The political tug-of-war between Washington and Tehran continues even as the war remains suspended following the conclusion of a general memorandum of understanding in mid-June, laying the groundwork for ending the conflict and beginning new rounds of negotiations. Most of the memorandum's fourteen provisions are broadly worded, particularly those concerning the Iranian nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and the sanctions imposed on Iran, in addition to its failure to address Iran's proxy policy and its ballistic missile program.
The issue lies not only in the ambiguity and limited scope of the memorandum's provisions, but also in the profound mistrust and hostility between Washington and Tehran, as well as the uncertainty over who truly holds the reins of power in Iran amid the sharp divide between hardliners within the Revolutionary Guard leadership and those who support negotiations with Washington. Added to this is the determination of both Washington and Tehran to use whatever leverage they possess to maximize their gains, or minimize their losses, in arduous negotiations scheduled to last sixty days, with the possibility of extension if necessary, not to mention the interconnection of regional issues and their mutual influence.
From the moment negotiations were first proposed and various ideas began to circulate, Tehran sought to turn any prospective agreement into an economic bargain in light of the severe sanctions imposed upon it, the burden of which was compounded by the counter-blockade Washington imposed after Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, leaving the country in an extremely precarious economic position. Tehran also recognized that time was not on Washington's side, as opposition to continuing the war was growing, while domestic political pressures tied to the upcoming November midterm congressional elections were mounting. Added to this were the negative consequences of the Strait's closure for energy prices, shipping, and the global economy, including the American economy.
In other words, the memorandum of understanding amounted to nothing more than an "agreement of necessity" to bring an "unnecessary war" to an end. It is fraught with risks and faces numerous obstacles and challenges. As such, it does not lay the foundations for a period of regional stability because it has settled none of the key issues. The political outcomes of the war fell far short of its military and economic consequences. Ordinarily, victory on the battlefield translates into political victory. In this war, however, and for the reasons outlined above, the political outcome remained ambiguous and inconclusive, leaving the current situation closer to a "dormant conflict" with numerous possible trajectories, including a return to war, precision military operations, or an economic blockade imposed by Washington in an effort to reach a comprehensive and robust agreement.
Talk of a possible sharing of influence between Washington and Tehran in the region remains far-fetched given the historic enmity between the two sides and the divergence of their objectives, agendas, and external alliances. That said, informal or undisclosed understandings cannot be ruled out, as suggested by reports that unfrozen Iranian assets may be used to purchase American goods. Whatever understandings may exist, they are unlikely to constitute a framework for reshaping the regional order, because such an arrangement would affect the interests of the Gulf states and their geostrategic position in the region. Nor is it in the United States' interest to pursue such a course. Many international powers are waiting for an opportunity to advance their interests in the region at the expense of the American role. Washington's power and influence have not declined, as some suggest; rather, its priorities have shifted, both in the region and globally.
This is nothing new. It happens from time to time as regional and international developments evolve. For example, at the beginning of the 1970s, President Nixon's administration pursued a policy of "reliance on regional allies" to preserve regional security and stability. It was later surprised by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that same year, developments that fundamentally altered the strategic landscape and prompted President Jimmy Carter to adopt a different strategy for safeguarding America's vital interests in the region, even if that required the use of military force. This led to the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, which later became the United States Central Command under President Ronald Reagan.
President Barack Obama, for his part, spoke of reducing Washington's involvement in regional conflicts. However, with the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, President Joe Biden came to recognize the Gulf region's central importance in maintaining the stability of global energy markets. The Gulf region will continue to occupy a vital place in the international balance of power owing to its economic and geostrategic significance for global security.
In conclusion, the confrontation between the United States and Iran has been resolved neither by force nor, thus far, through diplomacy. The war was halted without producing a decisive outcome capable of serving as a turning point for the future of the region and its security. It is therefore incumbent upon the Gulf states to strengthen Gulf coordination and integration at every level.
