America's standing in the world has never rested on military and economic power alone. It has also rested on the stability of its institutions, its respect for the orderly transfer of power, and the predictability of its policies—qualities that inspired allies' confidence in American leadership of the international order. Donald Trump's arrival in the White House in 2016, however, challenged that model. It exposed profound shifts within American society, deepened political polarization, and raised questions about the resilience of American institutions and the durability of US commitments.
American administrations have always adjusted foreign-policy priorities, of course. But those adjustments remained bounded by constitutional principles and the state's overriding strategic interests. From Woodrow Wilson until the eve of Trump, methods and policies evolved, yet the United States continued to be regarded as a partner whose conduct could be anticipated. Trumpism marked an exception. It did not merely alter policies; it touched something more fundamental: confidence in the stability of the American political system itself.
Why raise this issue when not more than two and a half years have passed since the start of Trump's second term? Because many countries now treat Trumpism as a permanent feature of American politics and have built their approaches to regional and international crises on that assumption—from Iran to the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, and through relations with NATO, the European Union, and international organizations.
Trumpism has not changed America's overarching objectives—containing China, preserving American primacy, and rethinking the effects of economic globalization—but it has changed the way those objectives are pursued. It has personalized decision-making, redefined relations with allies, made "America First" the organizing framework of foreign policy, and cast doubt on several assumptions that had shaped the American role since the end of the Cold War.
The consequences have been felt both at home and abroad. Domestically, political polarization reached its height amid the controversy surrounding the disputed 2020 election results, shaking the image of American democracy itself. Internationally, disputes with European allies, withdrawals from a number of international agreements, and a preference for bilateral relations over multilateral cooperation have led many governments to reassess the reliability of American commitments, given growing doubts about the continuity of US policies and the volatility with which they are pursued.
Prudence therefore requires preparing for multiple possibilities, because American policy is likely to remain shaped by election outcomes, domestic political balances, and economic conditions. So which path will prevail after Trump?
The first scenario is the continuation of a modified Trumpism through the election of figures from the same political current to the White House. That would not necessarily mean replicating Trump's policies in every detail—especially his personalized style of decision-making and his continual clashes with institutions—but it would preserve the primacy of immediate national interests, economic protectionism, a hard line on immigration, and the reassessment of alliances through a cost-benefit lens. Such a course would make it difficult to restore allies' confidence, because doubts about the reliability of American commitments would persist. The figures most often mentioned in connection with this scenario are Marco Rubio, JD Vance, and perhaps Eric Trump.
The second scenario envisions the rise of traditional Republican leaders who opposed Trump and seek to restore the party's conventional approach by reaffirming traditional alliances and lowering the political temperature. Yet they would struggle to reverse policies that now enjoy broad support within the party and its base, particularly on immigration, China, and the reshoring of strategic industries. The change, therefore, would be greater in style than in direction.
The third scenario assumes the return of a Democratic administration seeking to repair relations with allies and strengthen the multilateral order in an effort to restore America's image as a dependable partner. Yet the success of that effort would remain limited as long as domestic divisions endure, because allies now judge American policy through the experience they have just lived, rather than through its stated intentions.
The fourth scenario—the most dangerous and the least likely—is a contested election result. Early signs are already emerging in the debate surrounding the upcoming midterm elections. If those disputes develop into a deliberate campaign to challenge the outcome, the United States could enter a period of constitutional, political, and security uncertainty whose repercussions would extend well beyond its borders. Allies would become even more concerned about persistent political uncertainty in Washington and more cautious about building their strategies on the assumptions that once prevailed.
Policymakers in the region and beyond must therefore keep all of these scenarios in view, rather than assuming that Trumpism is either America's permanent destiny or something that will disappear decisively.
In the end, the central challenge is not simply who occupies the White House, but whether American institutions can regain the confidence that for decades constituted one of the country's greatest sources of strength. Trumpism has become part of a broader debate about the identity of the American state and its role in the world. That question will not be resolved merely by changing the president or the governing party. It will require time—and a renewed demonstration that American institutions remain capable of guaranteeing the continuity of the United States' role in world affairs.
