However which way one reads the visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Beirut, it restored Lebanese-Syrian relations to their normal course and remains a step of great importance- provided the relationship rests on cooperation and coordination between two independent states. This was no ordinary diplomatic pitstop. It came at an exceptionally sensitive regional moment, amid increasing discussion of new arrangements concerning Lebanon's future and Hezbollah's place in the regional balance of power.
Shaibani's statements about Damascus's readiness to help address the Hezbollah question cannot be understood in isolation from the positions voiced by US President Donald Trump, who has said more than once that Syria should play a role in this matter.
Damascus appears eager to present itself as a partner in building stability rather than an extension of the former era. It understands that a return to the Lebanese arena cannot be accomplished by the old methods, and it is therefore seeking to put its geographic position, its renewed Arab and international engagement, and its intimate knowledge of Lebanese affairs to work in restoring its regional role and entrenching its presence in the region's emerging security and political arrangements.
American reliance on Syria in dealing with Hezbollah, in turn, reflects a shift in Washington's approach. The United States appears to have moved from managing the war to managing its consequences. In the American reading, Israel succeeded in degrading Hezbollah's military capabilities without eliminating its political and social power. Washington is therefore leaning toward a political approach that reshapes Hezbollah’s base rather than pursuing military means alone.
In the background, Washington also appears to be encouraging expanded economic cooperation between Iraq and Syria as a way of reintegrating Damascus into its Arab surroundings, and of gradually weaning both countries off the Iranian axis. This would, in time, have implications for their political and regional alignments.
Türkiye's position, by contrast, reflects concern that these arrangements could redraw the map of influence in the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean in ways that marginalize Ankara, whether through a new Syrian role or through a US-Iranian understanding that alters the region's balance of power.
Where does Lebanon stand amid this flurry of activity? From Washington to Tehran, by way of Damascus, Ankara, and Tel Aviv, everyone is discussing Lebanon's future. Lebanon’s voice remains absent from the process of shaping it. This is not merely a political irony; it is a genuine crisis of sovereignty that turns the Lebanese state into an arena where the interests of others intersect, rendering Lebanon once again the consolation prize of other parties' settlements. State-building, meanwhile, remains a distant objective, and sovereignty negotiable rather than the starting point of any settlement.
The threat is no longer confined to the substance of any agreement; it extends to the logic governing it. When Lebanon is reduced to Hezbollah within US-Iranian understandings, or when security arrangements with Israel are tied to reshaping the Lebanese reality, the issue goes the resolution of a security crisis and raises a question about the very nature of the state.
The conflict is no longer solely about Hezbollah's arms. It is also a conflict between two conceptions of the state: one in which the state alone holds the power of decision, exercises sovereignty, and has the right to use force; and another in which state institutions and de facto powers share sovereignty.
When settlements are built around arrangements that bypass the state's authority, when unofficial actors are treated as part of the mechanism for implementing agreements, or when a foreign state is licensed to intervene militarily, the discussion stops being about restoring sovereignty and becomes about delineating it.
Sovereignty, then, is no longer the foundation on which settlements are built. It has become merely one of their terms that is subject to negotiation and redefinition with every new crisis.
It is true that Lebanon's internal divisions invite external powers to intervene to facilitate settlements. There is a fundamental difference, however, between international support for a sovereign Lebanese decision and a situation in which Lebanon's future is determined by arrangements drawn up beyond its borders and then handed to it for implementation.
Imposed settlements may ease tensions for a time, but they build neither a stable state nor sustainable sovereignty.
The real challenge remains changing the perception of Lebanon as an arena for managing regional balances. Lebanon must be neither within Iran’s sphere of influence nor a security zone Israel invokes to justify its interventions or a bargaining chip in regional and international deals.
Restoring sovereignty does not begin with ending security crises alone. It begins with affirming a simple principle: Lebanese decisions must be made first and foremost in Beirut, not in regional and international capitals, and not as a reflection of balances of power beyond the country's borders.
