The US-Iran memorandum of understanding to halt the war and reaffirm the sixty-day ceasefire, with half of that period devoted to a transitional phase aimed at addressing outstanding, difficult, and highly complex issues, places at its center, without doubt, the nuclear file, which served as the detonator of the crisis that escalated into war.
A range of competing and contradictory settlement proposals is currently being discussed. One calls for zero uranium enrichment, with a regional joint-enrichment arrangement as an alternative. Iran rejects this option and continues to insist on its right to enrich uranium domestically up to the 3.67 percent level recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Another contentious issue concerns the future of Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level that leaves Tehran only a short distance from what is commonly described as the "nuclear threshold"- 90 percent enrichment.
Questions remain over whether this stockpile should be destroyed or transferred to a friendly country, as Iran has suggested. Washington opposes the latter option, while disagreement persists over which third party, if any, could host a quantity of enriched uranium that would otherwise allow Iran to enter the nuclear club within a relatively short period. This remains a red line for the United States and, even more so, for Israel, which seeks to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the region.
Other proposals include a suspension of Iranian enrichment activities for fifteen or twenty years. All of these ideas are on the negotiating table, alongside Tehran's demand for the full and unconditional release of Iranian funds. According to Iran, such a step could open the door to a gradual normalization of US-Iran relations, particularly in the economic sphere. Ballistic missiles and the role of what Washington describes as Iran's regional "proxies" are also among the issues the United States has placed on the negotiating agenda.
The inclusion of the "Lebanese card" in the understanding, through Tehran's insistence on a ceasefire in the Lebanese theater of confrontation, both in its direct military dimension and in the broader proxy struggle for regional influence, formed a central component of the agreement, with Washington's approval. The question now is whether the United States can compel Israel to fully respect this aspect of the memorandum, which would undoubtedly help reduce tensions and perhaps succeed in ending the ongoing war, an outcome that would be beneficial for Lebanon.
It also constitutes an Iranian message about linking the various conflict tracks, though this does not necessarily mean that Iran will ultimately be able to sustain such linkage indefinitely or wield the same level of influence over the management of conflict, de-escalation, and eventual settlement.
A ceasefire is more than necessary for Lebanon, but it is not sufficient, particularly if it settles into an open-ended timeframe while any prospect of a political settlement remains blocked or absent. Such a situation could gradually evolve into an unwritten understanding- one governed by what are commonly known as rules of engagement- taking shape over time amid the severe challenges Lebanon has faced since before the war. Those conditions have worsened catastrophically during the conflict, compounded by the presence of more than one million displaced people.
Such an arrangement would amount to a de facto understanding in the absence of a genuine political solution. It would carry the risk of contained tensions and limited confrontations, both geographically and militarily, potentially confined to areas south of the Litani River.
With the cessation of hostilities, or the sixty-day truce, which may be extended, agreed upon to allow negotiations on the difficult issues outlined above to continue, and with some describing the truce as little more than a warrior's respite before the conflict is reignited, Arab and international support for Lebanon becomes more necessary than ever.
Lebanon must use the climate created by this understanding to advance what I would describe as a negotiating roadmap. Such a roadmap should begin by ensuring a complete ceasefire, rather than one applied selectively, arbitrarily, or at Israel's discretion. It should also establish a clear transitional negotiating framework based on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, the release of prisoners, and the full deployment of the Lebanese Army throughout the area up to Lebanon's internationally recognized borders.
The roadmap should reaffirm the 1949 Armistice Agreement as the governing reference framework and work to strengthen and reactivate it. As has often been emphasized, that agreement was originally drawn along Lebanon's internationally recognized borders. It should also address the formal demarcation of the frontier, given the existence of a limited number of disputed points, reportedly no more than six or seven.
As for peace, that discussion can only come after Lebanon has restored its sovereignty over the remaining occupied territories and disputed points, within the framework of its commitment to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative in all its components.
