Eyad Abu Shakra
TT

The Lebanese State: The Biggest Absentee from the Scene

Yesterday, Israel rejected Lebanon’s request for a ceasefire during the period of direct negotiations currently underway in the US capital, Washington.

With this position, Israel clearly has no fear whatsoever of provoking American anger. That is because the nature of US-Israeli relations differs fundamentally from Washington’s ties with any other “allied” state. Consequently, only the most naïve observers - or those inclined toward denial - can still believe that Washington is a neutral sponsor of the current negotiating process.

At the same time, the negotiations are unfolding against the backdrop of two major developments:

First, the expansion of Israeli military operations - in both destruction and displacement - under the pretext of uprooting Hezbollah’s infrastructure, together with the political turmoil, sectarian incitement, and economic devastation these operations are inflicting on Lebanon internally. This is precisely what the Israeli right seeks as part of its partitionist and fragmentation project for the Arab East.

Second, the reshaping of the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel amid rapid shifts in Washington’s international and regional relations, as well as in Israeli military doctrine.

Yesterday, Asharq Al-Awsat published a valuable contribution from our correspondent in occupied Palestine, quoting reserve General Amos Yadlin as saying that there is a “deepening crisis in American public opinion toward Israel. One immediately senses the emergence of an anti-Israel front that brings together the progressive left in the Democratic Party and the isolationist camp within the Republican Party. The younger the demographic groups, the wider this phenomenon spreads, extending even to some moderates in both parties. This trend is becoming more acute in light of the unprecedented security cooperation between the two countries in the war against Iran, and Israel’s major and influential contribution to the joint military operations.”

Yadlin - together with Avner Golov, founder and director of the organization “MIND Israel” -believes that despite the high regard for the Israeli military because of its “partnership” in the war alongside the US military against Iran, an anti-Israel front is nevertheless taking shape within both American parties, outside the security establishment and President Donald Trump’s inner circle. This front portrays Israel as having “dragged” the American president into a regional conflict in pursuit of its ambitions through military force. Therefore, the two men argue that Israel must offer Washington “not merely another relationship based primarily on security interests or historical commitments, but a partnership that provides direct strategic value to the shared interests of both countries.”

Accordingly, the two men call on Israel to strengthen a new model for its relationship with Washington - one “not limited to receiving aid, but encompassing partnership” - particularly in the fields of technology, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, energy, and biomaterials.

Important in this context is the enormous growth in American acquisitions, as well as joint development and manufacturing programs between giant US corporations and Israeli startup companies excelling in various AI-based surveillance and sensing applications. By way of example alone, it is enough to point to Apple’s massive investments in Israel, where the company maintains in the city of Herzliya its second-largest research and manufacturing facilities in the world.

Conversely - while continuing the discussion of Tel Aviv’s relationship with Washington - an Israeli researcher critical of his government’s policies pointed out yesterday that Israeli authorities are uneasy about being “excluded” from the talks Washington is conducting with Tehran. As a result, Israel is attempting to influence those talks “from the outside.” The researcher then listed several reasons for this unease:

First, Israel fears that any agreement between Washington and Tehran may stop at securing a ceasefire and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, without resolving what remains the top priority for Tel Aviv: Iran’s nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Second, Benjamin Netanyahu doubts the sincerity of Washington’s repeated assurances that no agreement on the nuclear issue will be reached without eliminating any threat posed by Tehran. Here, Israel believes the goal should be the destruction of the nuclear facilities and the transfer of enriched materials outside Iran’s borders. Yet there remains a wide gap between what Israel seeks and what is actually being proposed. Netanyahu therefore fears that Israeli elections may arrive before that gap is bridged.

Third, regarding Lebanon, it is entirely clear that Israel, in order to strengthen and entrench its political position, continues to “create an occupation reality” on the ground that it can exploit should it be forced to accept a deal. Otherwise, it will continue sabotaging every opportunity for an understanding.

Fourth, and related to the above, Israel fears that any Iranian agreement with Washington could lead to the release of frozen Iranian funds estimated at around $25 billion. Its concerns are heightened by the possibility that the released funds could reach Tehran’s allies and “proxies” in the region - especially since Iranian negotiators insist that their talks include a ceasefire in Lebanon and preventing Israel from striking Hezbollah, which would further strengthen the party’s already close relationship with Tehran.

Meanwhile, Lebanon’s social, economic, and political crises continue to deepen. In the face of Israel’s insistence on displacement and occupation, and Hezbollah’s reliance on its regional alliances, official paralysis, popular division, and the scramble by certain power-hungry politicians for foreign backing are becoming ever more evident.