To begin with, it can be said that had it not been for the readiness of the Gulf Cooperation Council Customs Union, as a product of Gulf integration efforts, the exchange of customs information among member states would not have been as efficient as it was.
This efficiency enabled the launch of an exceptional temporary logistics transit mechanism, which played a key role in accelerating the movement of goods and ensuring their smooth passage, particularly food and medical supplies that were prioritized to move unobstructed among GCC countries.
Had there not been such a high degree of coordination in procedures and unified customs efforts, GCC states would not have possessed this level of preparedness to deal with emergency circumstances and maintain the continuity of trade flows and supply chains under conditions like those our region recently experienced, specifically the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
It is true that ambitions extend far beyond this. It is also true that when the GCC was established 45 years ago, its primary purpose was defensive, aimed at filling the security vacuum left by the expiration of security agreements between some Gulf states and Britain.
However, it was the evolution of the concept of security that broadened the Council’s areas of concern, and it was the member states’ response to this evolving concept that preserved stability during this critical stage of our history and significantly reduced its repercussions.
Military threats are no longer the only security challenges facing the region. The concept of security has expanded to encompass food security, pharmaceutical security, energy security, the security of supply and logistics chains, information security, and intelligence sharing.
These sectors are no less important, and any disruption or lack of coordination in them creates a collective rather than an individual risk for GCC countries. In other words, such threats can be just as serious as any military threat to the region, as the current situation has demonstrated.
Fortunately, we witnessed how effective these forms of integration were in preventing, or at least mitigating, many of the negative consequences and risks that the war posed to the peoples of the region. During the conflict, the GCC Customs Union Authority and other institutions performed a role that deserves recognition and praise.
Essential goods, particularly food and medicine, would not have reached Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates when the Strait was closed, especially during the early days, had shipments not been redirected from those countries’ ports to Saudi Arabia’s western ports. Without the preparedness of the Customs Union Authority, which facilitated the rerouting, unloading, and overland transportation of shipments, food and medical supplies in the Gulf states would not have remained stable. Indeed, Gulf citizens never experienced shortages of essential goods, and prices remained steady.
Such readiness could not have succeeded under such emergency circumstances had it not been the result of decades of sustained and diligent work.
This is only one example of the efforts that have yielded such significant benefits for the peoples of the GCC. One can only imagine the impact of Gulf security integration in safeguarding the region’s internal frontlines.
It is fair to say that, had it not been for the GCC, the effects of this war on the peoples of the Gulf states would have been far greater.
