Following the earthquake of Oct. 7, 2023, and the intense shockwaves it generated within Israel and across all levels there, the official and military leadership responded with extreme measures, hastily launching a ground invasion into the Gaza Strip—a territory heavily armed, populated with fighters, and filled with tunnels.
This action was deemed essential to address the public’s declining morale, to eliminate the threats posed by Hamas’ military presence and power grab in Gaza, and to secure the release of hostages, who this time were larger in numbers compared to those detained in previous wars.
Due to the principle of unifying the various frontlines, and up until the conflict widened on the northern front, Gaza remained the primary target, with the elimination of Hamas and its leaders as the focus of political, intelligence, and military efforts. This approach led to the failure of de-escalation and exchange attempts, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stubbornly insisted on continuing the war until achieving total victory.
As the Israeli offensive in the north intensified, aiming to weaken and potentially eliminate Hezbollah’s power even up to Beirut, Gaza became a secondary military front. Forces were withdrawn from there to reinforce the northern front, as Israel prepared for an offensive and defensive war potentially extending to Iran. Consequently, militarily-occupied Gaza effectively became a hostage in Israel’s hands, its fate tied to the outcomes of the battles with Hezbollah and the potential future conflict with Iran. Gaza, thus, could be seen as the first chapter of the war and the last piece of any eventual resolution.
Analysts and many policymakers misjudged, assuming that the elimination of Yahya Sinwar, a prominent Hamas figure, would symbolize a victory that might bring the Gaza war to an end. This assumption led US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to urge Israel to capitalize on this and work with mediators on a prisoner exchange. Blinken even attempted to entice Netanyahu, referring to him as a “victor in Gaza,” to turn his win into a strategic accomplishment by halting the war and showing flexibility regarding what comes next.
However, Netanyahu rejected all of Blinken’s requests and remained steadfast in his position “before Sinwar and after.” He is continuing a war characterized by unnecessary massacres, leaving the US and the world speculating on scenarios for the day after, without offering any hint on the matter himself.
Netanyahu’s policy, his notable disregard for the significance of Sinwar’s elimination, and his adherence to the generals’ plan—beginning with an assault on Jabalia—practically mean that Gaza, with or without Sinwar, with or without the US elections, with or without a decisive outcome on the northern front or a settlement there, and with or without recovering hostages, will remain a pawn in his quest for absolute victory. This quest is fundamentally driven by his desire to remain in power for life and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu views the harsh reality of the ongoing war on two main fronts and the potential extension of the conflict to Iran differently than others do. He perceives any indication of flexibility—especially in terms of a ceasefire—as a retreat that would harm both his strategic plans and his standing in Israel, where he is seen as the central commander of what some call an “apocalyptic war” that was initially dubbed “Iron Swords.”
According to Netanyahu’s calculations and strategy, he sees no reason to back down as long as both Democrats and Republicans in the United States are competing to align with his vision. His approach can be summed up in his view: “If the Democrats stay in power, no harm done; if the Republicans come to power, all the better.”
