After a suffocating siege and a gradual encroachment, strategically placed Ali al-Taher ridge has fallen, in what appears to be timing that serves the electoral interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
From the outset, it was evident that the fate of the Imad 4 tunnels would be no different from that of the tunnels destroyed in Majdal Zoun, Khiam, Qantara, Ras al-Biyada, Bani Hayyan, the vicinity of Beaufort Castle, and elsewhere. Indeed, Israel's capture of a key command center defended by the Badr Force constitutes a significant asset for a Talmudic-minded leadership that is expected to capitalize on it at the ballot box. With Hezbollah pushed out of Ali al-Taher, direct observation of the settlements in the Galilee has become impossible.
Settlers now enjoy a sense of security, while southern Lebanon, by contrast, has been forcibly emptied of its residents, its towns and farmlands bulldozed, and transformed into scorched earth unfit for habitation.
The question raised by the relatively easy fall of Ali al-Taher, which controls the route linking the Bekaa Valley to southern Lebanon, is this: Where will the front line with the Israeli occupation now lie? And will Tel Aviv seek to impose an additional price because Hezbollah refused to hand the ridge over to the Lebanese Army, clinging instead to its illegal weapons, a move that could have strengthened the Lebanese negotiator's position? Time, after all, is not working in Lebanon's favor with fewer than 50 days remaining before Israel's Knesset elections.
With Ali al-Taher now incorporated into the so-called "Yellow Zone,” and with one town after another being destroyed under fire, it appears that Israel is preparing for further occupation. Among the indications is a reported warning attributed to Israel's Northern Command: “We hope we will not have to operate militarily deep inside Lebanon.” The stated objective is to “prevent Hezbollah from regaining its ability to threaten northern Israeli communities.”
This coincides with signs that Netanyahu intends to push even further, aligning his electoral campaign with military advances toward Sajd, Jabal al-Rihan, and the Iqlim al-Tuffah region, and perhaps eastward toward the western Bekaa, which the Israeli military effectively controls from the Mount Hermon area.
This is a dangerous trajectory that will not be halted merely by reviving direct negotiations and the possibility of another round of talks in mid-September. Tel Aviv is benefiting from the ambiguity surrounding the Lebanese authorities' performance, as they have trapped themselves within a closed circle defined by the formula established under the Framework Agreement: land in exchange for the surrender of illegal weapons.
This equation has created an unavoidable, incremental linkage, whereby every Israeli withdrawal is tied to measures aimed at dismantling unauthorized arms. Israel relies on an American position that demands more from Beirut than simply repeating familiar political rhetoric. National interest, as affirmed by the Taif Agreement and the Lebanese Cabinet's historic decisions of August 5, 2025, requires the disarmament of illegal weapons because that would restore state authority and mark the beginning of a serious effort to confront the catastrophe that has befallen the South and the consequences of defeat.
President Joseph Aoun previously stated that Lebanon has been “trapped between an enemy that respects neither law nor norms, and an armed faction operating outside the state that places no value on Lebanon's interests or its people.”
This clarity from the presidency requires abandoning a policy of waiting and beginning to implement government decisions that enjoy broad public support. Among these is the decision to ensure that Beirut is safe and free of weapons. Authority must also exercise its responsibilities wherever possible to demonstrate that it is the sole reference point for all citizens, thereby influencing the broader national landscape.
In practical terms, this means beginning to dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure, including institutions such as Al-Qard Al-Hassan, along with other financial, economic, social, and political structures that have overshadowed the state.
Former MP Nawaf al-Moussawi, a Hezbollah official, has described these institutions as being “in service of the resistance,” making weapons a source of political influence. This, the argument goes, confirms once again that Hezbollah has, since its inception, been an Iranian military-security project linked to broader efforts to reshape the region and protect Iran's strategic expansion, and that confronting it is unavoidable.
The alternative to concrete initiatives by the authorities, including the use of state legitimacy against those operating outside the state, as President Aoun describes them, is the continued expansion of occupation. Indicators suggest that this process is being justified under slogans such as “eliminating any future threat.” Meanwhile, illegitimate arms and Iranian influence would remain, at least temporarily. In that case, what space would remain for sovereign decision-making if Lebanon continues to refrain from taking the initiative?
It should be remembered that Lebanon became a victim of an Israeli-Iranian war, and there can be no preference between two parties that have both violated its sovereignty and harmed its people. If the trilateral Framework Agreement serves as Lebanon's guarantee for recovering its territory, since it provides for an Israeli withdrawal, albeit through a redeployment outside Lebanese borders, then the fate of the land and the priority of liberating it are tied to the disarmament of illegal weapons.
There are no alternative solutions, and Lebanon does not have the luxury of time. Neglecting this national responsibility risks reconnecting the country to Tehran's sphere of influence, threatening Lebanon's standing and very survival, and extinguishing the Lebanese people's aspiration for a state capable of protecting them and safeguarding the nation's future.
