Syria rejected the United States' request that Damascus intervene in Lebanon to confront Hezbollah. President Ahmed al-Sharaa expressed this refusal, affirming Syria's commitment to civil peace in Lebanon, wishing the Lebanese people well, and hoping that Lebanon's relationship with Syria would be at its best.
Much of the praise for the new Syrian leadership's position has centered on the logic of prudence, the refusal of revenge, magnanimity in the moment of power, and the other virtues many have attributed to the new order. The truth is that the larger and more important aspect of Syria's position toward Hezbollah is that it was guided by the calculations of a head of state, not the leader of an organization. Had Ahmed al-Sharaa still been leading Jabhat al-Nusra or Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and had the opportunity arisen to retaliate against Hezbollah for its crimes in Syria, he might well have done so, because his calculations would have been those of the leader of an armed organization, not those of a head of state.
Imagine that, before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham had been presented with an opportunity to retaliate against Hezbollah on its own turf in response to what it had done in Syria, and that regional circumstances had allowed it to seize that opportunity. It would most likely have acted without much hesitation. The calculations of an armed organization are grounded in revenge, retribution, and the pursuit of victories, regardless of the price ordinary people pay or any collateral consequences or catastrophic outcomes of such an intervention, just as Hezbollah and Iran did in Syria, where they lost a large popular base of support.
Jabhat al-Nusra acted according to the logic of an armed organization when it intervened in Lebanon, specifically in Qalamoun in 2014, in response to Hezbollah's intervention in support of the Syrian regime. It did so despite the difficult circumstances, the strength of the opposing side, and the Lebanese army's support for Hezbollah at the time. Nevertheless, it entered into confrontations inside Lebanon, took soldiers captive, and answered crimes with crimes of its own.
That is why the current situation is so striking and so clearly revealing: the balance of power favors Syria's new leadership, Hezbollah and Iran are in a weakened position, there is a Lebanese constituency that supports any move capable of breaking the power of Hezbollah's weapons, and there is a green light, indeed, incitement, and perhaps American pressure, for Damascus to move against what remains of Hezbollah's arsenal. Yet the Syrian president's refusal was categorical because he understands the price that both Syria and Lebanon would pay for such an intervention, however tempting it might be.
In truth, al-Sharaa's position does not stem only, or even primarily, from his having reconsidered some of his ideas and put forward new ones that differ from those prevailing within political Islamist movements. Rather, it stems from the fact that he has become the president of a state with a popular base, seeking to build institutions rather than militias built on revenge and retribution.
The calculations of a prudent and rational state, even one whose institutions are still under construction, place national interests and the interests of its people above every other consideration. Whether to make concessions or refuse them on any political issue, whether it concerns Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, or even Israel, is determined by the country's supreme interests, not by ready-made ideological formulas or a recipe for revenge that ignores the costs of any battle or confrontation with a rival or an enemy.
Therefore, we should not be surprised that the calculations of an armed organization, whether it is called Hezbollah, Jabhat al-Nusra, or anything else, remain governed by the organization's own cause, its interests, and the interests of its allies. No rational state can ignore the consequences of entering an armed confrontation for its people, as Hezbollah did when it brushed aside the judgment of its partners in the homeland, who rejected the "war of support" for Gaza because it harmed Lebanon without benefiting Gaza, and who rejected the "war of support" for Iran because it defended another state at the expense of the homeland and its people.
Perhaps if Hezbollah tried to understand the logic of the state, however weak that state may be, and even tried to learn from Iran itself, not from anyone else, it would recognize that people chanted before the war, "Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life for Iran." And if it tried to "Lebanonize" that slogan, it would understand that the majority of Lebanese who rejected a war for Iran's sake are not agents of Israel. They reject the logic of an armed organization deciding, in place of the state, to wage wars at home and abroad. They reject an organization that recognizes no rights for individuals, treats their concerns and lives with contempt, and regards them as sacrifices to be made in pursuit of the organization's objectives. Had it sought to become part of the project of rebuilding the state, it would have respected its partners in the homeland even while disagreeing with them, and it would not have led them into the flames for the sake of another state.
