In an article published in Asharq Al-Awsat on October 14, on the eve of his visit to Riyadh, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi presented a vision for relations with Saudi Arabia that goes beyond the traditional, limited framework toward a future partnership based on mutual interests and cooperation in security and investment. Riyadh and Baghdad possess many assets that the two countries can leverage to strengthen their ties.
This is both possible and difficult at the same time, given challenges related to Iraq’s institutional structure and the presence of armed factions that use their weapons to attack vital and economic targets in the Kingdom. These factions therefore pose a security threat requiring a clear commitment from the Iraqi government to prevent such acts.
Al-Zaidi expressed this position when he affirmed “the Iraqi government’s firm stance against allowing Iraqi territory to be used as a launching pad for any attacks or actions affecting the security of the Kingdom and the countries of the region.”
He reiterated “the Iraqi government’s commitment to the principles of good neighborliness and respect for the sovereignty of the Kingdom and brotherly nations,” according to a statement published by the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) following a meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and PM Ali al-Zaidi in Riyadh on October 14.
Returning to al-Zaidi’s article, it is evident that he places considerable emphasis on the concept of “national sovereignty,” which he described as “not merely an occasion for celebration,” but a “daily responsibility.”
This approach takes on even greater significance when applied to the conduct of the state’s foreign relations, the protection of economic interests, and the use of diplomacy to strengthen the independence of national decision-making, which has suffered considerable disruption as a result of years of foreign interference and terrorist activity. It is a conception of sovereignty that sees it as the state’s ability to perform its functions without being challenged by non-state actors.
In Iraq, what often makes “sovereignty” fragile is the gap between the government’s constitutional powers and its actual ability to control all armed formations that have imposed themselves through force and with the support of the Quds Force. Baghdad’s problem, therefore, lies in the overlap between official security structures and forces that possess political influence, military capabilities, and regional ties whose priorities conflict with the government’s sovereign decision-making.
Accordingly, the “sovereignty” advocated by al-Zaidi requires reforming the structure of security decision-making and ensuring that the use of force is subject exclusively to state authority and legal accountability, rather than to any other armed formations.
Al-Zaidi stressed in his article that Iraq’s security and the stability of Saudi Arabia are not separate issues, based on his conviction that cross-border attacks impose costs on both countries, undermine their ability to cooperate, and create an atmosphere of public tension.
Al-Zaidi also presented a vision for Baghdad’s external role as a bridge for dialogue among regional powers. Iraq maintains diverse relationships that allow it to communicate with parties that are difficult to bring together within a single framework. Yet the effectiveness of such mediation depends on the government’s ability to implement the understandings it helps facilitate and to prevent non-state actors from undermining them.
There have been previous examples of this during Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government, when Baghdad hosted Saudi and Iranian delegations in an effort to narrow their differences before the announcement of the “Beijing Agreement” in March 2023.
However, what constrained the Iraqi government’s ability, despite al-Kadhimi’s persistent efforts and the sincere intentions of his team, as those familiar with the talks at the time attest, was the absence of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms capable of preventing Iran’s allies from engaging in hostile acts. Baghdad also lacked guarantees it could provide to ensure that the various parties complied with the provisions of any agreement.
Al-Zaidi’s argument also includes an economic dimension linked to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and the need to diversify trade and energy routes. He calls for “diversifying trade routes and reducing dependence on any single route or exposure to exceptional circumstances,” arguing that “the severe disruptions in markets, trade flows, and energy supplies” as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have caused damage to the region’s economies.
Accordingly, “Iraq needs a more resilient economy, built on diversifying sources of income, expanding trade routes and access to markets ... and creating greater opportunities for private enterprise and investment.”
These legitimate Iraqi aspirations require a stable and attractive environment, modern and enforceable laws, and an independent judiciary capable of upholding them. All of this leads inevitably back to the issue of “sovereignty and bringing all weapons under state control,” so that investors can feel secure and confident in developing major projects that create shared interests for both sides.
The next phase of the reform process that al-Zaidi seeks to advance could begin with a regular mechanism for security coordination, both domestically and with regional partners, foremost among them Saudi Arabia. It could also include clear procedures for investigating cross-border attacks and holding their perpetrators accountable, exchanging intelligence on sources of threats, following up on outcomes through the relevant institutions, and mobilizing domestic public support for these measures.
If these arrangements succeed cumulatively, they will help achieve the two objectives at the heart of al-Zaidi’s article: sovereignty and investment. In my view, Riyadh does not oppose either objective. On the contrary, it shares Baghdad’s aspirations and would support their realization if the relevant institutions take clear steps. This would allow the two countries to move beyond the stage of testing one another’s good intentions toward genuine trust and an effective partnership.
This is particularly significant because, according to informed sources with whom I have spoken, the meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was viewed in Riyadh as highly important, especially given its timing. It clearly indicates a willingness on Riyadh’s part to support al-Zaidi’s mission to consolidate state sovereignty and establish a sustainable partnership with Saudi Arabia across various fields, thereby creating a broader regional safety net capable of reducing the instability affecting the Middle East.
