereignty, and institutions. Internal reform, however, goes hand in hand with an understanding of the role Lebanon can play in the Middle East taking shape around it, on foundations different from those it knew over past decades.
For a long period of its modern history, Lebanon derived its importance from a set of functions that made it a pioneer. It was a regional financial and banking center, an Arab media and cultural platform, a hub for education, universities, and publishing, and an arena for Arab-international balances.
It also formed a meeting ground for East and West, and of political and intellectual pluralism in a region dominated by rigid military regimes. Regardless of the success or failure of this experience, it gave Lebanon a standing that exceeded its geographic and demographic size.
Most of these functions, however, have eroded in recent decades. The banking sector, which formed a pillar of the Lebanese economy, has collapsed, and the country’s ability to attract investment has declined. Many media, cultural, and educational functions have moved to other Arab centers that enjoy greater political stability and larger resources. Lebanon has also lost its monopoly as a bridge between East and West in a world that has become more open, interconnected, and less in need of traditional intermediaries.
In light of these transformations in Lebanon, the Middle East has entered a different phase from that which had prevailed since the Cold War. After decades of ideological conflict, proxy wars, and sharp polarization, the key powers of the region, especially Gulf states seeking to consolidate their role as global economic and investment centers, have adopted new priorities centered on economic development, attracting investment, technology, energy, trade connectivity, and building regional and international partnerships. At the same time, the region has been marked by the change in Syria, with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran as it faces unprecedented pressures, and the repercussions for its proxies, foremost among them Hezbollah.
Does the new Middle East still need Lebanon in the way it knew it over the past century? Lebanon’s challenge today lies in defining its place within a new regional system whose priorities and rules of operation have changed, and which is not necessarily looking for the old roles Lebanon once played. What, then, can Lebanon offer today to a Middle East moving toward economics, technology, and stability?
Lebanon has not lost all elements of its strength. Its essential advantage was never purely economic, but also lay in its ability to produce a space of pluralism, openness, and cultural and intellectual interaction that remains difficult to find elsewhere in the region, despite all the changes it has witnessed.
In spite of everything, Lebanon still possesses a wealth of human capital, a large global diaspora, a distinctive educational and cultural legacy, the ability to interact with different environments and cultures, rare social and linguistic pluralism, as well as a resilient private sector and accumulated expertise in education, healthcare, services, and the knowledge economy. All of these elements are the foundations of the role it can formulate to build its standing in the region politically, economically, and culturally.
Alongside its human resources, Lebanon’s geopolitical location offers opportunities to take part in regional economic and trade connectivity networks. It can also play a diplomatic role grounded in its historical experience in managing diversity, in a region still searching for more stable formulas for coexistence and partnership among its different components. If Lebanon succeeds in rebuilding its state, it may have the opportunity to reposition itself as a center for talent and creative minds, a platform for openness and intellectual and cultural exchange, and a space for dialogue and multicultural engagement.
States do not preserve their importance by yearning for past roles or by trying to freeze history at a particular moment. This depends on their capacity to read transformations, adapt to them, and create new functions. Perhaps the test Lebanon faces today is not only the test of survival, or of returning to what it once was, but the test of finding a new justification for its importance in the region, offering value that others cannot offer, and discovering a new place suited to the transformations underway.
But the deeper question may be this: does Lebanon need an exceptional new role at all? The real challenge, perhaps for the first time since the entity’s creation, may be to move from the logic of “Lebanon the message” and “exception” to the mindset of a normal state: a stable and effective state, integrated into its surroundings, and capable of turning the capacities of its people into added value.
