In Lebanon's long-running debate over neutrality, the question often begins from the outside: Can Lebanon be neutral in a region engulfed in conflict? And can a small state situated at the center of intertwined regional and international conflicts distance itself from competing axes?
But perhaps the more important question is entirely different: Does Lebanon, first and foremost, have a state capable of making the decision to adopt neutrality? This idea was at the heart of my intervention during the workshop on neutrality organized by Saint Joseph University at the Philip Salem Center for Lebanese Political Studies on July 29 and 30, 2026.
Neutrality is not merely a foreign policy choice, nor is it a slogan that can be raised in response to Lebanon's internal divisions. Above all, it is a matter connected to the very nature of the state: sovereignty, unity of decision-making, and the ability of institutions to determine strategic choices and implement them.
Lebanon's problem has never been its relations with the outside world. No state can live in isolation, and Lebanon, by virtue of its geography, history, and economic nature, needs a broad network of Arab and international relations. The problem begins when foreign relations turn into political and security alignments that make the country part of conflicts beyond its capacity. At that point, Lebanon is no longer a state managing its relations with others. Instead, it becomes a space where the relations and conflicts of others are managed on its soil. This is precisely where neutrality acquires its true meaning.
Neutrality does not mean that Lebanon must have no position, abandon its Arab identity, remain silent in the face of wars, or shirk its humanitarian and moral responsibilities. A neutral state can condemn aggression, support international law and the right of peoples to self-determination, and participate in diplomatic and humanitarian efforts. There is, indeed, a difference between taking a moral position and participating in war.
A state can speak for what it believes in and defend, through diplomatic means, the principles it considers just, without becoming a military party to the conflicts of others. This is the essential distinction between moral neutrality and political neutrality: neutrality does not mean abandoning principles.
From here emerges the idea of "positive and active neutrality," not as a withdrawal from the world, but as a different way of engaging with it. Such neutrality is based on respecting Lebanon's Arab and international commitments, refusing to turn its territory into an arena for conflict, and establishing the state as the sole authority over sovereign decisions, particularly on matters of security and foreign policy. The problem, however, is that neutrality cannot come into being through an administrative decision or a political speech.
The experiences of states that have chosen neutrality confirm that this option requires more than a declaration. It requires strong institutions, domestic consensus, and a foreign policy capable of securing recognition and respect from abroad. Neutrality is not a gift bestowed by major powers on small states. It is the result of a state's ability to protect its position and convince others that respecting its neutrality serves stability. This is where the Lebanese challenge reveals its true dimensions.
Lebanon is not an island isolated from the region. It lies at the heart of conflicts in which the calculations of Israel, Iran, Türkiye, the United States, and other powers intersect. Each of these powers has its own interests and its own view of Lebanon. Therefore, declaring neutrality from within is not enough if Lebanon remains weak and incapable of asserting its sovereignty, or unable to speak to the world with one voice. When centers of power multiply, so does decision-making. Strategic decisions then become divided between official institutions and other forces, leaving sovereignty itself incomplete. This is why the statement that captures the essence of the debate is clear: a state that does not monopolize the decision of war cannot monopolize the decision of peace, and therefore cannot monopolize the decision of neutrality.
Restoring the state's exclusive authority over decision-making is not an issue that concerns one political camp against another. It is the first condition for establishing a modern state. The decision of war and peace is not merely a security decision. It is the decision most closely tied to the fate of society and the future of the state. Naturally, it should be made by institutions that represent the collective national will and legitimacy.
In this context, it is also necessary to reconsider the concept of national security. Security is not simply a matter of the number of soldiers and weapons. It also means protecting society, the economy, and political stability. For Lebanon in particular, it means having the ability to prevent its territory from becoming an arena for the wars of others.
Small states cannot alter the balance of power in the world, but they can manage their vulnerabilities intelligently, reduce the cost of the conflicts surrounding them, and turn their geographic position from a source of threat into a source of value.
For this reason, in this approach, neutrality is not a sign of weakness. It may instead be one of the strongest political choices, because it presupposes a state that knows its interests, sets its priorities, and has the ability to withstand pressures that push it into conflicts that do not serve it. True protection does not come from seeking shelter abroad, but from building a state in which every citizen feels that the law protects them as it protects everyone else, and that the state belongs not to a sect, group, or party, but serves as a common framework for all.
Therefore, neutrality is not the starting point of the Lebanese crisis. It is the result. It cannot substitute for reform, nor is it a magic formula for addressing weak institutions, internal divisions, and multiple centers of power. Before Lebanon asks whether it can declare neutrality, it must ask itself whether it is capable of building the state that would make such neutrality viable and sustainable.
Here Lebanon faces two choices: either it remains a territory over which the projects of others intersect, with its fate managed according to the calculations of regional and international powers, or it reclaims its position as a state that determines its own interests and shapes its foreign policy according to its national priorities. Neutrality is not Lebanon's abandonment of its role. In reality, it is the recovery of that role.
