Between Aoun's insistence on the state monopolizing arms and Hezbollah reverting back to its position on maintaining its arms, reproducing its previous taboos and reiterating the notorious threat “to cut off the hand that reaches for the weapons,” Lebanon (its state, people, sectarian and political parties) face two opposing challenges. Indeed, the state seeks to align itself with a new regional order and strictly enforce its political and strategic rules, particularly those concerning the state’s monopoly on “the means of violence.” On the other hand, political and sectarian forces that had long relied on their outsized power and foreign backing to place themselves “above the state” are seeking to preserve their privileges.
Hezbollah was the most extreme model of these ideological armed groups, both within Lebanon and beyond, in terms of its role and influence. However the party has suffered a military, strategic, and social blow that has recalibrated the domestic balance of power in Lebanon, as seen in the terms of the ceasefire with Israel following the “support war.”
Nonetheless, Hezbollah seeks to liberate itself from previous commitments and has begun linking its future to the negotiations in Muscat between Washington and Tehran, which will determine how much regional influence the latter retain as it trades proxies’ arms for shares of influence, for itself or subordinates who fall into its sphere of influence, wherever they may be. In this sense, the Lebanese question could be considered ground zero for an Iranian-American understanding.
In fact, Lebanon, as a state and society, is dealing with two opposing camps. The first considers confining arms to the state a national responsibility needed to spare Lebanon as a whole, not just those who insist on holding onto the weapons, potentially exorbitant costs. The second camp, however, refuses to separate “arms from ideology;” it sees its arsenal as the only safeguard of a particular sectarian or ideological group. It has even begun tying its arsenal to mystical beliefs; one of Hezbollah’s intellectuals, for instance, has said that the party’s weapons would be maintained until the reappearance of the Mahdi.
Since the “support war,” Hezbollah has prioritized safeguarding two things: its support base and what remains of its arms. It is trying to weave sharp domestic discourse that links the two and frames them as mutually dependent. This discourse seeks to remilitarize the ideological identity of its base, which has shaped the ideological identity of the Shiite sect as a whole, allowing Hezbollah to draw a line around both its weapons and its domestic role.
In the Southern conscience, these weapons are the “weapons of resistance” that liberated their land, deterred the enemy, and “pushed fear from South Lebanon to the North (i.e., occupied Palestine).” As a result, defending Hezbollah’s arsenal became synonymous with defending this resistance, and defending Hezbollah became defending the sect... However, that changed when the deterrence assumption collapsed after the support war. Fear returned to the South and beyond, and extreme military power turned into extreme suffering; most Shiites found themselves trapped in a harsher dilemma amid “fear for the weapons” and “fear of the weapons.”
The questions that have imposed themselves after the “support war,” then, are the following. Has Hezbollah failed the test of arms, disappointing its own base, sect, and supporters first and foremost, and the rest of the Lebanese, whether opponents or critics, second? Has this conflict proved that its deterrence or “balance of terror” vis-à-vis the enemy had been an illusion? For decades, Hezbollah and its propaganda machine had constantly boasted of “keeping the enemy on its toes” for years, but that same enemy is pressing forward with its assault: from South Lebanon to the northern Bekaa, passing through Beirut’s southern suburbs, with nothing standing in its way.
Caught between “fear for the weapons” and “fear of the weapons,” the party, as well as its community, sect, and supporters, are in turmoil following their loss of dominance. No one has the power to deter Israel’s hubris and crimes. Survival is not enough to declare victory, and the narrative that Israel failed in its ground incursion does not restore deterrence.
Accordingly, in Hezbollah’s current discourse and new narratives, there are early attempts to once again tie the sect to its position, its strength, and “the arsenal.” This effort is the gravest threat facing the push to rebuild the state, and it is just as dangerous to the Shiite sect itself, whose role, partnership, and weight are being presented as determined solely by this question. Meanwhile, these weapons now seem to be facing a difficult test whose costs might be even more difficult.
