With Iran under the rule of Guardianship of the Jurist, there are no limits to the dangers facing the region. Iran ranks among the most disruptive, aggressive and influential forces in it, blurring the boundaries between good and evil.
The failure of most Arab elites and states to recognize this since the proclamation of the “revolution” and its drive to export itself constituted the great deception, wrapped in the rhetoric of hostility toward the United States and fighting Israel. Yet along a path that led to neither objective, Iran attacked Iraq and fought and divided the Syrian and Lebanese peoples. In both arenas, the story of Yemen continued. Now, it is the Gulf and its people whose turn has come.
Understanding the role of Iran’s proxies and their ability to interfere in nation-states has been at the heart of an open and continuous debate surrounding the crises of these countries over the past four decades. In every conclusion, this debate has led to the view that national and pan-Arab destinies depend on the extent to which these proxies are exposed and confronted. Their participation in the war confirmed that they had wrested sovereign decision-making away from these states, against the will of their majorities.
It was neither an American oversight nor a passing Iranian desire that the “expired” memorandum of understanding should enshrine the best outcome Iran achieved from this deal: deliberately singling out its proxies by extending the ceasefire to all fronts in countries that had not chosen to participate in the war.
Another message confirming that these proxies are first and foremost an affliction on our own states and societies came from the United States, when it negotiated and reached an agreement with the Houthis to exchange accommodations and postpone confrontation.
If we set aside what had already become firmly understood before the war we are now experiencing, namely that Iran’s role was designed and employed to undermine the social cohesion of the Arab Levant, and that its regional arc benefited anyone seeking to remove Iraq, Syria and Lebanon from the regional and international power equation, then the developments to come in the course of this war and the negotiations over solutions to the region’s conflicts must, from the standpoint of Arab interests, place the containment of Iran’s proxies and all its affiliated groups ahead of other issues.
It is no exaggeration to say that the intense attention paid in the Arab Levant to the war and its consequences is concentrated on this particular dimension of the conflict: the proxies.
What was striking was the consensus that emerged during a gathering in Beirut, a city whose cafés continually seek to revive such debates. The gathering brought together three Iraqis, Syrians and Lebanese, along with one Palestinian, all of whom had worked in politics and contributed to cultural life. Their relationship was marked by their different experiences and intellectual identities. Who they were is less important than what they agreed upon:
1. Protecting the institutions of the state in Arab countries is a central task in confronting Iranian encroachments. Strengthening political, popular and diplomatic resistance to Israeli expansionism is another. These are two priorities that, for elites and intellectuals, should not be displaced by other debates, such as arguments over the nature of political systems or the definition of political choices.
2. Solidarity with the Gulf at this stage goes beyond concern for the Gulf Cooperation Council states’ experience in governance, development, economic progress and international influence. It extends to safeguarding Arab national security. Gulf strength represents a crucial asset, but it must be complemented by another condition: the ability to confront threats. This is particularly important after the states of the Arab Levant turned their attention toward attempts at recovery and containing Iranian encroachments, while Egypt retreated toward concerns in its immediate surroundings.
3. If this war ends with Iran stripped of its nuclear capability from the perspective of the United States, Israel and the broader Western order, then from the Arab perspective it must also be stripped of its proxies, particularly its armed ones. Particular vigilance is required because, if the Iranian regime survives, even in a weakened state, its final objective will be to preserve these tools for a future resurgence and once again obstruct Arab efforts to capitalize on the shift in the international position in support of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. In such a bargain, Israel’s guarantees may well remain safeguarded.
4. A current priority is to guard against operational “networking” at new and different levels between the Houthis and Iran-aligned militias in Iraq. This requires all Gulf Cooperation Council states to strengthen their security resilience and military capabilities, enabling collective defense and cultivating broader social readiness for the requirements of national defense, while keeping pace with mutual-defense agreements between Saudi Arabia and the countries of the region.
In this context, the Saudi leadership’s decision to confront the Houthi threat is neither a minor detail nor a limited or merely preventive measure. It is intended to protect stability in the Gulf and Red Sea region and safeguard the future relationship between the Yemeni and Saudi peoples.
Views on virtually every aspect of the war have shifted over the course of recent months. The same sources have produced different assessments.
The US administration has continued without a roadmap for achieving its objectives. Israel has had little more than a project for war. Iran clings to denial and claims victory. The balance of power has remained the only constant.
The discussion summarized here was extensive. Its conclusions reflected convictions that remained constant both before and during the war. What remains to be seen afterward is how Iran relinquishes the “nuclear” option while holding on to its “proxies.”
