With every reckless attack by the terrorist Houthi militia, the question resurfaces: why does Saudi Arabia remain patient with these militias, despite the vast disparity in the balance of power between one of the most powerful countries in the region and a militia that masks itself in the guise of a state and politics, yet practices the methods of rogue organizations?
This question assumes that military victory is measured by the scale of the strikes, and that the stronger country is required to exhaust its power whenever it is provoked by sub-state entities. However, the experiences of past decades have proven that militias are not eradicated by retaliatory strikes alone, but also by defeating their project and ideology and drying up the pretexts upon which they feed. For quite often, force unleashed out of a motive of revenge or reflex grants its opponent what it failed to seize on its own: "victimhood."
Saudi Arabia refuses the path of revenge out of choice and capability, not helplessness, drawing on 300 years of experience in dealing with challenges. King Abdulaziz - may God bless his soul - expressed this approach by saying: "I never initiate aggression against anyone; rather, I remain patient, and extend my patience toward whoever initiates hostility against me, countering with goodwill as long as there is room for it. But when no room for patience remains, I strike my blow, and it is the decisive one."
This idea has been discussed by many thinkers and writers, and the numbers support it. According to a RAND Corporation study on how terrorist groups end (2008), which analyzed 268 armed groups and terrorist organizations between 1968 and 2006, 43 percent of them ended due to integration into the political process, and 40 percent through policing and intelligence efforts, while the percentage of groups eliminated by military force did not exceed 7 percent. In other words, victory was mostly the outcome of a combination of deterrence, politics, and security, rather than military eradication alone.
The Houthi militia represents a grave danger due to its subordination to a project outside Yemen's borders and its donning of the guise of a political player, all while hijacking Yemen, its resources, and its institutions. It practices eradication internally within Yemen, forcibly mobilizes the population in areas under its control, and targets Saudi Arabia under the impression that raising the cost will bring it back to the dialogue table, despite possessing no project for Yemen other than war and suffering. Today, it besieges the city of Taiz, a war crime and a humanitarian catastrophe that has prompted international appeals, including a plea from the Pope in the Vatican.
The militia bets on luring the Coalition into comprehensive strikes to portray itself as a victim and grant itself a false sense of victimhood to cover up its failures and crimes. Therefore, it thrusts innocent people into the confrontation, shields itself with civilians, sets up missile launchpads among residential homes, recruits children, and turns civilian facilities into weapons depots. These behaviors do not reflect strength, but rather a gamble on restricting the state's ability to respond.
Following the events of September 11, the United States provided a clear example of the cost of excessive power when used out of a motive of revenge and restoring its image. The shock transformed into an open-war doctrine, the cost of which was estimated at around eight trillion dollars, along with more than 900,000 deaths from direct violence, including around 387,000 civilians, and 38 million displaced persons. In Iraq, the dissolution of the army and the de-Baathification of state institutions led to a vacuum that contributed to the emergence of ISIS and militias loyal to Tehran. After 20 years in Afghanistan, the Taliban returned to Kabul following a dramatic American withdrawal.
Israel has adopted the same mentality of revenge, where its 1982 invasion of Lebanon to uproot the Palestine Liberation Organization paved the way for the birth of Hezbollah. Similarly, pressure on Gaza and the West Bank has failed to eliminate Hamas, while the war following October 7, 2023, has resulted in a toll exceeding 72,000 dead, unprecedented international isolation, no clear vision for the day after, and the survival of Hamas as an organization and an ideology.
The Kingdom has never viewed Yemen as a battlefield, but rather as strategic depth, a neighbor, and a shared destiny. Some two million Yemenis reside on its territory, living and working with dignity among their people. It has provided around $27.7 billion to liberated areas, ranging from financial deposits to hospitals, roads, and electricity. Furthermore, it has hosted the legitimate Yemeni government for ten years and repeatedly opened the door to a settlement for the Houthis, out of concern for the lives of Yemenis and to avoid granting the militia a sense of victimhood to exploit.
However, the patience of states has limits. When the militia goes too far in targeting regional security and navigation, a decisive resolution becomes a necessity. Here appears the vast difference between the logic of an ancient state and the recklessness of a terrorist militia: the state resolves and does not seek revenge, and it strikes those who threaten its security with an iron fist to protect Yemenis and their legitimacy until they reclaim their state. This is the difference between a surplus of power that produces devastation and a rationalization of power that wishes for Yemen to rise again, not to be erased.
In short: power that is not guided by wisdom creates its own enemies, whereas power that is governed by values, the ethics of neighborliness, and consideration of consequences will inevitably create peace... even if it is delayed.
