Mustafa Fahs
TT

Expanding the Mechanism… Has Lebanon Avoided Escalation?

Lebanese people - especially southerners - tied their anxiety about the possibility of war to the period following the visit of Pope Leo XIV, assuming that the countdown would begin once he departed. Some residents of the South and the southern suburbs began preparing to relocate beyond what was presumed to be the perimeter of Israeli operations.

A relatively affluent segment of southerners and suburb residents rented homes in places considered safe or unlikely to be bombed; the majority, however, remained at the mercy of Israeli threats and the escalation that precedes any confrontation - serving as a warning to evacuate. The state is incapable of meeting their displacement needs, and the “Hezbollah–Amal duo” does not have the resources to cover the costs of their departure. They have become targets of an enemy planning collective punishment, and hostages of the “duo,” which dominates them in a game of bargaining to preserve its influence.

Just when everyone began a countdown to an explosion, confrontation, invasion, or escalation, the state played a winning card: it appointed former ambassador Simon Karam as the first civilian member of the Mechanism Committee. A decision the Lebanese differed in interpreting.

Naturally, Hezbollah would consider it submission to US and Israeli will, and its media outlets would take on the task of accusing and demonizing the man. Yet the party overlooked that the appointment came after coordination among the three presidencies, meaning that the party’s partner in authority and arms - Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, or the “older brother,” as the party’s secretary-general once called him - approved the expansion of the Mechanism and the name selected. Notably, the grassroots of the Amal Movement, like those of the party, did not comment on the matter.

Within the Mechanism, whether military or civilian, there are no signs of a peace agreement, no joining of the Abraham Accords, and no normalization. This was quickly clarified by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in his response to Netanyahu’s comments about an economic track.

Instead, there is a new strategic reality in the region after October 7, 2023, as the Israeli enemy has succeeded in achieving most of its objectives and now has an even more dangerous set of goals it seeks to pursue. Netanyahu’s project is to continue the war under the pretext of eliminating the demographic threat along his entity’s northern border. This means preventing the return of residents south of the Litani River to their villages, and even disrupting life in areas north of the river, turning part of them into buffer zones. If negotiations are capable, even partially, of preventing or delaying a potential war and ensuring the return of southerners, then this is a national interest, regardless of names or political calculations.

In the modern Syrian model, the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa conducted direct security negotiations with the Israeli side. Al-Sharaa refused to concede a single inch of Syrian land and made the negotiations public after they had been secret since 1974. This shift into the open, coordinated with Washington, embarrassed Tel Aviv in its relationship with the White House, prompting Thomas Barrack, the US special envoy to Syria, to publicly criticize certain Israeli actions in Syria.

In the past, the secret relationship between Damascus and Tel Aviv provided the Assad family with Israeli cover in exchange for their surrender of the Golan. Today, however, public negotiations and Damascus’ insistence on its rights threaten the stability of its new regime. For the Syrian government - despite all its weakness - remains committed to a fair, comprehensive settlement beginning with the occupied Golan and ending with the two-state solution.

Lebanon, in a weaker position than Syria, is required to uphold the armistice line, reclaim all its land, solidify the ceasefire, and restrict weapons to the state. Nothing more. Anything beyond that relates to a collective Arab decision and national interest.

As for the “stubborn” Simon Karam, he is certainly more committed to Lebanese national interests than those who negotiated the maritime border and surrendered strategically valuable, resource-rich areas to the enemy under the pretext of power balances, while the truth was domestic political gains. And Simon Karam, “the southerner,” is not seeking office; first, because he previously walked away from the whole system entirely, and second, because he needs no one to instruct him or remind him of the southerners’ right to return to their land.

As for accusations of treason, those who use that language would do better to feel shame and remain silent. As the saying goes: “The worm that destroys the vinegar comes from within.” In his integrity and national commitment, he has all he needs to confront his interlocutors, and to resign if matters conflict with his national convictions.