Confusion in Baghdad comes in many forms—political, economic, electoral, both domestic and foreign. The Shiite political house has splintered into multiple factions; its roof is full of cracks and its walls crumbling, within which contradictions gather—moderates, ideologues, and armed factions alike. They are confused about themselves and their choices. Once united by mutual interest, they are now likely to be divided by the coming elections. Their current state of confusion is complex—ranging from tensions within their own ranks to uncertainty over parliamentary elections, all against the backdrop of growing anxiety about a political system that speaks in broad terms but lacks clear direction.
The outlook in Baghdad today is foggy. For some, it hinges on the outcome of US-Iran negotiations—positive or negative, either way, change is inevitable. For others, it’s about internal rivalries within the largest political bloc, and the contradictions between the government, the Prime Minister, and his former allies turned into future adversaries. That, perhaps, is where the heart of the story—and the problem—lies.
On the regional front, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is clearly aware of the shifting dynamics across the region and the world, especially how US-Iran talks might affect Iraq. He is doing his best to shield Iraq from their fallout. Despite mounting criticism, he views building ties with a “new Syria” as a political and security necessity. A stable Damascus means a stable Baghdad—and vice versa. It’s also an opportunity for geo-economic cooperation that could open new horizons for regional integration—not just between Iraq and Syria, but also with Lebanon and Jordan. If successful, Iraq could transform into an economic and investment hub by fostering synergy between resource-rich countries, transit nations, and re-export centers like Lebanon.
From the aftermath of October 7, 2023, to the Muscat talks, and through the shifts in Syria and Lebanon, we are witnessing regional transformations no actor in Baghdad can afford to ignore. These changes call for a fresh approach to relationships—between Baghdad and Damascus, Beirut, Tehran, and Washington.
The “confusion about al-Sudani, and through al-Sudani” is now out in the open. It’s part of a long-running saga that dates back to the formation of the post-2003 political order, particularly the complex relationship between the system’s founding powers and the office of the prime minister. That office has long been weakened, subject to the grip of dominant political forces and their alliances. These forces boxed the prime minister into a mold and established an unwritten rule of a single, non-renewable term. They are quick to turn against him if he crosses their red lines or starts to assert himself as a central political actor.
There is a clear and growing rift between al-Sudani and some key figures in the Shiite political establishment—within the Coordination Framework and among the original architects of the post-2003 system. This rift has become increasingly public—not only because of his outreach to Syria’s new leadership and his more flexible regional and international posture, which contrasts with the Framework’s rigid approach—but also because of his decision to contest the next parliamentary elections. To many, this signals his intention to build a new political force that could propel him to a second term. He is laying the groundwork through internal stability, which his government has leveraged into economic and service-based gains. This has improved his public standing, especially in comparison to the failures of previous governments.
As Iraq moves toward its next parliamentary elections in October, many alliances are falling apart—not just for al-Sudani, but across the entire Coordination Framework. Elections have divided them, and it’s unlikely that the results will bring them back together as they once were. These factions, all emerging from the broader Shiite political house, resist the idea of al-Sudani becoming a strong, independent figure. Meanwhile, those pushing for generational change have failed to downsize the founding powers, which are clearly showing signs of wear—both structurally and in their leadership. Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains a powerful and unyielding figure, both within and beyond the Framework. Together with the leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, they remain the most influential duo within the Shiite bloc.
The question now is: can al-Sudani succeed in ending this long-standing duopoly?
