It has been nearly three weeks since the American-Iranian memorandum of understanding, and nothing in the course of the ongoing negotiations suggests that a final agreement is within reach. That brings the future of this negotiating track back into focus once the sixty-day period the memorandum set for negotiating an agreement expires. If that deadline can be extended indefinitely, and if the cost of withdrawing from the negotiations is, in practice, a return to war, will the memorandum of understanding become the agreement itself de facto?
Such a possibility would only deepen anxiety, particularly among regional partners, even if some continue to hope that Washington will reconsider some of its concessions in a way that eases those concerns.
There is growing momentum behind strengthening regional defenses and diversifying trade corridors away from traditional chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. This will likely accelerate investment in armaments and infrastructure development.
The consequences of extending negotiating deadlines without a defined time horizon go beyond the negotiations themselves, affecting a range of far more sensitive issues.
The memorandum stipulates that the Strait of Hormuz is to remain open for sixty days, with freedom of navigation guaranteed for ships without transit fees. After that period expires, Iran is to begin discussions with the Sultanate of Oman and the Gulf states on the management of the strait and "maritime services." Such an arrangement would cement an unprecedented role for Tehran in administering this strategic passage, opening the door to redefining the governance of international sea lanes according to regional balances of power rather than the international rules governing maritime navigation—a dangerous precedent.
Moreover, the memorandum does not provide for the disposal of Iran's current stockpile of highly enriched uranium. It merely refers to the possibility of reducing its enrichment level inside Iran, with monitoring of the process to be entrusted to one or more parties yet to be determined.
Nor does the memorandum address the ballistic missile program, a matter Iran insists is not open to negotiation in the first place. Likewise, the activities of Iran's proxies in the region were not simply left off the negotiating agenda. The memorandum's first clause links the handling of the issues it covers to a ceasefire in Lebanon and Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory, thereby providing protection for Hezbollah.
Washington's acceptance of linking negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz and the other issues to Lebanon is a strategic mistake. Tehran's priority is not protecting Lebanon but rescuing Hezbollah. If American officials genuinely want to protect the Lebanese government and preserve any hope of restoring the state's sovereignty, they must not yield to the Iranian demand that addressing the issues set out in the memorandum be made conditional on maintaining the ceasefire in Lebanon. Under the Iranian approach, this condition effectively means ending the war, giving Hezbollah the opportunity to rebuild its capabilities instead of being disarmed, while pressure mounts for an Israeli withdrawal.
To avoid all these scenarios, the United States will have to use the instruments of pressure that both President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance have repeatedly said remain available to Washington. Yet Trump himself has, through his repeated public statements, sent contradictory signals that undermine the credibility of using those instruments.
The Trump administration's approach appears to rest on the assumption that Iran's desire for economic integration could transform it into a different kind of state. Yet that assumption overlooks the deeply entrenched nature of the regime's ideology and self-image. While many observers believe sanctions relief would benefit the Iranian people, the more likely outcome is that those gains would remain limited, because a large share of the funds would be directed toward priorities determined by the regime, particularly after emerging from the war more hardline and more confident.
Domestically, hardliners categorically reject the memorandum of understanding, while some reformists view it as a victory over America. By contrast, Iranians opposed to the regime believe the memorandum has let them down and that they are its biggest losers.
Ultimately, the memorandum of understanding may not lead to a final agreement. Instead, it could become the agreement itself, entrenching a lasting new regional balance of power in Tehran's favor without any genuine settlement.
The potential trigger for renewed escalation remains Israel's continued military operations in Lebanon. Tehran has warned that these would constitute a violation of the ceasefire and could lead to a new round of reciprocal missile strikes.
