Will it be just another round, or will it be greater and more dangerous than that? Is it the end of the war or the end of an era? Will it be a violent passing storm or a deadly earthquake that is enough to change features? Is it true that the approaching fleets are seeking to end half a century of a period in the Middle East and open a new chapter? Is it true that the world has grown tired of “resistance”, enrichment, tunnels and small armies, and preparing to return maps to governments and legitimate armies? These are questions that are being pondered in Tehran and at the heart of the Hezbollah command in Lebanon.
The 1970s were a very eventful time in Beirut. The Lebanese University campus was the stage for communists, Nasserites, nationalists and phalangists. The Islamists didn’t have much of a presence. The country was boiling. The weak republic was hosting an armed dream that was beyond its ability to contain. The world became preoccupied with Yasser Arafat, who turned southern Lebanon into a platform to launch rockets at Israel to remind the world of the injustice against his people.
At the beginning of that decade, Walid Jumblatt was a student at the American University of Beirut. At the same university was Samir Geagea, who was observing how the authority of the state withered against the armed factions. A man named Rafik al-Hariri was in Saudi Arabia where he was consolidating the pillars of his financial empire.
At the Lebanese University, there was a student who was not lured by the proposals of the left and leftists and the speeches of Mohsen Ibrahim and George Hawi. He admired Imam Moussa al-Sadr and the speeches of Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. That student was called Naim Qassem. He was born in 1953, a year after Geagea was born, four after Jumblatt and nine after Hariri.
Fates would play their part. Kamal Jumblatt’s assassination would summon his son Walid to politics, party leadership and the war. The war summoned Geagea to the war, politics and leadership. Peace summoned Hariri, but he was assassinated after he tried to rescue Lebanon from its captors.
Qassem took the Amal movement route after he was attracted to the dream of defending the deprived. Two developments will change the future of the chemistry teacher: the Iranian revolution and the ideas it pumped into the region and Shiite groups; and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Islamist groups came together in wake of the invasion to establish a new entity called Hezbollah. During that time, Qassem worked with Hassan Nasrallah, Imad Mughnieh and others. The new entity was born with Iran’s direct sponsorship and help from Hafez al-Assad, who chose to align himself with Khomeini’s revolution for too many reasons to list here.
The 1980s would bring about change in Lebanon. A suicide bomber blew himself up at the Marine headquarters in Beirut in 1983, killing over 200 people. The US army consequently packed up and left the country. The American embassy in Beirut was also dealt a heavy blow. It became obvious that Khomeini’s Iran chose Lebanon to implement an article in its constitution on exporting the revolution. Under Nasrallah, Hezbollah started its upward trajectory, especially after Israel withdrew its forces from southern Lebanon in 2000 at no cost.
Hezbollah became the number one player in Lebanon. It chose presidents and named governments. It then became a regional player by sending its fighters to Syria and saving Bashar al-Assad's regime. It also left its mark in Yemen and Iraq.
Qassem knows the entire story. He has been a partner from the start. He assumed the role of deputy secretary-general in 1991 and fate would summon him to the top post after the assassination of Nasrallah and Hashem Safieddine. Fate summoned him during the most trying times. He is confronted with several pressing questions. What will Hezbollah do if Donald Trump ordered the fleets to launch new strikes against the Iranian regime? Can the party remain on the sidelines if the regime started to crack under the strikes? Moreover, the attacks may summon Israeli strikes if Iran acted on its threats and chose to retaliate to the US by attacking the Jewish state.
Qassem is aware that his party today is not in the same shape it was before the launch of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. His capabilities have been weakened and the situation in Lebanon and the region is different. Qassem knows that other Lebanese segments oppose Hezbollah joining the battle, especially after they were vocal in rejecting the “support war” that Nasrallah declared in wake of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation. Hezbollah’s former allies have distanced themselves from it, and head of the Free Patriotic Movement Gebran Bassil washed his hands clean of the alliance that helped expand his bloc in parliament.
Qassem knows that the scene has changed. He knows that Joseph Aoun did not become president because of Hezbollah as was the case with his predecessor Michel Aoun. The latter entered the presidency riding the Hezbollah horse after other parties reluctantly agreed to his election in order to end a presidential vacuum that had stretched on for too long.
Qassem also knows that Assad’s Syria, which had been a route for its rockets and provided it with a strategic depth, is now Sharaa’s Syria, which is a wall blocking Qasem Soleimani’s route and surrounding Hezbollah inside Lebanon. He certainly knows that the international demand for Iran to return to the confines of its borders without a nuclear arsenal and regional proxies also demands that Hezbollah return to the “Lebanese house” without its arsenal.
Qassem is mulling difficult options. The relationship with the Wilayet al-Faqih is vital and organic and their fates are connected. However, the balance of power is vastly not in its favor, and the Lebanese people are living at the mercy of Israeli drones and their daily violations. Can Hezbollah survive the storm of the American-Iranian confrontation if it happens? Can it close the chapter on its arsenal and return to the “Lebanese house”, relying solely on its representation among its supporters? Can the Hezbollah secretary-general play a normal political role in line with the Taif Accord the way Jumblatt, Geagea and others did before him?
