It is hard to say with certainty what the recent Israeli elections will produce, amid shifting balances of party power, political and social divisions, and the fragile governing coalitions they may yield. The upcoming American midterm elections are no less important, since they test the administration's capacity to carry out its priorities and manage foreign crises, especially in the Middle East.
In Israel, the question goes beyond a choice between Benjamin Netanyahu and Gadi Eisenkot to the future of political and social life, the composition of the government and its parliamentary base, and how far it depends on the most hardline forces. Changing the prime minister does not guarantee a radical shift toward Palestine, Iran, and Lebanon, but it may change priorities, methods of managing the conflict, and the limits of responsiveness to diplomacy, with the role of the Arab members of the Knesset an important factor. The return of Netanyahu and his team, on the other hand, raises the question of whether the current approach continues and how far it can be adjusted.
In the United States, the elections are a referendum on Donald Trump's rule, and will determine the balance of power in Congress. If the Republicans keep both chambers, his margin widens; losing one or both makes it harder to pass and fund his priorities. Despite his broad powers in foreign affairs, the results will affect his calculations and the cost of his choices, without settling their direction.
Will the shifts in Washington and Tel Aviv allow a move from military attrition to sustainable settlements? Or will electoral calculations, ideological rigidity, and conflicting regional and international interests prolong the wars and widen them?
The region's course is likely to be shaped by both contests, depending on how their results are used and on the cost of stalemate to its states and societies, to Iran, to Israel, and to the United States. Two main paths lie before the region: a settlement led by Washington with Tehran, or a military round to adjust the terms of negotiation, with continued attrition remaining a possibility if American hesitation between pressure and settlement persists.
The first path is an agreement with Iran, led by the nuclear file and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and guaranteeing the security of navigation and energy supplies, while the other regional files recede or are handled through partial understandings that contain escalation without addressing its sources.
The danger is that a settlement entrenches the influence of the forces tied to Iran in exchange for calm. Merely restraining the operations of the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the pro-Tehran factions in Iraq, without addressing their weapons and their relationship to the state, may ease the regional confrontation, but it would strengthen their hand against the legitimate authorities and their threat to others. That is not an inevitable outcome, but it is likelier if Washington reduces success to restricting the nuclear program and securing the sea lanes.
The second path is an American-Israeli confrontation with Iran, if negotiations fail and the Israeli leadership, under Netanyahu or someone else, convinces Trump of the usefulness of force. The wager would be on a swift operation that weakens Tehran's capabilities and extracts broader concessions. But a short and controlled war is not guaranteed, and exhausting Iran may push it to widen the confrontation rather than show negotiating flexibility.
And if military pressure opens the door to diplomacy, the challenge is to reach a settlement that goes beyond a temporary ceasefire, with effective Arab participation, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states above all, ensuring that the region's interests are not reduced to an American-Iranian understanding or to Israel's demands. Stability requires addressing the sovereignty of states and weapons outside their institutions, the security of navigation, the nuclear and missile files, and opening a political horizon for the Palestinian question.
These two paths require Arab capitals to define their shared priorities in defense of their sovereignty and their societies' interests, and to take part in shaping the conditions of stability, through coordination that goes beyond containing the confrontation to preparing for the understandings and balances that will follow it.
How are Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinians to protect their interests, despite their differing circumstances and their lack of control over the decision of war and settlement and its terms? The beginning is to stop waiting. Preparing for war requires protecting civilians, securing essentials, strengthening institutional response and Arab coordination, reinforcing national capacities, and diversifying partnerships.
These states' capacities to influence events are not equal, and their crises are not solved by a single formula. The Arab states' effort begins with supporting their legitimate institutions and involving them in the arrangements for their future, rather than merely informing them of decisions others have made.
Hedging against a settlement is as necessary as hedging against war. What is needed is to define national interests and crystallize clear Arab positions before the understandings settle, and to refuse to trade calm for entrenching weapons outside the state, or for separating security in Palestine from national rights.
This preparation matters all the more because the diplomatic success of the great powers can add to the burdens of weaker states. A settlement is measured by its guarantees, its implementation, and its prevention of renewed confrontation. Without those who have a stake in it, negotiations may settle for managing the conflict and distributing its costs rather than resolving it, so that societies once again bear the price of arrangements they had no part in drafting and have no means of reviewing or contesting.
The upshot is that the elections in Washington and Tel Aviv reveal a crisis that goes beyond the contest of right and left to the nature of the system and the cohesion of society, since internal division is more dangerous to their future than external threats. As for the region, ending the war is a necessary humanitarian and political gain, but turning it into a sustainable peace requires addressing the roots of the conflicts, foremost among them the erosion of state sovereignty. Achieving stability goes beyond silencing the guns and dividing up influence to states recovering their legitimate authority, strengthening their institutions, and guaranteeing their peoples' rights. Otherwise the end of the war will remain a fragile truce that keeps the region an arena of conflict and holds its peoples hostage to settlements concluded without them.
