Washington continues to forcefully push "official" Lebanon toward normalization with Israel, through a process premised on direct negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, effectively without conditions or guarantees.
This pressure is intensifying despite the absence of any signs of "good faith" from the Israeli side, which has killed around 325 Lebanese citizens since the announcement of a largely meaningless "truce," while accelerating bombardment, destruction, and displacement across southern and southeastern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Lebanon is deeply divided, regrettably, along two clear lines:
The first sees no alternative but to engage in direct, unconditional negotiations with Israel, not only because of the stark military imbalance between the two sides, but also because Washington, under its current administration, is the sole effective external sponsor.
The second argues that what the United States seeks is not negotiations aimed at producing mutually beneficial arrangements, but rather the formal entrenchment of Israeli dominance, granting Israel, on a silver platter, everything it wants within Lebanon, as well as in its waters and surrounding environment.
The camp advocating negotiations, largely aligned with the first position, includes a significant proportion of Christians, echoing the "scenario" of 1982, when Israeli forces, under Menachem Begin and the military command of Ariel Sharon, occupied half of Lebanon and reached the capital, Beirut.
At the time, as today, that Israeli war enjoyed US backing, most notably from President Ronald Reagan, then leader of the Republican right, much like current President Donald Trump, along with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Ambassador Philip Habib, the special presidential envoy of Lebanese origin.
In 1982, Palestinian guerrilla organizations and their Lebanese leftist allies constituted the shared "enemy" of both Begin and Reagan. The Israeli invasion did, in fact, albeit temporarily, achieve two major objectives:
First, it broke the military capacity of Palestinian guerrilla organizations and pushed them out of Lebanon.
Second, it enabled the election of a Lebanese president willing to enter direct peace negotiations, culminating in the May 17, 1983 agreement, which both Tel Aviv and Washington expected to lead to full normalization with Israel.
These objectives were only partially realized before both Tel Aviv and Washington lost the ability to control events in the longer term. Lebanese "calculations" and "equations" forced even those who had bet on the Israeli "racehorse" to reckon with the importance of the Arab hinterland, and to recognize its role in sustaining any governing formula in Lebanon’s multi-sectarian system.
While it is true that a majority of Christians supported the May Agreement at the time, contrary to what the "hawks" of Christian normalization with Tel Aviv had anticipated, the leaders of that majority failed to secure a corresponding majority among Muslims.
Cracks quickly emerged, enabling shifts and realignments, compounded by Lebanon’s departure, traditionally grounded in consensus, from the May Agreement into a clear "winner and loser" dynamic.
In reality, under conditions of demographic pluralism, such an imbalance was never sustainable, particularly given that multiple actors stood to benefit from exploiting the fragility of the temporary dominance produced by the 1982 war.
To begin with, there was the "Syrian factor," reflected in the relationships between the regime of Hafez al-Assad and Lebanese factions, as well as remnants of Palestinian organizations. In this context, a member of one such group was accused of assassinating President-elect Bachir Gemayel, whose selection had been endorsed by Washington, particularly by Philip Habib.
There were also voices of restraint within Christian communities that opposed a complete rupture with the Arab hinterland and rejected placing "all eggs in the Israeli basket."
In addition, the relocation of armed Christian groups to Druze-majority areas in southern Mount Lebanon, and the abuses committed by some against local residents, triggered an unforeseen but decisive factor. These actions provoked Druze communities across Lebanon and even within Israel, where Druze figures exerted pressure on senior Israeli officials, including cabinet ministers, as well as among Druze serving in the Israeli military. The outcome was Druze control over southern Mount Lebanon. Soon after, Sunni communities regained their footing, while the Damascus–Tehran axis consolidated its grip over Shiite-majority areas in eastern and southern Lebanon.
Today, despite many similarities, including the roles of figures such as Philip Habib and Michel Issa, the situation is unlikely to be an exact replica of 1982 and its aftermath.
However, if grave miscalculations are made before and after the "US-imposed" negotiations, the consequences for Lebanon and the wider region could be severe.
In my view, Lebanon’s fragile condition cannot withstand a civil war further fueled by Israeli settler extremism.
Nor will the broader Shiite landscape across the Middle East remain passive in the face of a major US war against Iran, the repercussions of which are already unfolding.
Above all, there is reason to fear for Arab solidarity if reckless gambles continue, gambles that threaten the survival of existing states, fracture national cohesion, destroy prospects for economic growth, and leave the Arab world exposed to deepening animosities amid escalating conspiracies and great power competition over its remnants.
