Although only one week has passed since the outbreak of the large-scale war, the imbalance in the balance of power is already undermining the capabilities of Iran’s regime, which had long refused to give up these capabilities through negotiations. The outcome is largely expected, despite Iran’s extensive counterpropaganda.
From an analytical perspective, the early results can be viewed as a success in containing the Iranian threat, even if they fall short of a complete victory. At the same time, however, the regime itself remains intact. Current assessments suggest the fighting could end within a few weeks, perhaps even sooner if the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), which effectively controls decision-making in Tehran, accepts a form of “partial surrender” that allows the system to survive.
So far, the signs of what comes after the war do not suggest that the regime is on the verge of collapse, either through internal unrest or external pressure.
That may mean the world will have to accept living with a weakened but still functioning regime. This recalls the “Safwan tent” scenario, when Iraq signed its surrender after its defeat in Kuwait and the destruction of much of its military. Saddam Hussein’s regime remained in power for another 12 years before it was finally removed in 2003. A similar pattern may now be unfolding.
The early conclusion, based on available military analyses, is that the existential threat Iran once posed to the region through its arsenal has effectively been neutralized.
Last week’s war, brief as it was, demonstrated clearly that the regime had both the plans and the capability to devastate the Gulf region.
Its attacks targeted more than ten countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Jordan and Iraq. Although the regime claimed its strikes were directed at military targets, in reality many of them hit civilian sites, including ports, airports, hotels and residential neighborhoods.
Iran built these capabilities with the aim of dominating the region. Tehran’s strategy of developing destructive capacities capable of paralyzing or even toppling neighboring states was never a secret. The question was always when “zero hour” would arrive, perhaps after the regime achieved nuclear deterrence, which would have granted Tehran protection from international military intervention.
From this perspective, the collapse of what could be described as Iran’s “weapons empire” represents an extremely significant political development, one that will have far-reaching consequences.
Iran’s plan to project itself as a dominant military power and a source of danger to its neighbors is now being dismantled. In the coming weeks, estimates suggest that the remaining elements of Iran’s weapons arsenal, along with its factories and military institutions built over three decades, will be destroyed. This could grant the region a reprieve from Iranian threats for perhaps a decade, assuming a negative “Saddam scenario,” in which a weakened but surviving regime attempts to rebuild its capabilities.
Another possibility, however, is that Tehran itself may change, either through a transformation of the regime or its policies, becoming a more normal state focused on development and regional cooperation.
The human and material losses suffered by our countries are painful. The Iranian people themselves are also at the heart of the war and are the most exposed to destruction, largely because of what the regime has done to them and to the region.
Even so, the cost of the war may ultimately be manageable.
Stripping the regime of its military claws would represent a historic achievement of enormous significance. It would serve the interests of the region, including the Iranian people themselves, whose country’s resources had long been diverted toward military ambitions.
What remains uncertain is what comes next in Tehran. Even after the elimination of many senior Iranian leaders, it may not be possible to impose a “friendly regime,” as Washington might hope. No internal Iranian forces have yet emerged willing to support the restoration of the Shah, nor are there signs of divisions within the military establishment, which for now appears loyal and disciplined.
Today the regime in Tehran is facing the most dangerous crisis in its history and is struggling to survive. The outcome of this difficult transition remains uncertain. So far, however, there is no opposition force on the ground capable of challenging the wounded regime. Nor has a broad popular movement emerged that could attract members of the military establishment and trigger widespread defections. Some believe it is only a matter of time before local forces move against the weakened regime, but without support from elements within the military, meaningful change remains unlikely. History offers a comparison: after Iraq’s defeat in Kuwait, despite major military campaigns and a decade of suffocating sanctions, neither internal Iraqi uprisings nor external opposition groups succeeded in toppling Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, the United States removed him by force, deploying roughly a quarter of a million troops with international support. A similar invasion scenario is unlikely to be repeated in Iran for several reasons.
In light of this, the United States may find itself with limited options, the most prominent being to deal with whoever emerges from within the existing system to take power. Washington possesses the military leverage that could allow it to impose its conditions if it chooses to work with the new reality. The White House has previously indicated that it would be willing to cooperate, under its terms, with leaders who emerge from within the regime itself.
Regardless of whether the current regime survives or a successor emerges from within it, Iran’s ability to threaten the region will have been largely eliminated by the end of the war, and its regional tools of influence will likely disappear.
The destruction of Iran as a dominant regional power marks the beginning of a new and significant chapter, the consequences of which will be discussed later.
