Today, Iran clings to one thing: preserving some of its geopolitical gains in the Arab region. Will it succeed in negotiations after failing in war? It seeks to control Iraq and preserve Hezbollah in Lebanon, having lost Syria and being on the verge of losing the Houthis in Yemen. It hopes that negotiations with the US administration will help preserve its extensive realm as much as possible.
No state has succeeded in imposing such widespread hegemony in the Arab region, using both hard and soft power, as Iran did over three decades until the October 7, 2023 attack occurred.
Nasserism's intellectual and military reach swept through various parts of the region, but it failed to plant proxies, establish governments, and control vast geopolitical areas. Cairo's influence over Syria, in the name of unity, lasted only three years before it was ousted in the first coup. Iranian influence, however, has been extensive, long-lasting, and backed by military force, unparalleled in the region since the decline of the British Crown's presence.
Tehran had advanced far in its expansion, reaching the borders of Türkiye and the waters of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
In current negotiations, it seeks to preserve most of the expansion it achieved. Recent events have revealed the costly price of the October 7 operation. By losing the Assad regime in Syria, it no longer has a corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Its strategic balance with Türkiye has weakened, and it has lost two fronts overlooking Israel: southern Lebanon and western Syria.
Tehran's empire was built on propaganda and weapons and cultivated a generation of Arabs, some of whom believed in the revolution and its image of resistance against the West and Zionism. But for the second time, as Al-Mutanabbi said: The sword conveys truer tidings than books.' And just as happened to Nasserist expansion, which extended north to Syria, south to Yemen, east to Kuwait, and west to Libya, Israeli power has crippled its Iranian rival and continues to push it back regionally.
This expansion would have led to a clash with Israel, which the events of October 7 accelerated, putting all proposals to the test. Iran was not a paper tiger but a heavily armed fortress ruled by the Revolutionary Guard from behind the Ayatollahs. However, it was not a military match for Israel and its ally America. Its military resilience was higher than expected. In aggression, thousands of missile and drone attacks on its enemy Israel did not achieve significant goals.
Its strategists succeeded in compensating for what they failed to achieve in confronting attacks by adopting an equally impactful plan. Closing the Strait of Hormuz became a high-pressure card. Hormuz was not the surprise, but rather Iran's widespread attacks on the Gulf and taking its states hostage. These states skillfully avoid becoming a battlefield and accept some losses, realizing that matters are out of control. It is better for Saudi Arabia and its sisters to leave the battle to be settled between the three powers, and whatever the results, it remains better for them than fighting the battle.
Hezbollah, which once threatened the region, is now fighting for survival. Israel, which was not satisfied with President Trump's truce and the negotiation process, opened the southern Lebanon front, seized all Hezbollah strongholds, crossed the Litani River, and threatens Tyre, perhaps even intending to march to Beirut.
More than one hundred days have passed since the start of the war and two months since the truce, and Iran has exhausted most of its cards. Trump's blockade on Tehran's ports deprived it of its highest daily revenue in four decades.
From the course of the war and its aftermath, we sense that Tehran does not wish to resume fighting. Even the ten missiles it launched at northern Israel for a few hours were a propaganda announcement and came to reinforce this hypothesis.
The regime weaves around itself an image of an invincible regional power, hoping to achieve through negotiations what it failed to achieve through military force.
Its endurance of losses, its targeting of less defended areas, and its recent attack on Israel are all theatrical displays. What worries everyone is that the US administration might fall into Iran's traps and grant it in negotiations more than 24 billion and lift the blockade, in addition to overlooking its ballistic missile system and regional proxies, which means that the probability of future confrontations with Iran is almost certain.
