At a highly sensitive juncture, and amid increasing talk regarding the possibility of a third round of regional escalation, Iraqis are confronted with a fateful question: Is there someone seeking to make Iraq a part of this conflict - not merely a venue from which messages are dispatched or through which pressure is managed, but rather one of its open arenas?
There can be no avoiding the question, as the answer is linked to Iraqi blood, state sovereignty, the future of the economy, and Iraq's standing among its brethren, neighbors, and the world. The matter is no longer a limited security issue; rather, it is a question of statehood, destiny, and direction, as well as a question of Iraq's ability to protect itself from being dragged into what it does not want.
Repeated attempts to use Iraqi territory to target fraternal and neighboring Arab countries - the latest of which was the announced targeting of Saudi Arabia, preceded by the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan - reveal that we are facing a systematic trajectory rather than an isolated incident. If not decisively resolved, this trajectory could transform into a de facto policy.
Should the state succumb to the blackmail of forces acting outside its authority, it loses not only its security decision-making power but the very meaning of statehood itself. Iraq must not remain a conduit for messages, a proxy mailbox for others, a negotiating card in their conflicts, or an arena pushed forward during every regional escalation.
The problem is no longer about issuing a statement after each incident or settling for a reassuring narrative that does not prevent the recurrence of danger. The deeper problem is the existence of a repeating pattern that consumes Iraq's political and moral capital, leaving the government to face the consequences of actions that do not reflect its own decisions. The longer a decisive resolution is delayed, the more a dangerous perception takes root abroad that the Iraqi state alone does not control its security decisions. This is an unfair image of Iraq and harmful to its interests, but it cannot be corrected by words alone.
Sovereignty is not safeguarded through slogans; rather, it is maintained by the state's capacity to serve as the sole authority for force and decision-making. Consequently, restricting weapons to state control is neither a stance against any faction nor a detraction from anyone's sacrifices. Instead, it is a prerequisite for the survival of the state and the protection of everyone. A state that does not hold exclusive authority over the decisions of war and peace can neither demand that others respect its borders, reassure its citizens, nor build stable relations with its neighborhood. It is in the interest of all forces, above all others, for the state to be strong, because a weak state protects no one; instead, it leaves everyone exposed.
Today, under highly sensitive circumstances, the Iraqi government is working to reconnect Iraq with its Arab, regional, and international surroundings, and to sincerely leverage available support and openness to serve the interests of Iraqis. These efforts deserve support - not because they are the efforts of a specific government, but because they represent the trajectory of a state. However, there are those, both internally and externally, who do not want Iraq to move past the logic of conflict and axes, and who seek to undermine any attempt to solidify its position as a balanced, secure partner state that is capable of speaking for itself, rather than for others.
The truth is that the Arabs, despite all the complexities that have affected the relationship, have not turned their backs on Iraq; rather, they have continued to view it as a pivotal country indispensable to regional stability. Throughout the difficult years, there remained an Arab readiness to embrace Iraq and restore it to its natural position, out of belief in its role, presence, and civilized and political depth. The problem has never been an Arab desire to break ties with Iraq; rather, it lay in Iraq's ability to present itself as a state with a single decision-making authority - not a country where decisions are contested between the government and factions, the constitution and weapons, and national interest and wills that do not emanate from Iraqi state institutions. It is unfortunate that opportunities for openness and trust are squandered due to practices that reflect neither the will of Iraqis nor the interest of their state.
The risk of slipping today is greater than some believe. Every uncalculated action could drag Iraq into a confrontation it does not want, and every use of its territory outside state decisions could push it an additional step toward isolation. Isolation is neither heroism, an interest, nor a viable option in a world where countries thrive on economy, partnerships, investment, and trust. Every armed message launched outside the state is met with a message of concern from the investor, the partner, and the fraternal state, and every new disruption reflects on the market, labor, energy, banks, and Iraq's image in the world. Iraq needs projects, energy, job opportunities, education, infrastructure, and openness - not more anxiety, armed messages, and alignments that deplete it.
We must be candid with our people: statements are no longer enough. Neither the domestic public is convinced by statements, nor is the outside world reassured by them. What preserves Iraq's standing is action: a professional investigation, fair accountability, real control, and a clear decision that no entity, regardless of its title, can place the country in war, isolation, or economic loss. Backing the government along this path is a national duty, because it is a support for the state, its right to protect sovereignty, preserve relations, and build the future.
Iraq is subordinate to no one, an enemy to no one, and an arena for no one. It is a great homeland, and the decision of war and peace within it belongs to the Iraqis and their state alone. This is the hour of the state, the hour of reason, and the hour to say clearly: Iraq first.
