It is only natural to feel indignation and anger toward an enemy like Israel, which in recent years has known nothing but killing, destruction, and blocking any prospects for peace.
However, two issues have become highly pressing, even if they appear distinct. The first is the vacillation between information and opinion. The second is militias and their weapons, which have become detrimental to both human life and the built environment.
In the conflict between information and opinion, it is observable that media and communication outlets report dozens of pieces of information about a single event within minutes. Analysts then repeat this information without offering a clear conclusion or an opinion that advocates for change, except perhaps occasionally suggesting that strikes will increase.
The most prominent case in this context is Iranian aggression against Arab states. With the exception of a few observers, who are mostly non-Arabs, speakers and writers merely list the facts, and if they add anything at all, it is to predict the worst. Their justification for this restraint is that deciding what should be done is the prerogative of states, not individuals. One analyst even remarked: "I said something and was told: 'Stop philosophizing; we know best what we are doing, and you do not possess sufficient information!'"
Information does not only address the event and its immediate damage, but also covers capabilities and the potential for a response. Therefore, we as Arabs have no excuse for restraint or neutrality, because a well-considered opinion in one direction or another will not provoke anyone's objection, whether it is acted upon or not.
It is well-known that all Arabs did not want a war between the United States and Iran. Amid Trump's recent intention to launch a major attack, Arab and Islamic nations, led by Saudi Arabia, appeared opposed to it, preferring to resort to negotiations for three reasons: first, the aggressiveness of the Iranian response and its specific targeting of Arabs; second, the destruction inflicted upon facilities and human life in Iran and other countries; and third, Iran's return to deploying militias to breach the security of Arab states.
Avoiding the escalation of conflicts with partners like Trump and Israel, whose actions are intertwined with blackmail and deals, is a positive step and a move with strategic dimensions. However, within this context, this major issue warrants collective and consultative reflection among specialists and interested parties. What is required now is the development of collective policies that are not limited to attempting to ward off harm from adversaries or allies. These policies should draw upon long-standing experiences with the US and Iran, as well as leverage the soft power of the Gulf states.
The Gulf nations do not only possess influence derived from energy ownership, but also from strategic alliances, ownership of institutions within Arab and Islamic domestic spheres and worldwide, and the fact that nearly 40 million people from around the globe work within them. Critical and urgent reflection on all these matters would be highly beneficial if undertaken for the long term. In this case, there is no difference between an official actor and a researcher in think tanks and institutions exploring alternatives.
The other matter is the weapons of militias in Gaza, Iraq, and Lebanon. In these three locations, and perhaps elsewhere, efforts are underway to disarm militias in order to save states and entities. A militia is an infiltration that is difficult to resolve, whether in terms of its weapons, political influence, or seized institutions.
In Trump’s comprehensive agreement for Gaza, approval was granted to disarm Hamas and the other brigades. However, Hamas subsequently refused unless the Israelis withdraw from Gaza, while the Israelis assert that disarming Hamas must precede any withdrawal. Without endorsing Israel’s claims, what use do Hamas's weapons serve after the slaughter and genocide? Furthermore, is it in the best interest of Gaza for Hamas itself to remain? This organization bears partial responsibility for the war of annihilation, and as the saying goes: "If you have no shame, do as you wish."
Hamas itself should step away from the scene after the defeat, but this is the nature of militias, whether they claim an ideological doctrine or are a political organization that lost in battle.
As for the Iraqi militias, which have had no function since 2018 other than looting, plundering, and seizing assets, the Iranians have returned to utilizing them against neighboring countries. This is not their first aggression; tens of thousands of them killed and looted in Assad's Syria before they fled in 2024.
These groups operate against the state, despite receiving salaries from it. They have ceased to be of any use following the defeat of ISIS. However, weapons have brought them wealth and influence, and now the Revolutionary Guard has tasked them with aggression.
The Iraqi government wants to remove them, but can it?
The third problem is with Hezbollah, which is clashing with the Lebanese government that seeks to disarm it. Having provoked Israel last time, Israel occupied and destroyed dozens of towns and hundreds of villages, and displaced the population. Hezbollah reproaches the government for negotiating with Israel after its defeat: yet, with whom else should it negotiate? And what is the need for its weapons, most of which has been destroyed, and is no longer fit for liberation nor for justification?
It is a choice between either states or the militias working for Iran, which also include the Houthis in Yemen. They must be dismantled urgently so they do not fabricate a new battle for survival.
