Mustafa Fahs
TT

Jurf al-Sakhar… On the Brink of Collision

A single vowel separates the Arabic words "jarf" and "jurf". Jarf is the act of uprooting something or sweeping away what surrounds it. A jurf is a bank cut by erosion. Sakhar means hard, massive rock. Read as "jarf al-sakhar", the place-name calls to mind stones wrenched from where they lie. Its political meaning runs deeper. What seems solid and firmly rooted can be swept away. Even a foundation that runs deep can be shaken.

Between sweeping away what seems entrenched and shaking what only pretends to be immovable, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has brought the confrontation to the brink of collision. The first sign is the Coordination Framework's collision with the rocks of Jurf al-Sakhar. The Framework's own rock has split, fracturing it into several frameworks. Some support al-Zaidi, some resist him, and others are looking for a way for both sides to win, under the motto "May the wolf live and the sheep survive."

Word of al-Zaidi's refusal reached Tehran, which sent its standing envoy Quds Force commander General Esmail Qaani to mediate on terms that put the state and the armed factions beneath it on an equal footing. Qaani achieved only part of what he set out to do, showing that while he inherited Qasem Soleimani's post, he did not inherit his influence or his role.

Al-Zaidi's insistence draws a line between sovereignty and chaos. Jurf al-Sakhar has grown beyond its significance as a place on the map, a military site, or a route through which the state's wealth is smuggled out. What is at stake there now is the very idea of the state, its law, and the respect it commands. Those three things belong to the state alone. They distinguish the state from those in power, the modern Iraqi state from the ideological order of 2003, and arms that defend Iraq's sovereignty and borders from arms whose purpose is to protect the regime.

On one side stand the state, its institutions, and its sovereignty. On the other stand forces that operate outside the state, beneath it, or alongside it. Al-Zaidi is pressing for what once seemed beyond reach: one gun, one law, and one economy. Today, weapons lie beyond the state's control, the law goes unenforced, and rival economies siphon off the country's wealth. So far, al-Zaidi has avoided using force, even as he insists that the state alone has the right to use it. By setting deadlines for weapons to be handed over, he is taking away the means, or the pretext, for a clash all Iraqis are trying to avoid.

Mediation between the government and the Framework and its factions may succeed. Al-Zaidi, however, will hold to his aim of bringing all arms under state control and extending the state's authority across its territory. To preserve its role and influence, Kataib Hezbollah may have to withdraw from Jurf al-Sakhar or agree to a settlement there. The mediators now grasp the depth of the division between those who understand the cost of keeping the government from doing its job and those who fear that, after Kataib Hezbollah, their turn will come.

Al-Zaidi's hand is growing stronger. More importantly, he now has popular support. His starting point is the state's right to exercise authority throughout its territory and protect Iraq's wealth. His warning to every armed group, whether organized along ethnic or ideological lines, is clear: things cannot stay as they are.

Before the mediators stepped in, al-Zaidi faced two choices. Two of his predecessors had shown what each could mean. Circumstances forced Mustafa al-Kadhimi to coexist with armed factions beyond state control. Nouri al-Maliki met arms with arms. The first gave dialogue a chance. The second used force, bore the consequences, and lived with the enmities it created. Can the mediators give al-Zaidi a third option?

As the mediators press on and al-Zaidi's deadline draws near, there is less and less left to bet on. Waiting is no longer tenable.