It is true that the recent ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon is a replica of agreements made over the past forty years, all of which failed to prevent subsequent wars. However, this war and this agreement differ from previous ones, and we might witness its implementations starting next year. In my opinion, this will change the concept of conflict through Lebanon.
The important question: What is new and different about this agreement?
It is not about Iranian concessions or weakening Hezbollah, as most assessments speculate. Instead, the changed factor this time is Israel itself.
The October 7 attack last year changed Israel’s deterrence concept to preventing the presence of potential threats in its immediate geographical vicinity. Israel considered that attack an existential threat, prompting a reconsideration of border coexistence with hostile groups. For this reason, it decided to eliminate Hamas, weaken Hezbollah’s power, and prevent both organizations from threatening the existence of the Jewish state.
The characteristics of the current war – its size, type, and the statements of strategic leaders – indicate that Israel has changed its policy from “mowing the grass” to “uprooting it.” Previously, it allowed Hezbollah and Hamas to grow their capabilities and then waged wars to destroy them. This cycle of confrontations would end with temporary truce agreements. In this confrontation, Israel has made significant progress toward its goals. Hamas has practically ended and may only return as a civilian entity if it returns at all. In eight weeks, Israel has eliminated Hezbollah’s leadership and much of its arsenal. However, the group still stands, albeit limping on one leg, and will seek to rebuild its destroyed capabilities and replace its decimated cadres, as it has done in past wars.
What is new is that Israel states its determination to uproot Hezbollah, and the agreement does not prevent it from doing so. It authorizes Israel to intervene and operate in Lebanon’s airspace. It includes explicit conditions for monitoring border crossings, preventing rearmament, and obliging the Lebanese government to dismantle what remains of Hezbollah’s factories and weapons depots. Furthermore, the group, through the Lebanese government, agreed to have the Americans oversee the implementation of these commitments.
This agreement is different in that it will enable the targeting of Iranian funding operations and rearmament efforts and will justify pursuits across the Iranian corridor through Syria and Iraq.
Israel’s argument is that the Lebanese state, which was previously tasked with these responsibilities, is too weak to uproot Hezbollah, a group deeply rooted and spread across the country both militarily and as civilians. Hezbollah is present in the army, security forces, municipal councils, banks, the airport, the government, and parliament. We remember how Hezbollah forced Lebanese factions to amend the Taif Agreement by inventing the blocking third mechanism in its favor, making one-third more important than two-thirds. This gave Hezbollah the final say in choosing the president, prime minister, and army chief.
Can Israel truly eliminate Hezbollah’s capabilities amid a regional conflict that also involves major powers indirectly?
Israel has proven to be a devastating regional military power capable of waging and winning long and multiple wars. It previously dismantled the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon, diminished Syria’s influence there, and this time surprised Hezbollah and its supporting forces with its decisive superiority. It will be difficult for Hezbollah to return as a regional player threatening Israel under the current balance of power. However, the path to stripping Hezbollah of its power is not only through disarming it but also through dismantling its influence, which will require additional rounds of confrontation.
