How can we read the Saudi position? Without resorting to the common formulas of American international relations literature, especially the concept of “hedging,” promoted by magazines, such as Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, and now almost every analysis, what is its historical context? Hedging is a concept associated with small states, and Saudi Arabia is not one of them.
Here, I propose another concept: “defensive neutrality,” to explain the Kingdom’s approach during the recent US-Israel war on Iran. International relations scholarship usually focuses its attention on states that won wars or were defeated in them, not placing the same focus on states that had succeeded in avoiding war in the first place. Historians go over the battles of military decisions, but they often overlook a state’s success in preventing its territory from becoming a conflict arena. In my view, that success is a strategic achievement in its own right.
Defensive neutrality is not moral neutrality between the warring parties, nor does it mean that a country has withdrawn into oneself or gone into strategic dormancy, as some see it. Rather, it is a policy founded on a simple principle: avoiding engagement in the war while retaining the full capacity to defend the homeland if the flames do reach it.
Türkiye and Sweden might offer two insightful examples of this.
On September 1, 1939, World War II broke out and Türkiye found itself in an extremely complex geopolitical position. Nazi Germany was expanding in Europe, the Soviet Union’s forces stood at the border, and Britain was exerting great pressure to push Ankara into joining the war. In January 1943, Winston Churchill himself traveled to Türkiye to persuade its leadership to enter on the side of the Allies. But Türkiye refused.
This was not out of sympathy for Germany, but out of an understanding that Türkiye's national priority was to avoid the destruction that swept across Europe. Ankara continued its policy of balancing between the warring parties and maneuvered diplomatically between Berlin, London, and Moscow.
In April 1944, it halted chromium exports to Germany, then severed diplomatic relations with Germany in August of the same year, when it had become clear that the war was close to ending. In February 1945, it formally declared war on Germany without its army actually taking part in the fighting.
The result was clear: Türkiye emerged from the war with its infrastructure intact, its institutions standing, and its economy in viable shape, while large swaths of Europe lay in ruins. Sweden’s experience, meanwhile, was more complicated.
In April 1940, Germany invaded Norway and Denmark, and Sweden was all but surrounded by German forces. It had two choices: direct confrontation with an overwhelmingly superior military power or the pursuit of a flexible policy of defensive neutrality. It chose the second option.
In June 1940, it allowed the passage of some German troops and goods through its territory, then in 1941 approved the transit of German forces heading to Finland. The ethics of these concessions later became a major controversy, but they were part of a strategy aimed at avoiding the invasion of the country.
As the balance of power shifted and its defensive capabilities improved, Stockholm - as it was receiving thousands of refugees from Denmark and Norway - began to retreat from those arrangements. In 1943, it halted the passage of German troops and gradually moved toward supporting the Allies’ humanitarian and intelligence efforts. Most importantly, it succeeded in sparing its territory from the war for six years.
The lesson from Türkiye and Sweden is not that neutrality is easy or free of moral contradictions, but that a state situated among conflicting powers may make the protection of society and the state its top priority. The Saudi position today can be understood from this angle.
The Kingdom lies at the heart of a region where regional and international conflicts intersect. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is implementing a major historical project to rebuild its economy and society through Vision 2030. In such circumstances, safeguarding domestic stability and cities, ports, airports, and energy networks becomes a pillar of national security.
Accordingly, the concept of “hedging” does not seem sufficient to explain Saudi behavior. Hedging refers to an effort to balance risk among multiple partners in an uncertain environment. What we have witnessed, on the other hand, is more an integrated strategy whose aim is to avoid involvement in the war while retaining the capacity for deterrence and defense.
This is the essence of defensive neutrality.
It does not mean abandoning allies or ignoring risks; it means refusing to turn national territory into a platform for other people’s wars.
Türkiye proved between 1939 and 1945 that a state can survive the greatest war in history if it manages its geographic position well. Sweden proved that staying away from war can become a strategic achievement in itself.
Perhaps Saudi Arabia is adding a new example to this historical experience: that the greatest victories are sometimes not achieved on the battlefield but through the efforts to prevent war from reaching the homeland in the first place.
