Radwan al-Sayyed
Lebanese writer, academic, politician and professor of Islamic Studies at the Lebanese University
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Measuring the Strength of the State in the Arab World Today

I once heard a fellow historian speak of laws governing the strength and success of the state in Arab history. Whether any such laws held sway in earlier times is open to doubt, given how radically circumstances have changed in time, place, and the considerations that matter. Historians, ancient and modern alike, have long disagreed about the Wars of Apostasy, and over whether the religious or the political dimension predominated in them.

My own view in that debate was that the idea of a single state, and its political dimension, weighed most heavily with Abu Bakr when he sent armies against those who withheld the zakat tax. The obligation was plainly religious, but the person to whom one paid one's zakat was, in those days, the legitimate ruler. My point is that the strongest law, in the eyes of Arabs past and present, is the idea of the state: its sovereignty and the unity of its decision. That is the one measure that has not changed between the old world and the modern, for all the upheavals of time, place, and the wider world.

Much has changed, and much else besides, yet certain considerations endure. Between the 1940s and the 1980s, the idea of the unified state flourished, and not only in reaction to colonialism, Sykes-Picot, and Zionism. The strong, unified state is an old Arab idea and a long-standing Arab aspiration. What Arabs fear most is division, the gravest symptom of a weakened state and, with it, of weakened identity and belonging. It may be debated that almost every project of unity failed. Yet solidarity and the awareness of a shared fate did not weaken: Arabs East and West alike gave Egypt, Syria, and Jordan every help they could, collectively through the Arab League and bilaterally. Nor was that solidarity confined to the Palestinian cause; it extended to many other problems and countries.

Two things above all have sapped the strength of the modern Arab state. The first is the weakening, since the 1990s, of solidarity with countries suffering from internal crises or from problems with the outside world and the international order. The second is the growing estrangement between the Arab East and the Arab West, even as the Arab League has endured, its strength and effectiveness have much diminished.

The problems of several contemporary Arab states stem from Iranian interventions in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, from the American intervention in Iraq, and from the interventions of other powers in a number of Arab countries. In every one of these countries afflicted by foreign interference, there were Arab efforts, by the League or some of its members, to build a measure of immunity or to mediate with the outside world, Iran included. Those efforts failed. The interveners soon became part of the internal landscape of these countries and paralyzed the state and its functions on various misleading pretexts, while their real motives were to extend their influence and to destroy the structures of states through sectarian and ethnic division.

Nor should we forget what foreigners called the "Arab Spring" of 2011. It was a wave akin to that of 1979, but wider in reach and more effective in its popular deception. We were told, and we believed, that it was a civic movement; then fundamentalists everywhere clambered to the top, with American and Iranian support. We were told that the structures of these states were fragile.

That is not a sufficient explanation, as the stirring of civil strife and the savage dominion of al-Qaeda and ISIS that followed attest. The Arab nation-state was the target, and it remains so. Every neighbor around us has intervened, or tried to, in order to kill, to displace, and to create militias that persist in several countries to this day. Iran had clear objectives in intervening; militias then became an instrument that every intervening power has used, in Somalia, Libya, and Sudan.

Amid all this, the question of the state's strength becomes decisive. The Gulf countries in particular have enjoyed stability and development by virtue of strong states. They have spread their wings across alliances and partnerships around the world and become indispensable to the global economy and to global stability. It is precisely because of this success that Iran threatens their security and stability, at times on the pretext of US bases on their soil, at others with no pretext at all.

If the 1960s and 1970s saw an Arab solidarity from which all benefited, the present situation, made "all the more dangerous" by direct attacks on the security of every country, and of the Gulf states above all, calls not only for effective solidarity but for collective initiative, whether to endure and defend or to negotiate. The lesson of recent decades is that bilateral negotiation leaves one exposed to being taken advantage of, and that its results neither hold nor last.

Is the Arab state strong? It is, as the determination of several countries to recover their unity and stability attests, and as does the resilience Syria displayed after three decades of interventions and militias, whose countless thousands vanished within a single week.