The Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue conference may be the best opportunity, and the best thing that could happen to Sudanese, since the war broke out. The difficult conditions, the worsening suffering, and the dangers facing the country cannot bear the continuation of political wrangling, and do not permit any further waste of time on the quarrels of elites.
Dialogue, in present circumstances, is not a political luxury but a national necessity for lifting Sudan out of its ordeal, with the war entering its fourth year. There is something close to agreement that a military solution alone will not end the crisis of instability, and will not guarantee that this war is the last of the wars. An inclusive political track remains the path most capable of building a sustainable peace and a stable state.
Why?
First, because stopping the war and protecting the state from disintegration require a political track running parallel to the military one. The continuation of the fighting threatens Sudan's unity and deepens its geographic and social divisions. Dialogue can provide a framework for consensus that prepares the ground for ending the war and helps bring it about.
Second, because Sudan needs to recover its own national decision-making. The longer the war lasts, the more important it becomes that Sudanese themselves have the decisive word in determining their country's future. Regional and international support can provide facilitation and guarantees, but it should not take the place of Sudanese will. This is the essence of the growing calls for a political process under Sudanese leadership and ownership.
Third, because a serious dialogue must not be confined to power-sharing or to halting the fighting. The Sudanese crisis runs deeper than that, and requires discussion of the nature of the state, of citizenship, transitional justice, development, and the questions of the regions, alongside addressing the grievances accumulated over decades of crises.
Fourth, because the success of the dialogue requires widening the circle of participation. It should not be the dialogue of a narrow political elite, but a platform bringing together civil and community forces, women and young people, and all the components of Sudanese society — nor should the voices of the displaced and of refugees be absent. Sudan is larger than its parties and its elites, and its future cannot be decided in isolation from its people.
There is, naturally, a great deal of noise about the nature of the dialogue: is it an independent national initiative, or a hidden arrangement between those calling for it and the state, aimed at engineering the scene and preparing the ground to consolidate General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan's position in power?
The truth is that the Sudanese arena was, and remains, receptive to any purely Sudanese effort seeking national accord. This is nothing new for Sudanese. Indeed, regional and international parties have themselves become convinced that any sustainable solution must be Sudanese, under Sudanese leadership and ownership.
From what has been put forward so far, the task of the dialogue preparatory committee is to facilitate the dialogue, not to monopolize it, and to bring the parties together to reach a comprehensive national consensus. And if the dialogue is to be held inside the country, that does not necessarily mean the state will determine its agenda or its outcomes. What is required of the state, according to what has been proposed, is to provide logistical support and the legal, political, and security guarantees needed. It has in fact declared its readiness to provide these guarantees, to support the dialogue and implement its outcomes, without interfering in its work or dictating its conclusions.
And it is precisely here that intentions must be tested by deeds rather than by assumptions. If the guarantees are available and the door is open to participation, the more useful course is to enter the dialogue and test what may come out of it, rather than passing judgment on it in advance. It is those taking part who will lead the dialogue and steer its outcomes, and in doing so help mark out the road to restoring the course of the transitional period.
The dialogue that is needed is not a political carve-up, and grants no party an automatic ticket to assume power or obtain positions. Its aim is to loosen the knots, narrow differences, and set out a road map for a transitional period ending in free and fair elections that can settle the question of legitimacy democratically and choose who governs Sudan.
Some say dialogue cannot begin before the war stops. But making a halt to the war a precondition means, in practice, disabling the political track and leaving citizens under the weight of suffering that worsens by the day. The war did not arise from nothing; it broke out amid political disputes, a zero-sum struggle, and a climate of exclusion and tension. Agreement on a road map out of the crisis, and on transitional arrangements ending in civilian rule and elections, can therefore help create the political conditions for a halt to the fighting.
Sudanese have done this before: after the December 2018 revolution they engaged in political dialogues with the military component that ended in constitutional arrangements and a share in power, without anyone at the time making the cessation of all the wars in the country's peripheries a condition for beginning the political process.
Power is not an end in itself but a means of serving the country and its people — or so it ought to be. Sudan has been scorched long enough by the disputes of elites and the zero-sum struggle over chairs. It is time for efforts to turn toward saving the country.
Sudan, in its present crisis, cannot afford the luxury of failure, nor of wasting another chance at accord. A patient people is watching and waiting, and what it needs now is not more outbidding, but a real window of hope.
